In Waqfs and Urban Structures, Richard van Leeuwen gives a clear and coherentthesis regarding the evolution of Damascene waqfs throughout the Ottoman period. Since thetakeover in 1516 of Greater Syria by the Ottomans, “waqfs were an integralpart of imperial policy and were used as a mechanism to foster the cohesion between the centre ofauthority and the conquered provinces” (p. 148). A number of phenomena point in thatdirection, all of which seem to confirm the thesis of the strengthening of ties between Damascusand Istanbul. A number of sultans, beginning with Selim, who entered Damascus in 1516, erectedtheir own waqfs within the city. Ties were strengthened with local families either throughiqtāע grants or prestigious appointments to religious positions.Positions of judges, muftis, and administrators to major public waqfs, were all intermittentlyinfused with elements from outside the city—or, at least, with elements known for theirloyalty to the “center.” These elements were not exclusively from within thehierarchy of aעyān and ulama, and the local would be mixed with loyalelements from other provinces. Above all, the local governors were for the most part—withthe notable exception of the עĀzms—Turkish, or at least fromnon-Arab provinces. Van Leeuwen argues—and that is his main thesis—that suchphenomena constituted a clear indication of “centralizing tendencies” (p. 114)whose aim was for the imperial state to interfere in and control some of the major localinstitutions, among them, of course, the waqfs. Even though van Leeuwen makes it plain thatsuch practices of “interference” did not imply that “waqfs wereappropriated by the central government” (p. 87), there was nevertheless a deliberate urbanpolicy of spatial control (the way waqfs were distributed). Control was imposed either throughresource management (how rents and leases were granted) and appointments to major religiousand judicial positions or through a reframing of the law to buttress the imperial grip over the city.Van Leeuwen's main thesis is indeed far broader than a study of urban waqfs. It uses theexample of waqfs to show that, contrary to many theses of “decentralization” inwhich the “center” is portrayed as losing its grip over the provinces (the so-calledperipheries), the state did its best not to relinquish control over major urban institutions. In short,the “centralizing efforts” (p. 115) of the imperial state is the motto of thisstudy.