Hostname: page-component-54dcc4c588-54gsr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-06T15:10:28.581Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The coordinating power of social norms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Francesco Fallucchi  and
Daniele Nosenzo Open the ORCID record for Daniele Nosenzo [Opens in a new window]
Francesco Fallucchi
Affiliation:
Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
Daniele Nosenzo*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
*
Daniele.Nosenzo@econ.au.dk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber in J Eur Econ Assoc 11(3):495–524, 2013). The Krupka–Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka–Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points in two series of experiments with more than 3000 subjects. We find that the method is robust, especially when there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior.

Keywords

Social normsKrupka–Weber methodCoordinationFocal pointSaliencyDictator gameC72C91

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 25 , Issue 1 , February 2022 , pp. 1 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09717-8.

References

Bacharach, M, & Bernasconi, M (1997). The variable frame theory of focal points: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 19(1), 1–45. 10.1006/game.1997.0546CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Banerjee, R (2016). On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: Moral frames and social norms. Experimental Economics, 19(1), 240–267. 10.1007/s10683-015-9436-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bardsley, N, Mehta, J, Starmer, C, & Sugden, R (2010). Explaining focal points: Cognitive hierarchy theory versus team reasoning*. The Economic Journal, 120(543), 40–79. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02304.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barr, A, Lane, T, & Nosenzo, D (2018). On the social appropriateness of discrimination. Journal of Public Economics, 164, 153–164. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benjamini, Y, & Hochberg, Y (1995). Controlling the false discovery rate: A practical and powerful approach to multiple testing. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B (Methodological), 57(1), 289–300. 10.1111/j.2517-6161.1995.tb02031.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bicchieri, C., Dimant, E., Gaechter, S., & Nosenzo, D. (2019). Observability, social proximity, and the erosion of norm compliance. SSRN discussion paper 3355028. Rochester, NY.Google Scholar
Burks, SV, & Krupka, E (2012). A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy: Evidence from the financial services industry. Management Science, 58(1), 203–217. 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1478CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bursztyn, L, González, AL, & Yanagizawa-Drott, D (2020). Misperceived social norms: Women working outside the home in Saudi Arabia. American Economic Review, 110(10), 2997–3029. 10.1257/aer.20180975CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Butler, J, Giuliano, P, & Guiso, L (2016). Trust and cheating. The Economic Journal, 126(595), 1703–1738. 10.1111/ecoj.12271CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chang, D, Chen, R, & Krupka, E (2019). Rhetoric matters: A social norms explanation for the anomaly of framing. Games and Economic Behavior, 116, 158–178. 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G., & Sontuoso, A. (2019). The doors of perception. Working paper https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/292/.Google Scholar
Crawford, VP, Gneezy, U, & Rottenstreich, Y (2008). The power of focal points is limited: Even minute payoff asymmetry may yield large coordination failures. American Economic Review, 98(4), 1443–1458. 10.1257/aer.98.4.1443CrossRefGoogle Scholar
d’Adda, G, Darai, D, Pavanini, N, & Weber, RA (2017). Do Leaders affect ethical conduct?. Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(6), 1177–1213. 10.1093/jeea/jvw027CrossRefGoogle Scholar
d’Adda, G, Dufwenberg, M, Passarelli, F, & Tabellini, G (2020). Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 124, 288–304. 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.012CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Erkut, H, Nosenzo, D, & Sefton, M (2015). Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs stakeholders. Economics Letters, 130, 28–31. 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E, & Schurtenberger, I (2018). Normative foundations of human cooperation. Nature Human Behaviour, 2(7), 458–468. 10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gächter, S, Gerhards, L, & Nosenzo, D (2017). The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing. European Economic Review, 97(C), 72–86. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.06.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gächter, S., Molleman, L., & Nosenzo, D. (2021). When and why people follow rules. Working paper under preparation.Google Scholar
Gächter, S, Nosenzo, D, & Sefton, M (2013). Peer effects in pro-social behavior: Social norms or social preferences?. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 548–573. 10.1111/jeea.12015CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gangadharan, L, Jain, T, Maitra, P, & Vecci, J (2016). Social identity and governance: The behavioral response to female leaders. European Economic Review, 90, 302–325. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giamattei, M, Yahosseini, KS, Gächter, S, & Molleman, L (2020). LIONESS Lab: A free web-based platform for conducting interactive experiments online. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 6(1), 95–111. 10.1007/s40881-020-00087-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guala, F, & Mittone, L (2010). How history and convention create norms: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(4), 749–756. 10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hargreaves Heap, S, Arjona, DR, & Sugden, R (2014). How portable is level-0 behavior? A Test of level-k theory in games with non-neutral frames. Econometrica, 82(3), 1133–1151. 10.3982/ECTA11132Google Scholar
He, S, & Wu, J (2020). Compromise and coordination: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 119, 216–233. 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holm, HJ (2000). Gender-based focal points. Games and Economic Behavior, 32(2), 292–314. 10.1006/game.1998.0685CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isoni, A, Poulsen, A, Sugden, R, & Tsutsui, K (2013). Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence. European Economic Review, 59, 167–188. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isoni, A, Poulsen, A, Sugden, R, & Tsutsui, K (2019). Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 114, 193–214. 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kimbrough, EO, & Vostroknutov, A (2016). Norms make preferences social. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14, 608–638. 10.1111/jeea.12152CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kimbrough, EO, & Vostroknutov, A (2018). A portable method of eliciting respect for social norms. Economics Letters, 168, 147–150. 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.030CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krupka, E, Leider, S, & Jiang, M (2017). A meeting of the minds: Informal agreements and social norms. Management Science, 63(6), 1657–2048. 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2429CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krupka, E, & Weber, RA (2009). The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(3), 307–320. 10.1016/j.joep.2008.11.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krupka, E, & Weber, RA (2013). Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary?. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 495–524. 10.1111/jeea.12006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Maniadis, Z, Tufano, F, & List, JA (2014). One swallow doesn’t make a summer: New evidence on anchoring effects. American Economic Review, 104(1), 277–290. 10.1257/aer.104.1.277CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mehta, J, Starmer, C, & Sugden, R (1994). Focal points in pure coordination games—An experimental investigation. Theory and Decision, 36(2), 163–185. 10.1007/BF01079211CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mehta, J, Starmer, C, & Sugden, R (1994). The nature of salience—An experimental investigation of pure coordination games. American Economic Review, 84(3), 658–673.Google Scholar
Nikiforakis, N, Oechssler, J, & Shah, A (2014). Hierarchy, coercion, and exploitation: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 97, 155–168. 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.06.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137–158. 10.1257/jep.14.3.137CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parravano, M, & Poulsen, O (2015). Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 94, 191–199. 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reuben, E, & Riedl, A (2013). Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 122–137. 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schelling, T. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schram, A, & Charness, G (2015). Inducing social norms in laboratory allocation choices. Management Science, 61(7), 1531–1546. 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2073CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simes, RJ (1986). An improved Bonferroni procedure for multiple tests of significance. Biometrika, 73(3), 751–754. 10.1093/biomet/73.3.751CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sitzia, S, & Zheng, J (2019). Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points—An experimental investigation. Games and Economic Behavior, 117, 461–478. 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, R. (1986). The economics of rights, co-operation and welfare. (2005th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Fallucchi and Nosenzo supplementary material

Fallucchi and Nosenzo supplementary material
Download Fallucchi and Nosenzo supplementary material(File)
File 2.3 MB