Since 1974, two out of every five constitutions (40.3%) were prepared via processes that included public consultation. The reasons for adopting these participatory mechanisms, however, are largely unexplored. I argue that public consultation is a tool for elite contestation of power. Introducing an original dataset of public consultations in constitution-making processes from 1974–2021 (n = 300), I find that in democracies, factional majorities and newcomer elites use public consultation to legitimate a break from the status quo. In autocracies, governing coalitions that depend on performance and enjoy greater party institutionalization push for public consultation to preserve favorable power-sharing arrangements.

Oral argument is the most public and visible part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision-making process. Yet what if some advocates are treated differently before the Court solely because of aspects of their identity? In this work, we leverage a causal inference framework to quantify the effect of an advocate’s gender on interruptions of advocates at both the Court-level and the justice-level. Examining nearly four decades of U.S. Supreme Court oral argument transcript data, we identify a clear and consistent gender effect that dwarfs other influences on justice interruption behavior, with female advocates interrupted more frequently than male advocates.

Federal law clerks play a vital role in the development and implementation of the law. Yet, women remain underrepresented in these positions. We suggest that one reason for this underrepresentation may be differences in hiring practices among judges in the federal judiciary. Specifically, we hypothesize that male judges and conservative judges may be less likely to hire female law clerks than female judges and liberal judges for two reasons. First, gendered attitudes held by judges may make some judges prone to hire women and/or others more resistant to these hires. Second, due to ideological asymmetries between the law clerk pool and judges in the federal judiciary, conservative judges and male judges may be less likely to hire women law clerks. Using data on clerks hired in the federal judiciary between 1995 and 2005, we find support for both mechanisms.1

Why would authoritarian rulers allow for an independent judiciary that could constrain their power? This study extends the insurance theory of judicial independence to autocratic contexts, arguing that when leaders perceive a higher risk of losing office, they become more likely to tolerate or create independent courts as a safeguard against potential post-exit reprisals. Using a novel two-stage analytical approach, I construct a hazard rate for each country year from the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic regime dataset, based on factors directly observable to autocratic leaders. This hazard rate serves as a proxy for perceived risk of losing power. My findings provide robust evidence that higher perceived risk is significantly associated with greater judicial independence in autocratic regimes, even when controlling for economic development, regime longevity, and court age. This research offers crucial insights into autocratic governance, demonstrating that promoting judicial independence can be a calculated strategy for regime survival rather than merely a democratic concession.

We analyze a cache of tweets from partisan users concerning the confirmation hearings of Justices Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Using these original data, we investigate how Twitter users with partisan leanings interact with judicial nominations and confirmations. We find that these users tend to exhibit behavior consistent with offline partisan dynamics. Our analysis reveals that Democrats and Republicans express distinct emotional responses based on the alignment of nominees with their respective parties. Additionally, our study highlights the active participation of partisans in promoting politically charged topics throughout the confirmation process, starting from the vacancy stage.

The article at hand introduces a comprehensive foundational database on the Czech Constitutional Court spanning from its inception in 1993 to 2023. The database includes metadata on all decisions, full-text corpus, and additional background data on judges and law clerks, filling a gap in high-quality datasets for empirical legal research in the Central and Eastern European regions. As one of the first comprehensive court databases in the CEE region, it has the potential to catalyze similar research efforts and contribute to methodologically rigorous empirical legal research in a region of increasing European significance.

How might constitution-makers write “transformative constitutions”? Scholars and policymakers have looked to constitutional design as a mechanism for societal change, for example, promoting democracy, equality, and social rights. In these efforts, accountability has most often been limited to government actors. Yet, constitution-makers are increasingly introducing the “horizontal” application of rights, a potent tool for transformation whereby private actors also gain constitutional rights obligations. We argue that a key predictive element in introducing this mechanism is a meeting of the minds in constitution-making processes, where interests and mutual commitments from a broad cross-section of society are expressed at the negotiating table. We test our theory, employing cross-national data concerning the adoption of horizontal application over time, and examples from specific countries’ experiences. Our findings support our theory, suggesting that powerful articulation of interests by expert professionals in inclusive processes is a significant factor in reshaping citizen duties and, thus, transforming society.

Do constituents care how judges are chosen? We conduct two nationally representative survey experiments focusing on state trial courts. Our first study indicates that respondents prefer judges who are elected to those who are appointed, though this does not affect their perceptions of the judiciary’s legitimacy. Our second study explores three potential mechanisms: efficacy, experience with democracy, and perceived ideological proximity. We find evidence that real-world experience with judicial elections is associated with a preference for such elections, but we do not find evidence for other mechanisms. Our study offers important new evidence for assessing proposed reforms to judicial selection.

Attention to ideological polarization in the Circuit Courts of Appeals has surged in recent years. However, no valid cross-circuit cardinal measure of polarization has been established. The lack of a valid cross-circuit measure of polarization has limited scholar’s ability to evaluate broad trends in judicial polarization and address how ideological polarization influences judicial decision-making. To address this, I develop a new measure of ideological polarization for each of the Circuit Courts of Appeals between 1953 and 2022 using the polarization framework established by Esteban and Ray (1994). I then theorize that in order to uphold the norms of collegiality, more polarized courts are likely to take strategic actions to avoid breaking consensus. I show that polarized courts deliberate longer before releasing opinions, are less likely to give cases with a full hearing, and are less likely to publish justified and signed opinions. These results have implications for the efficiency, efficacy, and authority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Students of comparative law have long argued that undermining judicial independence is electorally costly, and that the norms against interference uphold institutional checks and balances essential to constitutionalism. However, evidence from countries with robust judiciaries suggests that exposing voters to deficiencies in the legal process or the courts’ partisan leanings can reduce perceptions of judicial legitimacy, making such interference on part of would-be authoritarians more likely. The rise of populist politicians poses additional risks: by emphasizing judges’ unelected status and counter-majoritarian tendencies, populists may erode legitimacy, framing judges as part of a “corrupt elite” opposing “the people.” This rhetoric challenges liberal-democratic norms that limit state interference with individual rights. To test whether one observes the effects of partisanship and procedural fairness on voters’ perceptions of the courts outside the US context, and whether populist messages produce comparable effects, a pre-registered survey experiment is conducted in the context of Czechia, a country that, until recently, has had both a populist executive and a strong and independent Constitutional Court. The study presented respondents with vignettes describing an important electoral ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court, embedding messages that highlighted judges’ unelected status, the ruling’s procedural irregularities, or its partisan implications. Contrary to expectations, findings show no significant effects of any message type on perceptions of judicial legitimacy. The results of the study suggest that the marginalization of robust judiciaries in backsliding democracies may be a largely elite-driven institutional process, with uncertain electoral payoffs.

Awareness of courts has long been theorized to engender enhanced support for judicial independence, but this is a logic that works only under the best of circumstances. We argue that interbranch politics influences what aware citizens know and learn about their court, and we theorize how awareness interacts with individual-level and context-dependent factors to bolster public endorsement of judicial independence in previously unappreciated ways. We fielded surveys in the United States (US), Germany, Poland, and Hungary, countries which diverge in the extent to which the environments are hospitable or hostile to high courts, and whose publics vary greatly in both their awareness of courts and perceptions of executive influence with the judiciary. We suggest that in hospitable contexts, awareness correlates with support for judicial independence, but said association depends on perceptions of executive influence. In hostile contexts where executive interference is common, more aware citizens are more apt to perceive this meddling, and although it might undermine trust in the judicial authority, it does not diminish their demand for judicial independence. Together, these findings underscore that public awareness and support for judicial independence are greatly informed by the political environment in which high courts reside.

Under what conditions are people more likely to support judicial invalidation of legislative acts? We theorize that constitutional recency confers greater democratic legitimacy on constitutional provisions, reducing concerns that judges may use dated language to impose their own will on a living majority. Exploiting differences among US state constitutions, we show in a pre-registered vignette experiment and conjoint analysis that Americans are more supportive of judicial review and original intent interpretation when presented with a younger constitutional provision or constitution. These results imply that Americans might alter their approach to the US Constitution if it were changed as easily and as often as a typical state constitution.

The majority opinion of the Supreme Court establishes precedent, but separate opinion writing affords the justices the ability to expound upon it or express their disagreement with the ruling or its logic. We broaden the exploration of separate opinion writing to consider how decisions and case features at the moment of granting cert shape justices’ decisions to engage in nonconsensual behavior. We also sharpen the focus on external actors to consider the nature of amici curiae. Through an empirical study of Supreme Court cases between 1986 and 1993, we find that aspects of the agenda-setting stage affect justices’ decisions at the litigation stage. In addition, we find that the number of briefs and the diversity of organized interests impacted by the case is particularly relevant to justices. The decision to write a separate opinion is the product of internal and external factors over the full course of a case’s history.

International courts are increasingly serving as bulwarks of democracy. These courts, however, often depend on the cooperation of the very governments they seek to hold accountable, exposing them to potential retaliation for attempting to constrain their behavior. As governments’ response to adverse decision-making is often conditional on public support, we explore whether citizens actually support international courts’ judicial power over questions of democracy. We argue that citizens’ support for this form of judicial power depends on their democratic values and their desire for institutional checks and balances against the executive. Furthermore, we contest that this support is conditional on partisanship, with this relationship holding for opposition partisans while government partisans are generally opposed to international courts’ judicial power. We support our expectations using original survey data collected from Hungary before their 2022 national legislative elections, and examining citizens’ support for judicial power for the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The number of women on high courts across the globe has been steadily increasing. Recent estimates found that women now make up 61% of the judiciary in European countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2019). The large number of women now serving in judicial positions has resulted in a changing demographic makeup of courts. While the majority might think this is a step forward for diverse representation, there is ultimately a dichotomy between judicial accountability that comes as a result of increased diversity in descriptive representation and judicial independence. Given this dichotomy, along with the increase in women on courts, it follows that the public’s perceptions of courts’ independence has the potential to change. We explore this phenomenon by asking the following question: How does the presence of women on high courts impact perceptions of judicial independence among the public? Using survey data gathered from respondents in twenty-seven European countries from 2016 to 2022, we examine how the dynamics of an increasing number of women on high courts alters the public’s perceptions on the level of independence of the court in their country. We draw from literature on judicial independence as well as women political elites and corruption. Importantly, we document that increasing the percentage of women on courts results in higher perceptions of judicial independence for women. Overall, our findings highlight important trends regarding gender diversity in political institutions and how changes in descriptive characteristics shape perceptions of judicial independence.

The US Supreme Court follows a fixed weekly schedule, with specific days assigned for tasks. Oral arguments – held on select Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays – are the only public part of the Court’s decision-making process. We argue that news outlets consider the Court’s schedule when deciding which arguments to cover. To test this, we analyze media coverage of oral arguments from the 2019, 2020, and 2021 terms. Our findings reveal a notable disparity, with Monday arguments receiving the most coverage. This highlights the influence of the Court’s schedule on media attention, shaping public awareness, and the perceived importance of cases.

We study the value of foreign judges and foreign case citations for emerging courts in postcolonial democracies, with a specific focus on the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeals (HKCFA). The HKCFA, Hong Kong’s highest appellate court since the transfer of its sovereignty to China, features foreign judges as full members of the court. Using a novel dataset of all publicly available HKCFA decisions from 1997 to 2020, we show that there is a significantly higher number of foreign case citations in cases where foreign judges have participated. Further analyses show that this correlation is stronger where the Hong Kong government is a disputing party, and more specifically, where the court rules in favor of the Hong Kong government. The findings are consistent with the possibility that foreign judges’ expertise in foreign case law is relevant for upholding the perception of the court’s independence from the executive branch. This explanation is in line with existing theories on the role of foreign judges on domestic courts.

Much of the research on public trust in courts focuses on countries with strong rule of law traditions and clear judicial norms. Less is known about such attitudes in young democracies with developing judicial institutions. To address this, we examine public confidence in Ghana’s court system. Ghana’s courts have faced various scandals, from judges’ personal conduct to separation of power conflicts. Using Afrobarometer data, we evaluate public attitudes toward Ghana’s courts. We find that Ghanaians generally have low trust in their courts, with factors such as partisanship, education, standard of living, and gender strongly influencing trust.

Black legal theorists often believe White Americans see Black judges as incapable of deciding racial issues fairly. Using a survey experiment, we examine this by studying perceptions of Black and White judges’ fairness through racial threat and group consciousness. Results show race consistently influences Black Americans’ evaluations of judges, with Black respondents viewing Black judges as fairer on racial issues. For White respondents, race only affects their views of judges in the context of racial resentment, otherwise playing no significant role. These results highlight the complex interplay of race in judicial evaluations.

How can citizens in authoritarian regimes exercise oversight of the legal system? I examine police and court monitoring, bottom-up oversight activities popular in pre-war Russia (2012–2022). Monitoring pushes the state to honor commitments it has made in its own laws, taking advantage of the authoritarian state’s need for information and legitimacy. Yet monitoring activities are not just about improving the state’s performance. Using interviews, participant observation and document analysis of monitoring campaigns in pre-war Russia, I argue that monitoring can empower citizens in a profoundly disempowering environment, perhaps its most important legacy in a closing authoritarian space.