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Responsiveness to the Public Opinion Expressed in Letters to Political Leaders: Insights from Australia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 July 2025

Daniel Casey*
Affiliation:
School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
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Abstract

Democracy requires responsiveness. While empirical responsiveness research tends to focus on opinion polls, there are other ways elites listen to public opinion. Therefore, we need to examine those forms of public opinion that elites see and hear. This is explored through a dataset of letters to Australian Prime Minister John Howard, coded consistent with the Comparative Agendas Project. I find evidence of deliberate, systemic non-responsiveness in the political agenda (measured by the topics of Mr Howard’s speeches) to the volume of letters. Mr Howard knowingly, deliberately ignored this public opinion. There are, however, indications that the topics of the letters are responding to government announcements. The findings highlight the selective nature of elite engagement with public opinion. The study contributes to understanding political agenda-setting, representation and the institutional conditions under which public input is ignored. These results have implications for theories of representation and responsiveness in policymaking.

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On 6 November 1997, Robin Ford wrote to Australian Prime Minister John Howard, to express his views on reconciliation with Indigenous Australians, an issue he considered ‘the defining issue of our generation’ (NAA: M4326, 497).Footnote 1 He was not alone. This letter was one of 170,000 received by Prime Minister Howard that year (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet – PM&C 1998). Mr Ford wanted to have an impact government policy. Yet Mr Howard’s first prime ministerial chief of staff, Grahame Morris, told me that ‘millions of bloody letter-writers are wasting their bloody time’.Footnote 2 This demonstrates the research puzzle – do letters from the public impact government action?

People express their political opinions in a variety of ways. Most importantly by voting, but also through protests, letters to the editors of newspapers and by contacting their representatives. Existing research shows that political leaders are broadly responsive to public opinion – their electoral future depends on it (Beyer and Hänni Reference Beyer and Hänni2018; Manza and Cook Reference Manza and Cook2002; Soontjens and Sevenans Reference Soontjens and Sevenans2022). However, the literature also recognizes that responsiveness is contingent – on electoral safety (Hakhverdian Reference Hakhverdian2012), on the policy issue (Hobolt and Klemmensen Reference Hobolt and Klemmensen2008), on the politician’s own policy position (Sevenans Reference Sevenans2021), on beliefs about electoral accountability (Soontjens and Walgrave Reference Soontjens and Walgrave2023) and on who is expressing the opinion (Gause Reference Gause2022; Sevenans and Walgrave Reference Sevenans and Walgrave2023).

Electoral incentives, shaped by institutional design, do not always align with theoretical expectations of responsiveness to majority opinion. Politicians assess not only the prevalence of public opinion but also its intensity. Will it change voting behaviour? Does it come from partisans or swing voters? These considerations can lead leaders to deliberately ignore some forms of public expression.

To explore this, I examine the role of issue intensity – as indicated by the volume of letters – and its potential influence on political leaders’ responsiveness. By analysing the (potentially bidirectional) relationship between letter-writing and Mr Howard’s speeches, this study tests whether letter-writing acts as an effective mechanism for agenda influence or whether it is systematically ignored. Contacting or writing letters to elected representatives is one of the oldest (Casey and Rottinghaus Reference Casey, Rottinghaus, Nai, Wirz and Groemping2025) and most common forms of political participation (CSES 2015). In the Anglo world, approximately one in four people reported contacting their elected representatives in the previous five years, with Australia sitting just above the average (29%) (CSES 2015).

I argue that letters from the public provide a practical measure of issue intensity (Hill Reference Hill2022), which may in turn translate to voting decisions. By using these letters, rather than opinion polls, I seek to extend our thinking about the mechanisms of political responsiveness. Using a combination of interviews and quantitative modelling, I find evidence of systemic, and deliberate, non-responsiveness by Mr Howard. This has international and comparative relevance, furthering the approach of Jeff Manza and Fay Lorna Cook (Reference Manza and Cook2002), that there are circumstances that do not generate responsiveness – namely, where there is a limited prospect of a negative electoral impact. By using a different form of public opinion, I provide new avenues for considering existing questions about why political leaders may choose to be (non)responsive to public opinion (Soontjens Reference Soontjens2022). There was, however, qualitative evidence to support a relationship in the opposite direction, often referred to as elite agenda-setting.

This study highlights how political leaders selectively engage with public opinion, and how they prioritize responding to public opinion on topics that align with their electoral incentives. This contributes to the literature on selective responsiveness by demonstrating that even forms of public opinion that demonstrate high levels of issue intensity – such as letter-writing – can be systematically ignored when they do not pose electoral risks. These findings enhance our broader understanding of democratic responsiveness and elite–public linkages.

Theory: responsiveness to public opinion

There needs to be linkage between public opinion and government actions for a state to qualify as democratic (Dahl Reference Dahl2008). Hanna Pitkin (Reference Pitkin1967: 224) similarly suggests that ‘[t]he representative system must … be responsive to public opinion’. While accepting the normative necessity for responsiveness, Pitkin (Reference Pitkin1967), Jane Mansbridge (Reference Mansbridge2003), Andrew Sabl (Reference Sabl2015) and others have debated the appropriate level of responsiveness. Political science typically identifies three main types of responsiveness: (1) position responsiveness, where political elites adjust their ideological stance to align with public opinion (Hakhverdian Reference Hakhverdian2012; Wood and Lee Reference Wood and Lee2009); (2) policy responsiveness, which refers to substantive government actions, such as budgetary allocations or legislative decisions (Hobolt and Klemmensen Reference Hobolt and Klemmensen2008; Soroka and Wlezien Reference Soroka and Wlezien2005); and (3) agenda responsiveness, the focus of this study, which examines whether politicians shift their public communications in response to public concerns (Jones and Baumgartner Reference Jones and Baumgartner2004). This study builds on prior work by testing whether agenda responsiveness applies to letters from the public – a rarely examined but widely used form of political engagement.

There has been a large literature confirming that political leaders and governments are (broadly) responsive to public opinion (as measured by opinion polls) and that institutional factors impact the degree of responsiveness (Beyer and Hänni Reference Beyer and Hänni2018; Dassonneville et al. Reference Dassonneville, Feitosa, Hooghe and Oser2021; Hobolt and Klemmensen Reference Hobolt and Klemmensen2008; Sevenans Reference Sevenans2021; Wlezien Reference Wlezien1995). Similar findings have been made in Australia (Martin et al. Reference Martin, Dowding, Hindmoor and Gibbons2014). Much of these studies built on Warren Miller and Donald Stokes’s (Reference Miller and Stokes1963) ‘diamond’ model of the connection between the public and their leaders (Figure 1).

Source: Based on Miller and Stokes (Reference Miller and Stokes1963).

Figure 1. Connections between Publics’ Attitudes and Leader’s Behaviour

The responsiveness literature has increasingly moved towards contingent effects models that recognize variation in when and how political leaders respond to public opinion (Manza and Cook Reference Manza and Cook2002). Factors such as electoral incentives, issue salience and institutional constraints shape this dynamic. In other circumstances, public opinion can be led by the elites, rather than the other way around, where the policy agenda runs from above, with political elites leading and shaping the agenda and substantive policy – often called elite agenda-setting. This is especially likely to be the case where an issue is particularly new, or complex. Establishing which ‘conditions’ and which ‘issues’ are likely to establish strong or weak connections has since become the focus of research.

This article seeks to contribute to the questions asked by Benjamin Page (Reference Page1994: 25): ‘under what circumstances is this impact larger or smaller? … what about … other means of measuring public opinion?’ and associated questions about the transmission of public opinion, and the leader’s perception of that opinion. My adjustments to the Miller and Stokes (Reference Miller and Stokes1963) model (Figure 1) highlight that different groups will have different attitudes, each of which are likely to have different levels of intensity, which will have different impacts on leaders.

Classic representation theorists suggest that ‘the constituency that a representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees’ (Fenno Reference Fenno1977: 883), and that ‘which sources politicians (prefer to) consult, has a bearing on their perceptions of public opinion’ (Walgrave and Soontjens Reference Walgrave and Soontjens2023: 1). The literature finds that the wealthy and higher educated are more likely to participate; more likely to express their opinion; have different opinions and policy priorities; and that governments are more responsive to the demands of this group (Schlozman et al. Reference Schlozman, Verba and Brady2012; Verba and Nie Reference Verba and Nie1987; Verba et al. Reference Verba, Nie and Kim1978, Reference Verba, Schlozman and Brady1995).

This means that understanding what opinion politicians engage with is important. Politicians viewed ‘direct contact with citizens’ as the most useful way to understand the public’s preferences – and significantly more useful than opinion polls (Walgrave and Soontjens Reference Walgrave and Soontjens2023). Similarly, politicians think that writing to elected representatives is one of the most effective ways of participating in politics (after voting, media attention and being active in a political party) (Hooghe and Marien Reference Hooghe and Marien2012). While these findings show that direct contact is important, they do not tell us which groups’ opinions are the most important. Which opinions, and from which publics, politicians are likely to find most useful, will be driven by the institutional structures. Different levels of voter turnout (Bugarin and Portugal Reference Bugarin and Portugal2015; Karp et al. Reference Karp, Banducci and Bowler2008; Singh Reference Singh2019); majoritarian versus proportional representation (Calvo and Hellwig Reference Calvo and Hellwig2011; Cox Reference Cox1990; Ezrow et al. Reference Ezrow, De Vries, Steenbergen and Edwards2011); and alternative vote versus first-past-the-post (Benoit Reference Benoit2006; Reilly Reference Reilly2019) all impact political incentives and therefore drive different forms of responsiveness (Hobolt and Klemmensen Reference Hobolt and Klemmensen2008).

This presents two challenges. The first is identifying which opinion political leaders are listening to, and the second is ensuring that the public opinion used as an independent variable is (to paraphrase Miller and Stokes Reference Miller and Stokes1963: 50) ‘at least tolerably’ similar to the political leaders’ perception of that opinion. Unfortunately, as Karolin Soontjens and Stefaan Walgrave (Reference Soontjens and Walgrave2023: 500, emphasis added) argued, ‘scholarly work on policy responsiveness hinges on the assumption that politicians monitor public opinion’, and I would add the assumption that the public opinion being monitored by politicians is tolerably similar to the opinion used as the independent variable. These challenges are often brushed over when the research relies on opinion polls. As Scott Althaus et al. (Reference Althaus, Swigger, Chernykh, Hendry, Wals and Tiwald2011) argue, we tend to assume that the relevant causal information has been transmitted, and heard, by the relevant individual or group. We need to confirm that the relevant information has been transmitted, to ensure that the theorized causal link is actually present. Apart from experimental studies (Butler and Nickerson Reference Butler and Nickerson2011; Sevenans Reference Sevenans2021; Soontjens and Sevenans Reference Soontjens and Sevenans2022), responsiveness studies generally assume that their independent variable has been accurately transmitted to political leaders, and that political leaders have accurately perceived that opinion.Footnote 3 If we are not prepared to assume away the lack of evidence of transmission of opinion from the public to leaders, we need to turn to other forms of public opinion, where we can confirm that leaders have been exposed to that opinion.

The preceding paragraphs suggest that to better understand responsiveness, we must find measures of public opinion that accurately reflect the opinion as perceived by political leaders, and that reflect the opinion that politicians are incentivized to listen to – which will depend on the different institutional structures. The circular definition of V.O. Key (Reference Key1961: 14) is actually useful – public opinion is ‘those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed’. If the purpose of public opinion research is to determine ‘the function and role of public opinion … in the operation of society’ (Blumer Reference Blumer1948: 543), then a key factor is which public(s) and which opinion(s) the policymaker considers.

This also implicitly reflects the ideas of Mansbridge (Reference Mansbridge2003) of ‘anticipatory representation’, where representatives seek to be responsive to (their perception of) future voters’ preferences at the time of the next election – rather than simply being held to promises made at the previous election (which she terms ‘promissory representation’). By moving temporal focus from the previous election to the next election, Mansbridge (Reference Mansbridge2003: 518–519) suggests that this creates ‘crucial elements of continuing communication’ between representatives and the represented, and ‘the better the communication … the better the representation’. Federico Russo (Reference Russo, Cotta and Russo2020: 314), building on Pitkin and Mansbridge, suggests that a key normative criterion for effective anticipatory representation is that ‘there must be institutional arrangements for citizens to express their demands’. It is therefore in the representatives’ interest to identify and use the best possible, and most nuanced, sources of public opinion.

In this vein, I turn to public opinion that has been deliberately and actively expressed by members of the public, in a way that we know that political leaders have heard. This decision to express a political opinion (whether it be through a letter, protest, donation, etc.) is a demonstration of the individual’s intensity of feelings about the issue (Gause Reference Gause2022; Hill Reference Hill2022). Understanding this issue intensity is vital, because the responsiveness driven by anticipatory representation is mediated by leaders’ expectations of the weight/intensity that voters place on an issue, and how that will impact their vote, rather than a simple headcount (Gause Reference Gause2022; Hill Reference Hill2022; Ryan and Ehlinger Reference Ryan and Ehlinger2023). As Paul Burstein (Reference Burstein2003: 30) noted, ‘citizens who care about an issue are especially likely to take elected officials’ actions on that issue into account on election day’.

I argue that letters from the public is an example of a form of public opinion that provide a practical measure of issue intensity (Hill Reference Hill2022). It is substantively different from answering a ‘most important issue’ or salience question in an opinion poll, because by writing, they have demonstrated that they are part of the ‘attentive public’ (Adler Reference Adler1984; Almond Reference Almond1950; Danley-Scott Reference Danley-Scott2006). If this is the case, political leaders are likely to be responsive to this form of public opinion, given that these letters reflect an intensity of opinion that is not evident in opinion polls; and leaders’ bias towards public opinion that is actively expressed and transmitted to them (Schlozman et al. Reference Schlozman, Verba and Brady2012):

Hypothesis 1: Following an increase in the volume of letters on a particular topic, there will be an increase in the proportion of that topic in political leaders’ communications.

One driver of responsiveness is politicians’ rational desire to avoid defeat at the next election. This should mean that the greater the risk of a loss of power, the greater the likelihood of responsiveness (Hakhverdian Reference Hakhverdian2012). Luca Bernardi (Reference Bernardi2020) notes, however, that there is conflicting evidence that electoral vulnerability or election proximity increase responsiveness. Focusing on budgetary policy, he finds limited evidence to support this thesis. Bernardi (Reference Bernardi2020: 183) concludes by suggesting further research, particularly ‘in more rhetorical policy venues’, which aligns with my approach. Therefore, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2: Responsiveness will increase when the government is politically vulnerable.

Manza and Cook (Reference Manza and Cook2002) argue that different levels of responsiveness are related to the salience of an issue. Letter-writing reflects issue salience, but not all letters carry the same weight. Individuals who take the time to compose personal letters likely have stronger preferences than those who sign pro-forma campaign materials. If responsiveness is driven by intensity rather than volume alone, we should observe greater government attention to issues with a high proportion of personal letters relative to pro-forma campaigns. This hypothesis extends work on issue salience (Gause Reference Gause2022; Hill Reference Hill2022) by testing whether governments prioritize highly engaged citizens over mass mobilization efforts:

Hypothesis 3: Responsiveness will be higher for topics with a higher perceived salience.

As noted above, there are also a range of studies that show that in some circumstances, public policy can lead public opinion, or in E.E. Schattschneider’s terms, ‘new policies create a new politics’ (quoted in Pierson Reference Pierson1993: 595). This is particularly likely to be the case for subjects/topics with lower levels of salience, issues that are new to the political agenda, or where external events have driven the agenda (Manza and Cook Reference Manza and Cook2002). Based on this:

Hypothesis 4: The more political leaders communicate about a topic, the greater the likelihood of there subsequently being letters on that topic.

Case selection, method, data and modelling

I focus on Australia, between 1996 and 2000, as a matter of data availability. Australia is a federal, bicameral, parliamentary system. The lower house, the House of Representatives, has 151 single-member electorates, elected by alternative vote. John Howard was prime minister from 1996 until 2007, making him Australia’s second longest-serving prime minister. There are two major parties, the centre-left Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the centre-right Liberal Party of Australia, which has been in (practical) permanent coalition with the agrarian National Party of Australia. Since Mr Howard left office, no prime minister has served more than four years.Footnote 4 This makes the period well suited to analysis, as there are no changes of government, or prime minster, to account for. The research period also excludes the significant change in communication methods brought in with email.

The importance of early hypothesis testing and research design justifies a single-country approach (Pepinsky Reference Pepinsky2019). It allows for additional levels of detail and in-depth description and analysis; however, I recognize that such a study may have limited generalizability.

The main independent variable is the volume of letters per topic per fortnight, based on newly accessed documentation from the National Archives of Australia (NAA). Each fortnight, Mr Howard received a brief from his department, giving the volume of letters received in the previous fortnight, as well as details of their topics.Footnote 5 Archival research and interviews have confirmed that provision of regular data to the prime minister’s office (PMO) about volume and topic of correspondence was standard practice since at least the mid-20th century (Casey Reference Casey2024a). Similarly, Brandon Rottinghaus’s (Reference Rottinghaus2007) study shows that some US presidents received briefings about their letters.

I obtained 69 of these briefs (see Appendix in the Supplementary Material), from the period March 1996 (when Mr Howard was first elected) to December 2000. The topics stated in the briefs were highly specific, such as ‘Cuts to funding for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’ (ABC), or ‘Tasmania’s multi-purpose AFL stadium – pro’.Footnote 6 These topics were then manually coded against the Australian version of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP)Footnote 7 (Bevan Reference Bevan, Baumgartner, Breunig and Grossman2019; Dowding and Martin Reference Dowding and Martin2017; Martin et al. Reference Martin, Dowding, Hindmoor and Gibbons2014) and intercoder reliability checking was undertaken.Footnote 8 Examples of how the letters were initially coded by public servants in PM&C, and then subsequently coded against the CAP are in the Appendix in the Supplementary Material. Consistent with Will Jennings and Peter John (Reference Jennings and John2009), only those topics where the proportion of both letters and speeches were above 2% were included in the analysis, resulting in four topics being removed.

To measure agenda responsiveness, this study examines all of Mr Howard’s public communications, including speeches, interviews, press releases and media appearances – more than 2,000 speeches totalling over 6 million words. This approach differs from previous studies, which typically rely on major speeches such as the Speech from the Throne or the Budget Speech (Hobolt and Klemmensen Reference Hobolt and Klemmensen2005; Jennings and John Reference Jennings and John2009; Wood and Lee Reference Wood and Lee2009). While these high-profile speeches are often compared with annual opinion polls, my analysis requires a higher-frequency dataset to align with fortnightly correspondence data. I coded these speeches into the same CAP topics, using the SeededLDA topic modelling package (Watanabe and Zhou Reference Watanabe and Zhou2020), which has been extensively used across social science (Curini and Vignoli Reference Curini and Vignoli2021; Fernandes Reference Fernandes2023; Levorato and Sguazzini Reference Levorato and Sguazzini2024; Macanovic Reference Macanovic2022). SeededLDA is semi-supervised; by incorporating a researcher-designed seed-word dictionary, it ensures that the topics identified by the model align with prior theoretical topics. My seed-word dictionary (see Appendix in the Supplementary Material) is based on the CAP codebook, following the process set out in Kohei Watanabe and Yuan Zhou (Reference Watanabe and Zhou2020), including fine-tuning using average feature entropy. I also undertook a range of post-hoc manual validation checks (Chan and Sältzer Reference Chan and Sältzer2020; Curini and Vignoli Reference Curini and Vignoli2021; Watanabe and Zhou Reference Watanabe and Zhou2020; Wesslen Reference Wesslen2018).Footnote 9 These tests resulted in two more topics being removed, leaving 15 topics within the analysis.

I also conducted semi-structured interviewsFootnote 10 with John Howard, senior members of his former staff and former public servants within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) (see Appendix in the Supplementary Material). My interviews have two core purposes. First, to establish the facts on how ministerial correspondence and the ministerial correspondence briefs were handled within PM&C and the PMO, to trace how public opinion information was transmitted to Mr Howard and the PMO. The second purpose is to understand how Mr Howard and the PMO interpreted and reacted to both the correspondence and the briefs, to understand how they ‘view[ed them] and the meaning that they attribute to [them]’ (Rubin and Rubin Reference Rubin and Rubin2005: 19). Both interviews and archival research ‘can provide excellent leverage for causal inference’ (Page Reference Page1994: 28). This helps directly address Hypotheses 1 and 4.

Modelling approaches

Various modelling approaches were used to test the hypotheses. To test H1, I use the approach of Sara Hobolt and Robert Klemmensen (Reference Hobolt and Klemmensen2008) and Armen Hakhverdian (Reference Hakhverdian2012). The response variable (Howard’s speeches) could be expressed as either a count (number of words per topic per fortnight), or a proportion. I use proportion, as the underlying premise of the CAP is that topics compete for a limited amount of space on the agenda (Dowding et al. Reference Dowding, Hindmoor and Martin2016). This also controls for other factors that impacted word count, including holiday periods (when word count dropped), election periods (when word count increased) and the annual increase in media engagements. The dependent variable was log transformed (to address non-normality of residuals), and the first difference taken, to address stationarity and autocorrelation (Parker Reference Parker2012),Footnote 11 consistent with the time series regression literature (Ahmed et al. Reference Ahmed, Atiya, Gayar and El-Shishiny2010; Cai Reference Cai2002). Therefore, my model for each topic is:

\begin{equation*}\Delta \log \left( {speech\,proportion} \right) = \,\alpha + \,\beta {\left( {total\,mail} \right)_{t - 1}} + \,\varepsilon \end{equation*}

A range of other modelling approaches were tried, and the results were consistent.Footnote 12

To test H2, I use the same model, with the addition of an interaction term of the Newspoll results.Footnote 13 Using the change in Newspoll results both reflects the need to ensure that the data series is stationary but also suggests that politicians are more concerned with the trend, rather than the absolute figure.

\begin{align*}\Delta \log \left( {speech\,proportion} \right) & = \,\alpha + \,{\beta _1}{\left( {total\,mail} \right)_{t - 1}} + \,{\beta _2}\Delta {\left( {Newspoll} \right)_{\left( {t - 1} \right)}} \\ & \quad + {\beta _3}\left( {{{\left( {total\,mail} \right)}_{t - 1}}*\Delta {{\left( {Newspoll} \right)}_{\left( {t - 1} \right)}}} \right) + \,\varepsilon \end{align*}

For H3, a different modelling approach was required. Given the large number of fortnights where no letters were received on a particular topic, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not suitable, so the response variable is transformed into a binary and binary regression used.Footnote 14 The model includes the volume of letters in the previous fortnight, to control for autocorrelation (Hakhverdian Reference Hakhverdian2012; Stimson et al. Reference Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson1995).

\begin{align*}\ln \left( {\Pr \left( {Letters} \right)} \right) & = \,\alpha + \,{\beta _1}\left( {{{\left( {speech\,proportion} \right)}_{t - 1}} + {{\left( {speech\,proportion} \right)}_{t - 2}}} \right) \\ & \quad + {\beta _2}lag\left( {volume\,of\,letters} \right) + \,\varepsilon \end{align*}

Results

Pattern of letters

Starting with descriptive statistics, during the period of the study, Mr Howard received more than 500,000 letters. Almost half the letters were classified as ‘pro-forma campaign letters’, where the same, or similar, text is sent by multiple people. These were usually driven by interest groups, who would provide template letters, postcards or facsimiles to their members, asking them sign and send them (Casey Reference Casey2024b) – see, for example, the first and fifth letters in the table in the Supplementary Material. The number of letters Mr Howard received per fortnight varied significantly, from a low of around 2,000 letters, up to a maximum of more than 21,000 letters, with a mean of around 5,500.

There is no obvious pattern, or seasonal trends (such as a decline over the December/January period). Instead, the peaks (August 1996, May/June 1997, November/December 1997 and September 1999) can all be traced back to a specific topic/issue, including childcare; chicken meat imports; global warming; and the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, and subsequent Australian-led UN intervention (Casey Reference Casey2022). These topics were then coded into 21 high-level topics, consistent with the CAP. Figure 2 shows the total mail volume, by topic, broken up by letters and pro-formas. The top three topics are international affairs, transportation and labour and employment.

Figure 2. Top Topics by CAP Topic

Was Prime Minister Howard responsive to the letters?

Evidence from archival documents and interviews confirms that Mr Howard was regularly informed about the volume and topic of public correspondence. Between March 1996 and November 2000, ministerial briefs on public letters were addressed to Mr Howard, and he received them almost every fortnight. Interviews with former staff (including Mr Howard himself, Tony Nutt (former chief of staff), Frank Leverett (former departmental liaison officer), Stephen Brady (former senior advisor) and Malcolm Hazell (former senior advisor)) further confirm that these briefs were seen at the highest levels, with some staff recalling direct discussions with the prime minister about their contents. Therefore, I can show that the measure of public opinion I am using as my independent variable is identical to one of the measures of public opinion that Mr Howard saw.

Hypothesis 1 proposed that an increase in the volume of letters on a particular topic would be followed by an increase in the proportion of that topic in political leaders’ communication. Using the regression model explained above, for most topics, the regressions resulted in coefficients at or near zero.

The only topic to show a statistically significant impact (even if the alpha is lowered to 0.1) is ‘environment’ (Figure 3). Looking at the environment model (Table 1), as the number of letters received on the environment increases by 100, the proportion of Mr Howard’s speeches dedicated to the environment should decrease by approximately 4%, compared to the previous fortnight, contrary to the hypothesis. However, this is a small impact and the low adjusted R2 indicates that the number of letters explains around 10% of the total variation.

Notes: Regressing the change in the log of speech proportion per topic, on total mail/100, per topic, per fortnight.

Figure 3. Effect of Letters on John Howard’s Speeches – All Topics – Coefficient Plot

Table 1. Responsiveness: the Effect of Letters on John Howard’s Speeches – Environment (Model 1)

* Note: p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.

This effect is driven by two outlier fortnights (Figure 4) – those ending 14 November 1997 (6,148 letters on global warming) and 12 December 1997 (2,776 letters on global warming). Each of these also displayed large falls in the proportion of Mr Howard’s speeches on the environment. These fortnights were the peak of a letter-writing campaign that commenced in late 1996. For most of the campaign, the number of letters remained fairly low, before a burst of activity associated with the Kyoto Climate Change Conference in December 1997. While Mr Howard did not particularly focus on the environment, it significantly rose in prominence in late 1997 and early 1998 because of the Kyoto Conference. It was the second largest topic in his speeches in the final quarter of 1997.

Figure 4. Responsiveness of John Howard’s Speeches to the Letters – Environment

While Mr Howard spoke a great deal about the Kyoto Conference, as soon as the conference finished, the topic disappears from his agenda, dropping to under 3% of his speeches for the rest of the study. Thus, while there were simultaneously high levels of both letters and speeches, they were driven by an external factor. Removing those two outliers, the model loses statistical significance (p = 0.387). As such, it does not support Hypothesis 1.

For the remaining topics, the regressions do not indicate that there is a relationship between the number of letters received on a topic and the proportion of Mr Howard’s speeches on that topic.

Now I move on to Hypothesis 2, that responsiveness will increase when governments are politically vulnerable. Consistent with the broad findings of Bernardi (Reference Bernardi2020), I do not find any topics where the interaction term was statistically significant, and graphs for sample topics are provided in the Appendix in the Supplementary Material. While not statistically significant, all point to an apparent increase in responsiveness when Newspoll falls, consistent with the hypothesis. However, given the lack of statistical significance, I cannot say that these provide support for my hypothesis.Footnote 15

Hypothesis 3 suggests that responsiveness will be higher for topics with a higher salience, using the proportion of letters, viz pro-formas, as the indicator of salience. The topics that generated the largest proportion of letters were ‘Law’, focusing on gun control following the Port Arthur massacre and ‘Government Operations’, which were well-wisher and congratulatory letters associated with the 1996 and 1998 elections. Apart from those two topics, in almost all the remaining topics, more than 90% of the letters were pro-formas. Given that this article has already found that no topic demonstrates systematic responsiveness, there is no support for this hypothesis.

Despite a range of modelling approaches, I am unable to find any support for the hypotheses. The consistency of the null findings, while showing that the hypotheses cannot be supported, are insufficient to make any statements about active or deliberate non-responsiveness. For that, I turn to the qualitative research.

Why was Prime Minister Howard not responsive to the letters?

The interviews and archival research indicated that Mr Howard, and his staff, made an active decision to be non-responsive to this form of public opinion. While Mr Howard did see the brief, his engagement was often fleeting, with both Tony Nutt and Malcolm Hazell suggesting in interviews that they were a ‘30 second’ item. From late 2000 the brief ceased being addressed to the prime minister and instead was addressed to one of his senior staff. From this point, Malcolm Hazell recalled that these briefs were only shown to Mr Howard on an ‘as-needs’ basis. At the same time, the number of people who routinely saw a copy of this brief was reduced. This demonstrates the lack of importance placed on this information. Perhaps the clearest response was from Grahame Morris, who was Mr Howard’s first chief of staff. He explained that ‘millions of bloody letter-writers are wasting their bloody time’.

This raises the obvious question of why Mr Howard acted this way. The interviewees recognized that these letter-writers were rarely swing voters. They were partisans, either on the government’s side – ‘I think many were from the prime minister’s patch for want of a better description. I’ve no doubt about that’, reflected one of his former chiefs of staff; or on the opposition’s side – ‘there’s a lot of people that never vote Liberal … were not supportive of the government [and] would never be supportive of the government’. The interviews show that these letters were not a useful source of information for understanding the issues and priorities of uncommitted voters. In other words, the political incentives of the Australian system meant that these cohorts were not a political priority, and their opinions did not create an electoral threat. Instead of the letters, Mr Howard identified talkback radio as his preferred method of listening to public opinion: it ‘was a more immediate way of finding out public opinion … I found it a very effective way … of finding out what the public was thinking’. His responsiveness was driven by that segment of the population that he perceived to be pivotal to his electoral future.

Were the letters responsive to Prime Minister Howard’s speeches?

In this section I examine the reverse relationship – were Mr Howard’s speeches impacting the letters (‘elite agenda-setting’)? A range of topics have a statistically significant relationship between the proportion of Mr Howard’s speeches over the two previous fortnights and the likelihood of letters being received in the following fortnight (Figure 5). However, qualitative analysis undermines these findings.

Figure 5. Likelihood of Letters Arriving after Speeches: All Topics

As the proportion of Mr Howard’s speech dedicated to education increases, so too does the likelihood of receiving letters on that topic in the subsequent period (Figure 6). A Wilcoxon test confirms a significant difference in the median proportion of Mr Howard’s speeches focusing on education between the two groups (those fortnights prior to when letters were received, and those fortnights prior to when letters were not received), consistent with Hypothesis 4.

Notes: Top: Graph of model, showing the likelihood of letters arriving increases as John Howard talks more about education. Bottom: Boxplot comparing the proportion of Howard’s speeches on education split by whether letters are then received on that topic, with the Wilcoxon test for comparison of non-normal distributions.

Figure 6. Elite Agenda-Setting: Predicting the Likelihood of Letters Arriving – Education

Within education, there were two issues that attracted significant volumes of letters. The first issue, ‘form letters commenting on the lack of public-school funding’ (NAA: M4326, 844), generated almost 10,500 letters over 12 fortnights. The letters started in the fortnight ending 4 June 1999, shortly after the government’s announcement on 11 May 1999 of a significant increase in private-school funding (Kemp Reference Kemp1999). The policy was controversial, with Mr Howard mentioning this proposal five times in the subsequent few days. This case provides support for the hypothesis. The second big issue was opposition to ‘proposed cuts in funding for Australian university’s [sic] – Anti’ (NAA: M4326, 33). This issue generated around 3,500 letters over 11 fortnights, starting in June 1996. The letters followed strikes in May 1996 at Australian public universities over funding threats (Pockley Reference Pockley1996). Following the announcement of funding cuts, Mr Howard repeatedly defended the changes while recognizing that ‘they have been criticised in some quarters’ (Howard Reference Howard1996). This provides further support for the hypothesis that the letters are driven by Mr Howard’s speeches.

The next topic is the environment, which shows that the likelihood of receiving letters increased as Mr Howard talked more about the issue. The major issue was global warming/climate change (as explored in the previous section). While both the letters and speeches were generated by international events, the letters appeared later, given that Mr Howard was able to respond within hours or days, while it would take some time for individuals to decide to write and their letter be received. This supports the hypothesis, although it raises the question of the impact of external events, which are not captured in the model.

However, for the other two topics where there was a statistically significant relationship (labour and employment and transportation), the quantitative results are undermined by qualitative evidence. First, in labour and employment, the letters were a campaign about family day-care. However, the speeches were about workplace relations. It is a coincidence that these two issues occurred at a similar time and are in the same CAP code – aggregation decisions created false positives (Cook and Weidmann Reference Cook and Weidmann2019). As such, this topic does not support the hypothesis.

The final topic is transportation, which displays a positive relationship between the speeches and subsequent letters. The letters were focused on Sydney’s second airport, which received almost 30,000 letters across 65 fortnights. There were also around 11,500 letters across 20 fortnights seeking additional funding for the Westgate and Princess Freeways in Victoria. However, across the four fortnights with the highest proportion of speeches on transportation (in August/September 1997 and December 1997/January 1998) these issues were not discussed – the focus was on other infrastructure projects, the Darwin rail link and the Jervoise Bay infrastructure project. Transportation topics that dominated Mr Howard’s speeches were local road funding, high-speed rail and inland rail and Sydney’s second airport. Apart from the second airport, none of the issues in the speeches were mentioned in the letters. Thus, while this topic provides statistical support for the hypothesis, the qualitative evidence does not.

Only one topic (education) provides both qualitative and quantitative support for Hypothesis 4 that the more Mr Howard speaks about a topic, the greater the likelihood of receiving letters on that topic in the following period. A second (environment) provides mixed support, given the difficulty in untangling the impact of external events, such as the Kyoto Climate Conference.

Next, I take a disaggregated, qualitative approach, looking at individual topics, rather than the aggregated level of CAP topics. I look at the letters, speeches and media coverage for the top 10 topics by volume, as well as a random sample of 10% of the remaining topics, to identify how these topics emerged. Each issue was categorized into one of the following inductively generated categories:

  • Elite-driven: a response to an action/event/decision by Australian political elite.

  • Externally driven: a response to an external event, beyond government control, such as wars, natural disasters or actions by foreign governments.

  • Administratively driven: a response to an administrative act of government. This differs from elite-driven, in that the act was not a decision or announcement by ministers, but rather from the ordinary operations of government.

  • Citizen-driven: where the letters do not appear to be a response to any of the above causes.

This analysis (Table 2) shows that of the 26 topics analysed, 16 were elite-driven, and only two likely to be citizen-driven (battery hen cages and dumping of nuclear waste).

Table 2. Qualitative Analysis of Selected Topics

Source: Author analysis.

* Note: Further details of each topic are available in Casey (Reference Casey2024a). Dates are given in the format dd/mm/yyyy.

Across these topics, the impetus for the letters was predominantly a government announcement. This finding was confirmed in my interviews. Mr Howard saw the correspondence as reflecting policy announcements: ‘I saw examination of correspondence as another way of monitoring how the policy was being received’. Mr Howard reflected, ‘I was interested to see whether over a period of time, our advocacy and our explanations, were having an impact on public opinion’. This indicates that while public opinion was important to him, he was less concerned with contemporaneous public opinion, but rather whether he was succeeding in shaping public opinion over time – particularly prior to the next election. This reflects an emphasis on anticipatory representation (Mansbridge Reference Mansbridge2003). His desire was to influence public opinion (rather than reflect public opinion), which would then result in a future congruence between his policy and future opinion. Bronwyn Morris also reflected that ‘usually people [were] reacting to a policy decision you’ve made, or some terrible political scandal’. Another recalled:

it’s not just like an isolated thing where we suddenly getting mail on an item. There’s probably been quite a bit of … media focus on a particular issue. And then people are seeing that and then writing. (Public servant 1)

This section provides qualitative evidence that suggests that public correspondence largely followed political elites’ existing agendas rather than shaping them. Many of the letter-writing campaigns followed government actions or external events, making it difficult to disentangle whether political leaders were proactively setting the agenda or merely responding to external pressures. Mr Howard and his staff saw letters as reactions to government decisions rather than inputs into them. This aligns with theories of elite agenda-setting, where political leaders define the issues that gain public attention rather than adjusting their priorities in response to bottom-up opinion shifts (Manza and Cook Reference Manza and Cook2002). Future research should further explore these dynamics by incorporating additional measures of external events and media coverage. .

Discussion and conclusion

This article examines the agenda responsiveness of Prime Minister Howard to the volume and topics of letters from the public. It demonstrates how expressions of political opinion can be traced from the public, directly to the prime minister. Using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, I find evidence of deliberate and systemic non-responsiveness. Mr Howard and his staff made an active decision to be non-responsive to this form of public opinion. These findings challenge conventional models of democratic responsiveness by highlighting how political leaders selectively engage with public input. Mr Howard and his staff actively dismissed letters as politically irrelevant. This suggests that not all forms of expressed opinion are perceived as electorally significant, reinforcing the argument that leaders prioritize engagement with sources they see as politically consequential (Walgrave and Soontjens Reference Walgrave and Soontjens2023).

Null findings provide important additions to our understanding and advance the discipline (Munafò and Neill Reference Munafò and Neill2016). They should force us to re-examine the theory, modifying it to address the new findings. This is what Manza and Cook (Reference Manza and Cook2002) suggest – that in some circumstances, we would find responsiveness, and in other circumstances we would not. They set the discipline a challenge of finding those different circumstances. It is in this framework that I situate these findings, helping to identifying those circumstances and situations where responsiveness is not expected to be found.

Hobolt and Klemmensen (Reference Hobolt and Klemmensen2008) show that there are very low levels of responsiveness in executive speeches in some countries, with ideology rather than public opinion being the driving force. Similarly, political elites are more likely to be responsive when there is a stronger electoral incentive (including to co-partisans in proportional electoral systems (Sevenans Reference Sevenans2021), or when they are electorally vulnerable (Hakhverdian Reference Hakhverdian2012; Soontjens and Sevenans Reference Soontjens and Sevenans2022)). This means that lower levels of responsiveness could be expected where there are reduced electoral incentives to be responsive to any particular form of public opinion or subgroup of constituents. To that extent, these findings may be generalizable.

Addressing the concern of James Druckman (Reference Druckman2014) that studies of responsiveness ‘typically fail to account for responsiveness to “what type of opinion”’, I help confirm the ‘contingent effects’ model, by suggesting that political elites are less likely to be responsive to opinion from those group(s) that do not pose an electoral threat. These findings similarly address the concerns of Herbert Blumer (Reference Blumer1948) and Key (Reference Key1961: 14) by identifying which opinions the government ‘finds prudent to heed’, and reinforce the importance of improving our understanding of the institutional impacts on responsiveness – which groups of voters they consider to be ‘pivotal’, and which (as in this case) they can choose to ignore.

Does this mean that writing letters is a waste of time? Not necessarily. Writers have a range of motivations and expectations. People writing to congratulate Mr Howard on an election victory are unlikely to expect an impact on the public agenda. Similarly, those who wrote seeking help with their social security or tax would not expect to impact Mr Howard’s speeches. The outcomes they are seeking would not be detectable by quantitative methods. More research is needed to better understand the impact of these individual letters.

In conclusion, this research makes a range of contributions to the literature. First, it sets out a unique dataset on the volume and topic of letters to a political leader. Like the study of protests (Gause Reference Gause2022), this helps to broaden the study of public opinion to better reflect how the public actually expresses opinion and how political elites engage with it. Second, it applies existing theories on responsiveness to a new empirical domain. The use of letters to political executives in quantitative political science is a novel methodological approach. Finally, by using briefs to the prime minister, it explores the causal linkages between public opinion and public agenda, where existing studies have often struggled.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.11

Acknowledgements

This article was presented at the 2023 ECPR General Conference in Prague. The author would like to thank Tinette Schnatterer, Chris Butler, Anja Durovic, Anne Rasmussen, Jesper Lindqvist and other participants at that conference. The author would also like to thank Ian McAllister, Marija Taflaga, Ken Benoit, James Walter and Rhonda Evans for their feedback on earlier versions of this article.

Financial support

This research was supported by both the ANU’s Australian Politics Studies Centre’s Director’s PhD Scholarship and the Australian Government Research Training Program Domestic Scholarship.

Ethics statement

The research using human subjects has been approved by the Australian National University, ref ANU 2021/101.

Footnotes

1 National Archives of Australia (NAA) material is cited using their style guide. After ‘NAA’, the next element is the series number (in this case M4326), then the control symbol (in this case 497).

2 See methods section for details of interviews and associated ethics approval.

3 A series of studies investigate when public officials (elected and appointed) respond to contact from the public, summarized by Costa (Reference Costa2017). These show that public officials are less likely to respond to contact from racial/ethnic minorities. However, they do not seek to measure change in leaders’ behaviour. Other studies (derived from the POLPOP project) show that leaders are prone to misperception/misinterpretation of public opinion. These studies reinforce the need to trace accurately the transmission of public opinion to elites, before such opinion can be used as an independent variable. However, these studies do not use politicians’ perception of opinion as an independent variable, or measure change in politicians’ behaviour associated with their perception of public opinion.

4 As at the time of writing, March 2025.

5 Neither I, nor Mr Howard, had any information on the socioeconomic background of the authors.

6 I was unable to access the original correspondence, as most of it was destroyed, pursuant to Australian archival rules. Therefore, I cannot confirm the reliability and validity of the topic classifications undertaken by PM&C. It is possible that different staff applied different subject titles to similar letters. However, as individual topics are coded against the CAP, difference topics like ‘Wik Decision’ and ‘Native Title’ were both coded as the same CAP topic.

7 The Comparative Agendas Project (Bevan Reference Bevan, Baumgartner, Breunig and Grossman2019) is a coding schema enabling research on policymaking and agenda-setting across countries. It classifies different policy activities (e.g. legislation, parliamentary questions, parliamentary hearings, key speeches) according to their policy objectives.

8 A random sample of topics was coded by three coders, using Krippendorf’s alpha. A threshold of 0.80 was established (Mikhaylov et al. Reference Mikhaylov, Laver and Benoit2012; O’Connor and Joffe Reference O’Connor and Joffe2020), and an alpha of 0.819 was obtained. As this met the threshold, I then completed the coding.

9 I identify the documents with the highest and lowest scores in each topic and manually check that these conform with expectations (Curini and Vignoli Reference Curini and Vignoli2021). For example, the document with the lowest environment score was about tax and the budget, while the highest was about water salinity. Predictive validity is addressed by seeing whether external events can explain sudden shifts or changes in topics (Chan and Sältzer Reference Chan and Sältzer2020). I used the NAA’s timeline of Mr Howard’s prime ministership and checked whether the model showed spikes in the relevant topic at the relevant time.

10 Ethics approval: Australian National University, reference 2021/101.

11 Unlike the speeches, the letters exhibit lower levels of autocorrelation. Error-correction models (Jennings and John Reference Jennings and John2009) were considered, but one of the assumptions is that there is a long-run equilibrium between X and Y, which does not exist in my data.

12 The other modelling approaches were:

  • - Using change in mail per-fortnight as the independent variable.

  • - Logistic regression, using the untransformed proportion of Mr Howard’s speech per topic. This requires the responsive variable to be between 0 and 1, so the first-difference transformation was not used.

  • - Using OLS, including either:

    1. o an extra fortnight, as it might take a more sustained volume of mail to generate responsiveness; or

    2. o a squared term, as Mr Howard may only have been responsive to very large volumes of mail.

an extra fortnight, as it might take a more sustained volume of mail to generate responsiveness; or

a squared term, as Mr Howard may only have been responsive to very large volumes of mail.

Details are included in the Appendix in the Supplementary Material.

13 Newspoll was the main public opinion poll, published on a fortnightly basis by The Australian, the leading national newspaper. Other studies use proximity to the next election to test political vulnerability. However, as this study includes only one election, it was not considered an appropriate approach.

14 If letters were received on a particular topic in a particular fortnight, the variable is coded as 1, and if no letters were received it is coded as 0. Using two fortnights in the model was used as it improves the robustness of the findings.

15 Similar results were obtained using the original Newspoll series, rather than the differenced series.

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Figure 0

Figure 1. Connections between Publics’ Attitudes and Leader’s Behaviour

Source: Based on Miller and Stokes (1963).
Figure 1

Figure 2. Top Topics by CAP Topic

Figure 2

Figure 3. Effect of Letters on John Howard’s Speeches – All Topics – Coefficient Plot

Notes: Regressing the change in the log of speech proportion per topic, on total mail/100, per topic, per fortnight.
Figure 3

Table 1. Responsiveness: the Effect of Letters on John Howard’s Speeches – Environment (Model 1)

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Figure 4. Responsiveness of John Howard’s Speeches to the Letters – Environment

Figure 5

Figure 5. Likelihood of Letters Arriving after Speeches: All Topics

Figure 6

Figure 6. Elite Agenda-Setting: Predicting the Likelihood of Letters Arriving – Education

Notes: Top: Graph of model, showing the likelihood of letters arriving increases as John Howard talks more about education. Bottom: Boxplot comparing the proportion of Howard’s speeches on education split by whether letters are then received on that topic, with the Wilcoxon test for comparison of non-normal distributions.
Figure 7

Table 2. Qualitative Analysis of Selected Topics

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