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Elite collective agency and the state

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Korkut Alp Ertürk
Korkut Alp Ertürk*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA
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Abstract

The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination.. The challenge for elites is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst..The basic insight holds that the credibility of the state's threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can control. The elites can coordinate by being compliant when the ruler's threats serve their collective interest, which by reducing the cost of carrying them out make them more credible. On the other hand, their coordinated non-compliance has the opposite effect...

Keywords

Elitescollective agencystate powercoordinationcredible threatssubgame imperfect equilibrium

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , February 2020 , pp. 13 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2019 

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