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The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Abigail Barr  and
Danila Serra
Abigail Barr*
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Danila Serra*
Affiliation:
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
*
e-mail: abigail.barr@economics.ox.ac.uk
e-mail: dserra@fsu.edu
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Abstract

Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.

Keywords

CorruptionEconomic experimentSocial preferences

JEL classification

D73: Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior Z13: Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology • Language • Social and Economic Stratification

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 2009 , pp. 488 - 503
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2009

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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