Hostname: page-component-54dcc4c588-mz6gc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-04T13:40:02.666Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Shaming Paris: A Political Economy of Climate Commitments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2025

Justin Melnick Open the ORCID record for Justin Melnick [Opens in a new window]  and
Alastair Smith Open the ORCID record for Alastair Smith [Opens in a new window]
Justin Melnick*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, New York University, USA
Alastair Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, New York University, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: melnickj@nyu.edu
Get access

Abstract

We use a formal model to explore leaders’ incentives to set climate commitments and subsequently exert downstream mitigation effort. Since the Paris Agreement asks countries to make unilateral voluntary commitments, we investigate the domestic factors motivating climate pledges. We study a country with electoral competition between two parties, Green and Brown, who first make commitments to reduce emissions and then implement policies to meet their commitments. Voters anticipate the equilibrium policies each party will implement given the pledge. If downstream mitigation policies are insufficient relative to the commitment, the government is “shamed” by the international community. Several incentive channels arise when parties make commitments, as they have policy and electoral value. Parties can use commitments to tie the opposition’s hands to implement preferential policies in the future. If parties care only about winning elections, they will exploit commitments to serve electoral needs, which paradoxically leads anti-environmental parties to implement more ambitious commitments.

Keywords

Paris Agreementclimate changedomestic politicstwo-level gamesclimate commitments

Information

Type
Research Note
Information
International Organization , Volume 79 , Issue 2 , Spring 2025 , pp. 281 - 305
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The IO Foundation

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Aklin, Michaël, and Mildenberger, Matto. 2020. Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change. Global Environmental Politics 20 (4):4–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aldy, Joseph Edgar, Pizer, William, Tavoni, Massimo, Aleluia Reis, Lara, et al. 2016. Economic Tools to Promote Transparency and Comparability in the Paris Agreement. Nature Climate Change 6:1000–1004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andrews, Talbot M., and Bokemper, Scott E.. 2024. The Road to Reelection Is Paved with Good Intentions: Experiments on the Role of Outcomes and Intentions in Voting Behavior. Journal of Politics 87(1).Google Scholar
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Konisky, David M.. 2014. Cheap and Clean: How Americans Think about Energy in the Age of Global Warming. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bagashka, Tanya, and Stone, Randall W.. 2013. Risky Signals: The Political Costs of Exchange Rate Policy in Post-Communist Countries. International Studies Quarterly 57 (3):519–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Battaglini, Marco, and Harstad, Bård. 2020. The Political Economy of Weak Treaties. Journal of Political Economy 128 (2):544–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bechtel, Michael M., and Scheve, Kenneth F.. 2013. Mass Support for Global ClimateAgreements Depends on Institutional Design. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (34):13763–68.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bergquist, Parrish, Mildenberger, Matto, and Stokes, Leah C.. 2020. Combining Climate, Economic, and Social Policy Builds Public Support for Climate Action in the US. Environmental Research Letters 15 (5):054019.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bodansky, Daniel. 2016. The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement. Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 25 (2):142–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buisseret, Peter, and Bernhardt, Dan. 2018. Reelection and Renegotiation: International Agreements in the Shadow of the Polls. American Political Science Review 112 (4):1016–1035.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calvo, Emilio, and Rubio, Santiago J.. 2013. Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 6 (4):289–339.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caparrós, Alejandro. 2016. Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics 65 (1):5–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Casler, Don, Clark, Richard, and Zucker, Noah. 2023. Do Pledges Bind? The Mass Politics of International Climate Targets, Available at <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/65d64df20aab017d8f9f03e6/t/66b3b70edced392d3986fb8e/1723053838869/CCZ_July2024.pdf>..>Google Scholar
Chapman, Terrence L., Urpelainen, Johannes, and Wolford, Scott. 2013. International Bargaining, Endogenous Domestic Constraints, and Democratic Accountability. Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (2):260–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Creamer, Cosette D., and Simmons, Beth A.. 2019. Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention Against Torture. International Studies Quarterly 63 (4):1051–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. Information Systems in Treaty Regimes. World Politics 54 (4):405–436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dai, Xinyuan. 2007. International Institutions and National Policies. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dannenberg, Astrid, Lumkowsky, Marcel, Carlton, Emily K., and Victor, David G.. 2023. Naming and Shaming as a Strategy for Enforcing the Paris Agreement: The Role of Political Institutions and Public Concern. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120 (40):e2305075120.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., and Barsoom, Peter N.. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. International Organization 52 (2):397–419.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edry, Jessica. 2020. Shallow Commitments May Bite Deep: Domestic Politics and Flexibility in International Cooperation. International Interactions 46 (5):669–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Egan, Patrick J., Konisky, David M., and Mullin, Megan. 2022. Ascendant Public Opinion: The Rising Influence of Climate Change on Americans’ Attitudes About the Environment. Public Opinion Quarterly 86 (1):134–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falkner, Robert. 2016. The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics. International Affairs 92 (5):1107–1125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3):577–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gaikwad, Nikhar, Genovese, Federica, and Tingley, Dustin. 2022. Creating Climate Coalitions: Mass Preferences for Compensating Vulnerability in the World’s Two Largest Democracies. American Political Science Review 116 (4):1165–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gazmararian, Alexander F., Mildenberger, Matto, and Tingley, Dustin. 2024. Public Opinion Foundations of the Clean Energy Transition. Working paper, Princeton University. Available at <https://osf.io/preprints/osf/m9edk_v1>.CrossRef.>Google Scholar
Gazmararian, Alexander F., and Tingley, Dustin. 2023. Uncertain Futures: How to Unlock the Climate Impasse. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. Is There a Broader–Deeper Trade-Off in International Multilateral Agreements? International Organization 58 (3):459–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. International Organization 59 (3):593–629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. International Organization 62 (4):689–716.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2012. International Regimes for Human Rights. Annual Review of Political Science 15 (1):265–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., LeVeck, Brad L., and Victor, David G.. 2017. No False Promises: How the Prospect of Non-compliance Affects Elite Preferences for International Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly 61 (1):136–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrison, Rodrigo, and Lagunoff, Roger. 2017. Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons. International Economic Review 58 (3):751–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harstad, Bård. 2023a. Pledge-and-Review Bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 207 (C).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harstad, Bård. 2023b. Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: From Kyoto to Paris. Economic Journal 133 (651):1181–1216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hermwille, Lukas, and Kreibich, Nicolas. 2018. Article 6 and the Global Stocktake. JIKO Policy Paper, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy.Google Scholar
Holz, Ceecee, Kartha, Sivan, and Athanasiou, Tom. 2018. Fairly Sharing 1.5: National Fair Shares of a 1.5°C–Compliant Global Mitigation Effort. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 18 (1):117–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iida, Keisuke. 1993. When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (3):403–426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iida, Keisuke. 1996. Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games. Public Choice 89 (3):283–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacquet, Jennifer, and Jamieson, Dale. 2016. Soft but Significant Power in the Paris Agreement. Nature Climate Change 6 (7):643–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johns, Leslie. 2014. Depth Versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements. Journal of Theoretical Politics 26 (3):468–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kennard, Amanda, and Schnakenberg, Keith E.. 2023. Comment: Global Climate Policy and Collective Action. Global Environmental Politics 23 (1):133–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keohane, Robert O., and Oppenheimer, Michael. 2016. Paris: Beyond the Climate Dead End Through Pledge and Review? Politics and Governance 4 (3):142–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Köke, Sonja, and Lange, Andreas. 2017. Negotiating Environmental Agreements Under Ratification Constraints. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 83 (C):90–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kotchen, Matthew J., Boyle, Kevin J., and Leiserowitz, Anthony A.. 2013. Willingness-to-Pay and Policy-Instrument Choice for Climate-Change Policy in the United States. Energy Policy 55:617–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leinaweaver, Justin, and Thomson, Robert. 2021. The Elusive Governance of Climate Change: Nationally Determined Contributions as Commitments and Negotiating Positions. Global Environmental Politics 21 (2):73–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Linos, Katerina, and Pegram, Tom. 2016. The Language of Compromise in International Agreements. International Organization 70 (3):587–621.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McAllister, Jordan H., and Schnakenberg, Keith E.. 2022. Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments. International Organization 76 (2):469–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGillivray, Fiona, and Smith, Alastair. 2008. Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melnick, Justin, and Smith, Alastair. 2023. International Negotiations in the Shadow of Elections. Journal of Conflict Resolution 67 (7-8):1452–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milkoreit, Manjana, and Haapala, Kate. 2017. Designing the Global Stocktake: A Global Governance Innovation. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Arlington.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen V., and Peter Rosendorff, B.. 1997. Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1):117–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mo, Jongryn. 1995. Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games. American Political Science Review 89 (4):914–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nemet, Gregory F., and Johnson, Evan. 2010. Willingness to Pay for Climate Policy: A Review of Estimates, Available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1626931>.CrossRef.>Google Scholar
Porter, Robert H. 1983. Optimal Cartel Trigger Price Strategies. Journal of Economic Theory 29 (2):313–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42 (3):427–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raiser, Kilian, Çalı, Başak, and Flachsland, Christian. 2022. Understanding Pledge and Review Learning from Analogies to the Paris Agreement Review Mechanisms. Climate Policy 22 (6):711–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robiou du Pont, Yann, and Meinshausen, Malte. 2018. Warming Assessment of the Bottom-Up Paris Agreement Emissions Pledges. Nature Communications 9 (1):4810.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rosendorff, B. Peter, , and Milner, Helen V.. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization 55 (4):829–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowan, Sam S. 2019. Pitfalls in Comparing Paris Pledges. Climatic Change 155 (4):455–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sælen, Håkon, Tørstad, Vegard, Holz, Ceecee, and Dan Nielsen, Tobias. 2019. Fairness Conceptions and Self-Determined Mitigation Ambition Under the Paris Agreement: Is There a Relationship? Environmental Science and Policy 101:245–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slechten, Aurélie. 2020. Environmental Agreements Under Asymmetric Information. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 7 (3):455–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spilker, Gabriele, and Böhmelt, Tobias. 2013. The Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements on Governmental Repression Revisited. Review of International Organizations 8 (3):343–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Terman, Rochelle. 2023. The Geopolitics of Shaming: When Human Rights PressureWorks—and When It Backfires. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Terman, Rochelle, and Voeten, Erik. 2018. The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review. Review of International Organizations 13 (1):1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tingley, Dustin, and Tomz, Michael. 2022. The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement. International Organization 76 (2):445–468.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tørstad, Vegard, Sælen, Håkon, and Standal Bøyum, Live. 2020. The Domestic Politics of International Climate Commitments: Which Factors Explain Cross-Country Variation in NDC Ambition? Environmental Research Letters 15 (2):024021.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tørstad, Vegard, and Wiborg, Vegard. 2023. Commitment Ambiguity and Ambition in Climate Pledges. Working paper 18, UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Available at <https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2023_wp18_vegard-v3-FINAL.pdf>..>Google Scholar
UNFCCC. 2015. Paris Agreement. Available at <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf>..>Google Scholar
Victor, David G., Lumkowsky, Marcel, and Dannenberg, Astrid. 2022. Determining the Credibility of Commitments in International Climate Policy. Nature Climate Change 12 (9):793–800.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Melnick and Smith supplementary material

Melnick and Smith supplementary material
Download Melnick and Smith supplementary material(File)
File 519.7 KB