(1) Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 143, Laws of the Federation and Lagos applicable in Southern Nigeria, and the Criminal Procedure Code Law, 1960, applicable in the Northern States.

(2) Cap. 62, Laws of the Federation and Lagos.

(3) Skelnick : Justice Without, Trial—Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society (1966), p. 197.

(4) S. 22 (1) Constitution of the Federation, 1963.

(5) S. 22 (9) Constitution of the Federation, 1963.

(6) As a matter of Fact, a prosecutor who is not so satisfied may be guilty of malicious prosecution.

(7) See s. 23 of the Constitution of 1963.

(8) Helmes : Olmstead v. The United States (1928) 277 US 438 at 470.

(9) The legislation has been described by Price, a former judge of the Northern Region High Court, as a retrograde step—Price : «Retrograde Legislation in Northern Nigeria», 1961 Mod. L.R. 604. But its supporters have described it as a major advance —Anderson : «Criminal Law Reform in Nigeria : A Major Advance» 1961 Mod. L.R. 616. See also Olu Odumosu : «Northern Nigeria Codes» 1961 Mod. L.R. 612.

(10) Robbery (Summary Trial and Punishment) Edict, 1967 of the Western State; Robber (Special Provisions) Edict, 1968 of the Lagos State.

(11) There is a slight departure from this general principle with respect to Northern Nigeria. In the case of a public nuisance or the contempt of a lawful authority of public servants only the person aggrieved thereby may prosecute the offender. In the case of adultery, only the husband or the father or guardian of an unmarried woman concerned may prosecute the offender. See ss. 141 and 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code Law, 1960.

(12) S. 255, C.P.A.

(13) S. 256, C.P.A.

(14) It as been held that the provision of the High Court Law which gave a party aggrieved the right to appeal against the decision of High Court does not give a complainant against whom the crime was committed a locus standi to lodge an appeal as he had suffered no legal aggrievement—Akinbiyi v. Adelabu (1956) 1 F.S.C. 45.

(15) I.e. the Attorney General and his staff.

(16) Devlin : Criminal Prosecutions in England (1960), p. 68.

(17) As to bail on arrest by police see inira.

(18) An indictable offence is one which is punishable with two years imprisonment or 200 Pounds fine and is not declared by the law creating it as punishable upon summary conviction. All other offences are summary offences.

(19) A felony is an offence which is declared by law to be a felony or is punishable without proof of previous conviction with death or with imprisonment for seven years. A misdemeanour on the other hand, is an offence which is declared by law to be a misdemeanour or which is punishable by not less than six months and not more than three years imprisonment.

(20) S. 14 (1), C.P.A.

(21) It has, however, been held that the arrest is not illegal where the arrester has taken the offender to the court rather tan to a police station—Nweke v The State, 1965, All N.L.R. 114.

(22) S. 15, C.P.A.

(23) S. 16 (1), C.P.A.

(24) S. 16 (2).

(25) See Adaramola : «The Protection of Personal Liberty», Symposium on Human Rights in Nigeria, 1968, p. 34.

(26) See, however, Onitiri v. Ojomo (1954), 21 N.L.R. 19.

(27) See s. 23, C.P.A.

(28) Cap. 154.

(29) In Police v. Oghomo, 1957, W.R.N.L.R. 200 it was held that knowledge of the fact that the police are looking for a person at large in order to arrest him for such a charge affords grounds for reasonable suspicion, and that the grounds for reasonable suspicion may either be facts within his own knowledge or facts stated to him by another person.

(30) See also ss. 275 and 281 of the Criminal Code.

(31) S. 271, Criminal Code; see also s. 272.

(32) S. 17, C.P.A. See also s. 21 (3) of the Constitution of the Federation 1965. Moreover, wilful delay in bringing a person arrested before a court for his trial is a misdemeanour punishable with two years imprisonment—s. 130, Criminal Code.

(33) S. 18, C.P.A. For the distinction between s. 17 and s. 18. See Police v. Abiodun, 1958, W.R.N.L.R. 212.

(34) Very often the police abuse this power by employing it to effect the imprisonment of suspected criminals even when there is no evidence against him.

(35) Chapters XII and XV.

(36) S. 136, Penal Code. For a restrictive interpretation of the section, see Mechanic v. Bedde Native Authority, 1962, N.R.N.L.R. 28.

(37) S. 27 (1). Evidence Act defines a confession as «an admission made at anytime by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting that he has committed the crime».

(38) S. 27 (2), E.A.

(39) Ibrahim v. R., 1914, A.C. 599 at p. 609. The learned judge conceded however that such statement can only be excluded in the exercise of the court's power to exclude prejudicial evidence for if admitted, it is bound to have little or no weight.

(40) The rules are rules of practice, not of law.

(41) Rule 9. The provision is subject to the Evidence Act.

(42) S. 29, Evidence Act.

(43) S. 6 (1), C.P.A.

(44) S. 6 (2), C.P.A.

(45) S. 107 (1), C.P.A.

(46) That is, an officer above the rank of an Assistant Superintendent of Police including a Chief Officer and a Deputy Chief Officer of a Police Fire Brigade and an administrative officer appointed to supervise a station in the absence of a superior police officer—s. 2, Police Act.

(47) S. 24, Police Act.

(48) 1968, N.M.L.R. 208.

(49) Ibid., at p. 212.

(50) A.B. Kasumu : «Admissibility of illegally obtained Evidence in Nigeria» (1969) 3 Nigerian Law Journal 83.

(51) Cf. s. 29 Evidence Act.

(52) Mr. Kasumu argued that the right to damages is illusory since most people confronting the police are of little means and even where he is able to sue, the police committing the offence may not be able to pay. Op. cit. p. 96 That is the bane of civil jurisdiction in any case.

(53) E.g. manslaughter.

(54) See generally, Elias : Nigeria : The Development of its laws and constitution (1967), p. 202.

(55) The usual explanation given by clerks of Magistrates is that the High Court has jurisdiction to inflict heavier punishment. That is true; but the accused ought to be further told that in the High Court he has a greater chance of a mature consideration of his case.

(56) 1965, All N.L.R. 217.

(57) The information filed upon the authority of a committal order may charge other offences in addition to or in substitution for those in respect of which the order was made. Additional evidence may also be adduced at the trial. The practice is, however, for the accused to be given advance notice of the evidence.

(58) An order as to sentence is not appealable at the instance of the prosecution.

(59) Under S. 435, C.P.A.

(60) S. 247, C.P.A.

(61) 1957, W.R.N.L.R. 125.

(62) S. 391, C.P.A.

(63) Goire v. Police, 1957, W.R.N.L.R. 80.

(64) S. 392, C.P.A.

(65) S. 382, C.P.A.

(66) As to Probation see s. 435, C.P.A.