Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-pvkqz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-08-20T11:53:32.121Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ananish Chaudhuri
Ananish Chaudhuri*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Auckland, 655 Owen G Glenn Building Level 6, 12 Grafton Road, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
*
e-mail: a.chaudhuri@auckland.ac.nz
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.

Keywords

Public goodsConditional cooperationMonetary punishmentsNon-monetary punishmentsMoral suasionSorting

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C71: Cooperative Games C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 47 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Ahn, T., Isaac, R. M., & Salmon, T. (2009). Coming and going: experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 336–351.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ambrus, A., & Pathak, P. (2009). Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments. Working Paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University.Google Scholar
Anderson, C., & Putterman, L. (2006). Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(1), 1–24.10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, S., Goeree, J., & Holt, C. (1998). A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games. Journal of Public Economics, 70, 297–323.10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00035-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291–304.10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving. Economic Journal, 100, 464–477.10.2307/2234133CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J. (1995). Cooperation in public goods experiments: kindness or confusion? American Economic Review, 85(4), 891–904.Google Scholar
Andreoni, J. (2006). Philanthropy. In: Kolm, S.-C. & Ythier, J. Mercier (Eds.), Handbook of giving, reciprocity and altruism (pp. 1201–1269). Amsterdam: North Holland.Google Scholar
Andreoni, J., & Croson, R. (2008). Partners versus strangers: random rematching in public goods experiments. In Plott, C. & Smith, V. L. (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics results (pp. 776–783). Amsterdam: North-Holland.10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00082-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004). Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fundraising. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1605–1623.10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00040-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVI, 818–860.Google Scholar
Asch, S. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment. In Guetzkow, H. (Ed.), Groups, leadership and men. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press.Google Scholar
Asch, S. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193, 31–35.10.1038/scientificamerican1155-31CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 10951111.10.2307/1960858CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bardsley, N., & Sausgrüber, R. (2005). Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26, 664–681.10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behaviour, 10, 122–142.10.1006/game.1995.1027CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bewley, T. (1999). Why don't wages fall in a recession? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.10.4159/9780674020900CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bewley, T. (2005). Fairness, reciprocity and wage rigidity. In Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (Eds.), Moral sentiments and material interests: the foundations of cooperation in economic life (pp. 303–338). Cambridge: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/4771.003.0017CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bochet, O., & Putterman, L. (2009). Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment. European Economic Review, 53(3), 309–326.10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bochet, O., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006). Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60(1), 11–26.10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bohm, P. (1972). Estimating demand for public goods: an experiment. European Economic Review, 3, 111–130.10.1016/0014-2921(72)90001-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bohm, P. (1983). Revealing demand for an actual public good. Journal of Public Economics, 24, 135–151.10.1016/0047-2727(84)90021-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bohnet, I., Frey, B., & Huck, S. (2001). More order with less law: on contract enforcement, trust, and crowding. American Political Science Review, 95, 131–144.10.1017/S0003055401000211CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolton, G., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC—a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review, 90, 166–193.10.1257/aer.90.1.166CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Homo reciprocans. Nature, 415, 125–128.10.1038/415125aCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000). Hot vs. cold: sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games. Experimental Economics, 2(3), 227–238.10.1023/A:1009962612354CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2009). The strategy versus the direct response method: a survey of experimental comparisons. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of California—Santa Barbara and Department of Business Economics, U. Autonoma de Barcelona.Google Scholar
Brandts, J., & Schram, A. (2001). Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contributions function approach. Journal of Public Economics, 79, 399–427.10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00120-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandts, J., Saijo, T., & Schram, A. (2004). How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms. Public Choice, 119, 381–424.10.1023/B:PUCH.0000033329.53595.1bCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brosig, J., Ockenfels, A., & Weimann, J. (2003). The effect of communication media on cooperation. German Economic Review, 4(2), 217–241.10.1111/1468-0475.00080CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bryan, J., & Test, M. (1967). Models and helping: naturalistic studies in aiding behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 400–407.10.1037/h0024826CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Burlando, R., & Guala, F. (2005). Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments. Experimental Economics, 8(1), 35–54.10.1007/s10683-005-0436-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cardenas, J., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. (2002). Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality. Ecological Economics, 40, 379–395.10.1016/S0921-8009(01)00285-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carpenter, J. (2004). When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods. Journal of Socio Economics, 33(4), 395–408.10.1016/j.socec.2004.04.009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carpenter, J. (2007a). Punishing free-riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 31–51.10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carpenter, J. (2007b). The demand for punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62(4), 522–542.10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carpenter, J., & Seki, E. (2009, forthcoming). Do social preferences increase productivity? Field experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyama Bay. Economic Inquiry, doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00268.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cavalli-Sforza, L., & Feldman, M. (1981). Cultural transmission and evolution: a quantitative approach. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google ScholarPubMed
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–869.10.1162/003355302760193904CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G., & Yang, C. (2007). Endogenous group formation and public goods provision: exclusion, exit, mergers and redemption. Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of California-Santa Barbara. Available. at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=932251.Google Scholar
Chaudhuri, A. (2009). Experiments in economics: playing fair with money. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Chaudhuri, A., & Paichayontvijit, T. (2006). Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to a public good. Economics Bulletin, 3(8), 1–14.Google Scholar
Chaudhuri, A., & Paichayontvijit, T. (2010a, forthcoming). Recommended play versus costly punishments in a laboratory voluntary contributions mechanism. In Dastidar, K. Ghosh, Mukhopadhyay, H., & Sinha, U. (Eds.), Dimensions of economic theory and policy: essays for Anjan Mukherji. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chaudhuri, A., & Paichayonvijit, T. (2010b). Does strategic play explain the decay in contributions in laboratory public goods games? Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Auckland.Google Scholar
Chaudhuri, A., Graziano, S., & Maitra, P. (2006). Social learning and norms in a public goods experiment with intergenerational advice. Review of Economic Studies, 73(2), 357–380.10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.0379.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2005). Can second order punishment deter perverse punishment? Experimental Economics, 9, 265–279.10.1007/s10683-006-9127-zCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006). Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1421–1435.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, D., & Kagel, J. (2009, forthcoming). Other regarding preferences: a survey of experimental results In Kagel, J. & Roth, A. (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics (Vol. 2). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Cox, J., Friedman, D., & Gjerstad, S. (2007). A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 17–45.10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, J., Friedman, D., & Sadiraj, V. (2008). Revealed altruism. Econometrica, 76(1), 31–69.10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00817.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croson, R. (2007). Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games. Economic inquiry, 45(2), 199–216.10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00006.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawes, R. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawes, R., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communication and assumptions about other people's behavior in a common dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 1–11.10.1037/0022-3514.35.1.1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawes, R., Orbell, J., Simmons, R., & van de Kragt, A. (1986). Organizing groups for collective action. American Political Science Review, 8, 1171–1185.10.2307/1960862CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Oleveira, A., Croson, R., & Eckel, C. (2009). One bad apple: uncertainty and heterogeneity in public good provision. Working paper, Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts- Amherst. .Google Scholar
de Quervain, D., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schallhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., & Fehr, E. (2004). The neural basis of altruistic punishments. Science, 305, 1254–1258.10.1126/science.1100735CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Denant-Boemont, L., Masclet, D., & Noussair, C. (2007). Punishment, counter punishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment. Economic Theory, 33, 145–167.10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 268–298.10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Efferson, C. H. Bernhard, Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2010). The ultimate origins of human prosocial behavior: an empirical test. Working paper, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.Google Scholar
Egas, M., & Riedl, A. (2008). The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 275(1637), 871–878.10.1098/rspb.2007.1558CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ehrhart, K.-M., & Keser, C. (1999). Cooperation and mobility: on the run. Working paper, CIRANO and University of Karlsruhe.Google Scholar
Ertan, A., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2009). Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem. European Economic Review, 53(5), 495–511.10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 293–315.10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., & Camerer, C. (2007). Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social preferences. Trends in Cognitive Science, 11(10), 419–427.10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.002CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004a). Third party punishment and social norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63–87.10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004b). Social norms and human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 185–190.10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005a). Altruists with green beards. Analyse & Kritik, 27(1), 73–84.10.1515/auk-2005-0103CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005b). Human altruism: proximate patterns and evolutionary origins. Analyse & Kritik, 27(1), 6–47.10.1515/auk-2005-0101CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980–994.10.1257/aer.90.4.980CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140.10.1038/415137aCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.10.1162/003355399556151CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2009). On the behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments. Discussion Paper No. 2009-25, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham.Google Scholar
Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2010). Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments. American Economic Review, 100(1), 541–556.10.1257/aer.100.1.541CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3), 397–404.10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, B., & Meier, S. (2004). Social comparisons and pro-social behavior. Testing ‘conditional cooperation’ in a field experiment. American Economic Review, 94(5), 1717–1722.10.1257/0002828043052187CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, B., & Torgler, B. (2007). Tax morale and conditional cooperation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 35, 136–159.10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gächter, S. (2007). Conditional cooperation. Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications. In Frey, B. & Stutzer, A. (Eds.), Economics and psychology. A promising new cross-disciplinary field. CESifo Seminar Series. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gächter, S., & Hermann, B. (2009). Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross cultural experiment. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 791–806.10.1098/rstb.2008.0275CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gächter, S., & Herrmann, B. (2010, forthcoming). The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia. European Economic Review. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.04.003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gächter, S., & Thöni, C. (2005). Social learning and voluntary cooperation among like-minded people. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2-3), 303–314.10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.303CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gächter, S., & Thöni, C. (2007). Rationality and commitment in voluntary cooperation: insights from experimental economics. In Fabienne, P. & Schmidt, H.B. (Eds.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gächter, S., Renner, E., & Sefton, M. (2008). The long run benefits of punishment. Science, 322, 1510.10.1126/science.1164744CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1989). Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 60–79.10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (Eds.) (2005). Moral sentiments and material interests. Cambridge: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/4771.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griesinger, D., & Livingston, J. (1973). Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in experimental games. Behavioral Science, 18, 173–188.10.1002/bs.3830180305CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guala, F. (2010). Reciprocity: weak or strong? what punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. IDEAS Working Paper 2010-23, University of Milan. http://ideas.repec.org/p/mil/wpdepa/2010-23.html.Google Scholar
Gunnthorsdottir, A., Houser, D., & McCabe, K. (2007). Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(2), 304–315.10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gürerk, Ö., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006). The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science, 312, 108–111.10.1126/science.1123633CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hamilton, W. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behavior. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 37, 1–52.10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (2001). Why people punish defectors: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208, 79–89.10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Henrich, J., Heine, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). Most people are not WEIRD. Nature, 466, 29.10.1038/466029aCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (Eds.) (2004). Foundations of human sociality: economic experiments and ethnographic evidence in fifteen small-scale societies. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0199262055.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hermann, B., & Thöni, C. (2008). Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication study in Russia. Experimental Economics, 12(1), 87–92.10.1007/s10683-008-9197-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hermann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishments across societies. Science, 319, 1362–1367.10.1126/science.1153808CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R., & Walker, J. (1988a). Communication and free riding behavior: the voluntary contributions mechanism. Economic Inquiry, 26(4), 585–608.10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R., & Walker, J. (1988b). Group size effects in public goods provision: the voluntary contributions mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 179–199.10.2307/1882648CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R., Walker, J., & Thomas, S. (1984). Divergent evidence on free riding: an experimental examination of possible explanations. Public Choice, 43, 113–149.10.1007/BF00140829CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R., McCue, K., & Plott, C. (1985). Public goods provision in an experimental environment. Journal of Public Economics, 26, 51–74.10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R., Walker, J., & Williams, A. (1994). Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 54, 1–36.10.1016/0047-2727(94)90068-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahan, D. (2005). The logic of reciprocity: trust, collective action, and law. In Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (Eds.), Moral sentiments and material interests: the foundations of cooperation in economic life (pp. 339–378). Cambridge: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/4771.003.0018CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelley, H., & Stahelski, A. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91.10.1037/h0029849CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keser, C., & van Winden, F. (2000). Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(1), 23–39.10.1111/1467-9442.00182CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, O., & Walker, M. (1984). The free rider problem: experimental evidence. Public Choice, 43, 3–24.10.1007/BF00137902CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knoch, D., Giannoti, L., Baumgartner, T., & Fehr, E. (2010). A neural marker of costly punishment behavior. Psychological Science, 21(3), 337–342.10.1177/0956797609360750CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kocher, M., Cherry, T., Kroll, S., Netzer, R., & Sutter, M. (2008). Conditional cooperation on three continents. Economics Letters, 101(3), 175–178.10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.015CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., & Riedl, A. (2009). Institution formation in public goods games. American Economic Review, 99(4), 1335–1355.10.1257/aer.99.4.1335CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245–252.10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kurzban, R., & Houser, D. (2005). An experimental investigation of cooperative types in human groups: a complement to evolutionary theory and simulations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(5), 1803–1807.10.1073/pnas.0408759102CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ledyard, O. (1995). Public goods: some experimental results. In Kagel, J. & Roth, A. (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Chap. 2).Google Scholar
Liebrand, W. (1984). The effects of social motives, communication and group size on behavior in an n- person multi stage mixed motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239–264.10.1002/ejsp.2420140302CrossRefGoogle Scholar
List, J., & Lucking-Reiley, D. (2002). The effects of seed money and refunds on charitable giving: experimental evidence from a university capital campaign. Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 215–233.10.1086/324392CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, R., & Randal, J. (2008). How is donation behavior affected by the donations of others? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67(1), 228–238.10.1016/j.jebo.2007.08.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. (1979). Experiments on provision of public goods I: resources, interest, group size, and the free riding problem. American Journal of Sociology, 84(6), 1335–1360.10.1086/226937CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. (1980). Experiments on provision of public goods II: provision point, stake, experience, and the free riding problem. American Journal of Sociology, 85(4), 926–937.10.1086/227094CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. (1981). Economists free ride, does anyone else? Journal of Public Economics, 15, 295–310.10.1016/0047-2727(81)90013-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Villeval, M., & Tucker, S. (2003). Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. American Economic Review, 93(1), 366–380.10.1257/000282803321455359CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moscovici, S. (1985). Social influence and conformity. In Lindzey, G. & Aronson, E. (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Nikiforakis, N. (2008). Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: can we really govern ourselves? Journal of Public Economics, 92, 91–112.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nikiforakis, N. (2010). Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public goods experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 689–702.10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nikiforakis, N., & Normann, H. (2008). A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public good experiments. Experimental Economics, 11, 358–369.10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Noussair, C., & Tucker, S. (2005). Combining monetary and social sanctions to promote cooperation. Economic Inquiry, 43(3), 649–660.10.1093/ei/cbi045CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., & Schram, A. (1996). Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods. Economic Journal, 106(437), 817–845.10.2307/2235360CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.10.4159/9780674041660CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ones, U., & Putterman, L. (2007). The ecology of collective action: a public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(4), 495–521.10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.018CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Orbell, J., Dawes, R., & van de Kragt, A. (1990). The limits of multilateral promising. Ethics, 100, 616627.10.1086/293213CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511807763CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review, 86(2), 404–417.10.2307/1964229CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (Eds.) (1994). Rules, games, and common pool resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.10.3998/mpub.9739CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page, T., Putterman, L., & Unel, B. (2005). Voluntary association in public goods experiments: reciprocity, mimicry, and efficiency. Economic Journal, 115, 1032–1053.10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palfrey, T., & Prisbrey, J. (1997). Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: how much and why? American Economic Review, 87, 829–846.Google Scholar
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 80(5), 1281–1302.Google Scholar
Rege, M., & Telle, K. (2004). The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations. Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-8), 1625–1644.10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006). The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature, 444, 718–723.10.1038/nature05229CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Seely, B., Van Huyck, J., & Battalio, R. (2005). Credible assignments can improve efficiency in laboratory public goods games. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1437–1455.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sefton, M., Shupp, R., & Walker, J. (2007). The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods. Economic inquiry, 45(4), 671–690.10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Selten, R. (1967). Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments. In Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung (Vol. I, pp. 136–168). Tübingen: Mohr.Google Scholar
Sober, E., & Wilson, D. (1998). Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offerman, T. (1999). Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart. Economics Letters, 62(1), 35–41.10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spitzer, M., Fischbacher, U., Herrnberger, B., Grön, G., & Fehr, E. (2007). The neural signature of social norm compliance. Neuron, 56, 185–196.10.1016/j.neuron.2007.09.011CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 36–57.10.1086/406755CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vesterlund, L. (2003). The informational value of sequential fundraising. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 627–657.10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00187-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walker, J., & Halloran, M. (2004). Rewards and sanctions and the provision of public goods in one-shot settings. Experimental Economics, 7(3), 235–247.10.1023/B:EXEC.0000040559.08652.51CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(1), 110–116.10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yamagishi, T. (1988). The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States and Japan. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51(3), 265–271.10.2307/2786924CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The handicap principle: a missing piece of Darwin's puzzle. New York: Oxford University of Press.10.1093/oso/9780195100358.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar