Allied states often seek to discourage other members from engaging in unnecessary conflicts, frequently working to mitigate and de-escalate tensions during crises involving their partners. This study investigates the de-escalatory influence of alliances − referred to as the restraint effect − on state behaviour during international crises. The central question addressed is: under what conditions does the restraint effect of alliances become more pronounced? The study hypothesizes that relatively weak states allied with major powers are more likely to experience a stronger restraint effect compared to others. This hypothesis is empirically tested using multiple regression models. The findings provide evidence of an additional restraint effect associated with the presence of a major ally within defence pacts. Furthermore, the temporal analysis reveals that this effect is particularly evident during the Cold War era.

This study investigates whether corruption among public officials undermines fundamental rights, analysing data from 142 countries using the Rule of Law Index, a widely recognised and respected tool for assessing the rule of law worldwide. The results show that corruption among judges and bureaucrats consistently erodes fundamental rights, including labour rights and freedom of association. In advanced democracies, police and military corruption significantly reduces freedom of association, while lawmakers’ corruption undermines labour rights. However, in the broader context, corruption among lawmakers, police, and military officers does not significantly affect these rights. This study emphasises the significant role of bureaucracy in protecting rights and the devastating consequences of bureaucratic corruption. The trend of executive power abuse further complicates this issue. To combat corruption and safeguard fundamental rights, this article recommends robust mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency, emphasising the importance of democratic oversight.

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a human rights mechanism under which all UN members are subject to human rights reviews by other states. Given that North Korea is among the worst human rights violators globally, human rights practitioners and academic research have paid much attention to North Korea as a State under Review (SUR). What is much less known and researched is that North Korea actively engages as a ‘reviewer’, regularly making human rights recommendations to other UN members. Using UPR data from 2008 to 2020, this study explores the political dynamics of North Korean human rights recommendations by identifying to whom North Korea makes recommendations and why. We theorize that North Korea utilizes the UPR as a political arena wherein it pats on the back of politically close states and tries to shame politically antagonistic states. Empirical analysis shows that political closeness with North Korea is the main driver influencing its back-patting and shaming efforts in the UPR. Specifically, politically distant states from North Korea, measured by the UN General Assembly voting affinity and presence of unilateral economic sanctions, receive more condemnations and fewer back-patting recommendations. We also demonstrate that North Korea has become much more active over time in their shaming efforts. These findings suggest that even an isolated country like North Korea can learn how to operate in an international institution and can utilize it strategically.

Since the initiation of its Belt and Road Initiative, China’s economic statecraft has drawn considerable attention in academic circles. Yet less attention has been given to why the Chinese leadership first chose to pursue its national interests through economic means in the post-Mao period. This underexplored part of China’s economic statecraft can serve as a useful starting point to understand China’s foreign economic policies on their own terms. Employing a neoclassical realist framework and surveying statements made by Chinese leaders throughout the reform era, this study argues that the country’s leaders have gradually modified the strategic importance of the country’s economic statecraft in response to changes in their perceptions of the world order. Meanwhile, China’s form of economic statecraft has largely been determined by reform of its state-owned enterprises in the domestic realm.

Recent studies suggest that young individuals living in consolidated democracies are growing increasingly disillusioned with liberal democratic institutions and becoming more receptive to alternative forms of governance. This study investigates the democratic orientations of young individuals by examining support for different forms of leadership in South Korea. It argues that some young Koreans are following the global trend and are increasingly showing less faith in democracy. Specifically, they are showing more support for strongman leaders due to the way in which these leaders appeal to these voters. An original survey with an embedded experiment suggests that, while the general Korean public tends to support democratic leaders, young Koreans increasingly express a greater preference for strongman leaders due to their growing public anxieties and societal grievances along with the leaders’ painted image to resolve problems. These findings empirically challenge the long-held belief that young people inherently and undoubtedly prefer democracy and suggest that more needs to be done to overcome their diminishing faith in democratic leadership. The study thus prompts a reconsideration of how generational value changes may influence democracies in the future.

A growing number of studies focus on how governments can manage audience costs when they want to back down from international crises. In line with previous studies, especially Kohama et al. (2024), this paper argues that the Japanese government can use a variety of reasons to justify its decisions to de-escalate while minimizing domestic audience costs. I found that governments can reduce audience costs using several rhetorical devices, reinforcing the current understanding of audience costs. However, my design, which presented a fait accompli scenario by China against Japan, yielded significantly different results regarding audience costs compared to previous studies on the subject. Specifically, the results of this study indicate that the public might not value economic development following a fait accompli as highly as in less severe scenarios. The results also suggest that leaders might have a harder time backing down after a loss of territory compared to other forms of provocation.

Unlike many other industrial societies, the partisan fights on the vaccination against COVID-19 in Taiwan centred on its brand choice rather than acceptance. Did the incumbent DPP supporters adhere to their party line of Medigen to vaccinate against COVID-19 during the pandemic? We argue that individual COVID-19 vaccine brand choices as gradually updated judgements during the pandemic were not solely determined by the party line, but jointly shaped by the strength of party affiliation and the level of government trust to facilitate decision-making in the highly uncertain information environment at the early stage of the pandemic. More specifically, when choosing COVID-19 vaccine brand, the incumbent DPP supporters, particularly weak ones, were more likely to adhere to their party line of Medigen as they trusted government more; however, this was only for the highly uncertain first shot, due to the absence of reliable information for making informed judgements about COVID vaccine brand choice at the early stage of the pandemic, not for the informationally rich booster shot. We report empirical findings consistent with our argument from statistical analyses of original data from a survey of 1642 Taiwanese adult respondents conducted in the fall of 2022.

Why do some autocrats establish a ruling party, whereas others do not? The existing literature argues that weak leaders facing a commitment problem have an incentive to create highly institutionalised parties in order to stabilise their ruling coalition. However, empirical research points out that stronger leaders also create ruling parties, which tend to lack institutional strength and be short-lived.

Through a simple formal model and a case study, this paper explains strong leaders’ motivation to create less-institutionalised, short-lived parties. My model introduces two variables to classical leader-elite bargaining model. (1) indivisible benefit from incumbency, which the leaders can exclusively consume and cannot share with ruling elites. This makes the bargaining more difficult while it also increases the leaders’ merit to maintain his post. Thus, the leaders found ruling parties to temporarily deter the elites’ defection, even if the leaders are sure that their ruling coalition will inevitably collapse in the near future. (2) loser’s share, which the elites consume even after the failed rebellion. Many existing models assume that losers in rebellions lose everything, but some leaders lack the willingness or capability to punish defectors. The low loser’s share decreases the elites’ future share, which encourages weak elites to rebel before their bargaining power furthermore goes down. Thus, even strong leaders can face the commitment problem. Through the case study of Georgia, this paper also shows that even less-institutionalised ruling parties can prevent elites from rebelling by empowering potential defectors.