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The labor-managed firm, Oliver Williamson, and me

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 June 2021

Gregory K. Dow
Gregory K. Dow*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada
*
Corresponding author. Email: gdow@sfu.ca
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Abstract

More than 30 years ago, I engaged in a debate with Oliver Williamson over the theoretical structure of transaction cost economics (TCE). This debate had its origins in our conflicting views of the labor-managed firm (LMF). Williamson believed that such firms were rare due to their inefficiency while I believed they might be rare due to market failures. Here I clarify my criticisms of TCE and contrast Williamson's view of the LMF with my own approach. I discuss empirical evidence that can distinguish between these two approaches and take up Williamson's challenge to identify policy interventions that could yield net social gains.

Keywords

Organizational behaviorproperty rightstransaction costsD23

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , April 2022 , pp. 219 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Millennium Economics Ltd.

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