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Commentary to Adam Oliver’s 'Incentivising improvements in health care delivery'

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 April 2015

Karsten Vrangbaek
Karsten Vrangbaek*
Affiliation:
Professor, Department of Public Health and Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
*
*Correspondence to: Karsten Vrangbaek, Professor and Head, Department of Public Health and Department of Political Science, Center for Health Economics and Policy, University of Copenhagen, CSS, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 København K, Copenhagen, Denmark. Email: kv@ifs.ku.dk
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Abstract

The commentary discusses key issues for assessment of performance management within health care. It supports the ambition to develop more realistic understandings of performance management based on insights from behavioral economics as suggested by Adam Oliver. However, it also points to several pitfalls and potential risks to consider when doing so. The commentary concludes that this is a promising field, but further research is needed to support the development of policy instruments.

Information

Type
Special Section
Information
Health Economics, Policy and Law , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , July 2015 , pp. 367 - 371
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2015 

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