With the demise of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the “End of History” in a seminal article published in the “National Interest” in 1989. Acknowledging the unabashed victory of liberalism, the author argued that humanity was witnessing “the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.Footnote ¹ Fukuyama expanded on his thesis in the book “The end of history and the last man” in 1992. His last monograph “Liberalism and its discontents” followed a similar genesis as the manuscript elaborates on key arguments exposed in an article published for “American Purpose” in 2020. However, the two books originate from very different political contexts. Liberalism was on its rise at the time of “The end of history and the last man”. On the contrary, Fukuyama's last book emerges in a historical period where liberalism is in retreat.

While autocratic powers have not socialized to core liberal values and principles, domestic forces in consolidated liberal democracies are also challenging its ideas. In “Liberalism and its discontents” Fukuyama can hardly celebrate the triumph of liberalism, but he does not retreat from his original arguments. The book is intended as a defence of classical liberalism. According to the author, the response to growing discontent does not stand in an abandonment of liberalism, but in its moderation. In the eyes of Fukuyama, liberalism still represents the best and most viable form of human government and much of the current discontent has to do with how liberal ideas have been misapplied or pushed to the extremes rather than with the essence of the theory.

In line with his arguments, the monograph does not pay much attention to external challengers, which hardly provide attractive alternative models of government to liberal democracies, but it focuses on domestic dynamics that are causing much of the resentment in the Western hemisphere. After an introduction on classical liberalism and its ratios, the book goes to the root of this discontent. Chapters 2–4 focus on neo-liberalism as the most glaring distortion of liberal ideas. Taking distance from neo-liberalism, the author also rebuts critical and Foucauldian arguments against liberalism in Chapters 5 and 6. Beyond theoretical challenges, Fukuyama also points out current trends threatening liberal societies. While Chapter 7 explores how technology is undermining the principle of free speech and privacy, Chapter 9 faces the challenge of national identity. Having addressed distortions and criticisms, the author reserves two chapters to make the case for liberalism. While Chapter 8 argues that liberalism remains the best and most viable model of government comparing it to potential alternatives advanced by the populist right and progressive left, Chapter 10 concludes with a set of principles to restore trust in liberalism.

Fukuyama structures his main arguments in a clear and well-structured manner. The author provides a detailed account of neo-liberal distortions, he advances convincing arguments in favour of moderation and has the merit of not shying away from the liberal critique. However, his responses to critical theories’ claims are not always satisfactory and Chapter 5 remains the most problematic. In reply to criticisms, Fukuyama occasionally falls into neo-liberal claims. Rebutting the idea of liberalism and colonialism as interrelated, he argues that free trade has allowed unprecedented growth in Asia and Africa and it cannot be compared to “King Leopold's efforts to tear away resources from Congo” (p. 88). However, his argument evokes a neo-liberal orthodoxy praising economic growth through free trade and skating over inequalities with a claim of moral superiority vis-à-vis colonialism.

Similar criticism emerges in the author's response to liberalism as individualistic. Fukuyama retains that associative life has prospered in modern liberal states, but his main argument rests upon the availability of an economic surplus that can be devoted to social oriented activities. Once again, the argument follows a neo-liberal market logic that risks downplaying alternative or contentious explanations, such as a reaction to neo-liberal visions of individuals mainly as consumers, a response to a shrinking role of the state as a provider of services or the extension of the realm of corporations to associative life.

Apart from reliance on arguments too familiar with neo-liberal orthodoxies, the author's responses to contract theory's critique and identity politics are partial and hardly resolve tensions. When it comes to contract theory, Fukuyama agrees that the initial contract had not reflected the balance of power among diverse social groups, but he contends that liberal societies addressed these issues. However, the author does neither delve into his argument nor explore whether resilient informal institutions associated with the initial contract contribute to the persistence of racism. The issue of race emerges frequently in Fukuyama's account of identity politics. Throughout the book, the author is consistent with his view of identity politics as distinct from the liberal environment. While he recognizes that individuals often fall into categories based on features they do not have control over, he reiterates that liberal orders should favour voluntary aggregations and grant rights to groups based on fluid rather than fixed features. While the origin of identity politics as foreign to certain liberal technocratic practices of social categorization could be debatable, the author partially contradicts his argument on voluntary/involuntary aggregations when he states that “the interior self is not sovereign…but strongly shaped by external factors, such as racism and patriarchy. Autonomy should be exercised not much by individuals but by the groups they are part of” (p. 72).

While Fukuyama argues eloquently how most of the negative consequences imputed to liberalism stem from misinterpretation of its ideas, the book leaves, nonetheless, the reader wondering whether liberalism has strong antibodies to prevent its own pathologies. Liberalism rests on a few broad key tenets that make the theory flexible and always perfectible, but also vulnerable to distortions. Blurred boundaries to personal freedom and autonomy might have done little to prevent the extreme self-fulfilling visions that Fukuyama condemns. The view of current trends as distortions of liberal ideas will also imply a deeper reflection on liberal belief in the triumph of good ideas. While the book acknowledges cyclical tensions in the dyads of sentiment and personal experience/scientific reasoning and of nationalism/liberalism, it dismisses the debate with a general rational faith in the restoration of good ideas. However, the neo-liberal distortions and misapplications pointed out by Fukuyama had been long celebrated as the best solutions in the free market of ideas. While it could be argued that groups’ interests and “Intellectual dependency” (p. 98) distorted the free market logic of ideas, this will lead current liberal theory to re-engage in a more attentive consideration of power and/or social groups’ dynamics, something that classical liberalism was never blind to.

In spite of these flaws, the book remains an interesting reading because the challenges Fukuyama points out are real and its invitation to moderation is timely and reasonable. While the slim and discursive style of the book is at the expense of more methodological rigour, the monograph will still appeal to scholars and students in political science, international relations, political theory and political philosophy interested in the ideas of one of the leading experts on liberalism. Furthermore, Fukuyama's elaboration on complex theories in an accessible manner makes the book suitable to a wider audience beyond academia, thus suggesting that the debate on the state of liberalism should be of concern to every individual.