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The political economy of insecure property rights: insights from the Kingdom of Sicily

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2019

Rosolino A. Candela
Rosolino A. Candela*
Affiliation:
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Buchanan Hall D119, Fairfax, VA22030, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: rcandela@gmu.edu
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Abstract

How did the evolution of the rule of law become stunted in Sicily during the 19th century? The work of economist Yoram Barzel, particularly his property-rights approach to understanding the political economy of state formation, is uniquely suited to understanding the failure of Italy's unification process to secure the rule of law in Sicily during the 19th century. This failure can be explained by a lack of a credible commitment to the rule of law in the state formation process. I argue that this lack of credible commitment manifested itself in the abolition of previously existing parliamentary institutions as an independent collective action mechanism, as well as prior constitutional agreements that existed in the Kingdom of Sicily. The resulting uncertainty over the security and legal definition of property rights over land raised the transaction costs of competing for resources through productive specialization and market exchange. In turn, it reduced the relative costs of competition for land ownership and the use of enforcement through other means, such as rent seeking or organized crime.

Keywords

Yoram BarzelItalian unificationproperty rightsrule of lawSicily

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 16 , Special Issue 2: Honour of Yoram Barzel , April 2020 , pp. 233 - 249
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2019

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