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Are Donations to Charity an Effective Incentive for Public Officials?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2017

Daniel M. Butler  and
Miguel M. Pereira
Daniel M. Butler
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, USA, e-mail: daniel.butler@gmail.com
Miguel M. Pereira
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Saint Louis, USA, e-mail: m.pereira@wustl.edu
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Extract

Incentivized experiments are frequently used to learn about individuals’ social, political, and economic behavior. However, public officials and other individuals are sometimes barred from accepting payment for anything related to their position, so money cannot be used in experiments (e.g., Butler and Kousser 2015). We assess whether donations to charity can be used to incentivize public officials, as an alternative to traditional monetary inducements.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , Spring 2018 , pp. 68 - 70
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2017 

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References

REFERENCES

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Supplementary material: File

Butler and Pereira supplementary material

Appendix A

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Butler and Pereira supplementary material

Appendix B

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