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A general theory of power concentration: demographic influences on political organization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2018

John Gerring ,
Matthew Maguire  and
Jillian Jaeger
John Gerring*
Affiliation:
Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
Matthew Maguire
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Jillian Jaeger
Affiliation:
Department of Government, St. Lawrence University, Canton, NY, USA
*
*E-mail: jgerring@austin.utexas.edu
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Abstract

Why is the exercise of political power highly concentrated in some polities and widely dispersed in others? We argue that one important causal factor is demographic. Populous polities are characterized by less concentrated structures of authority. To explain this relationship, we invoke two mechanisms: heterogeneity and trust. The theory is demonstrated with a wide variety of empirical measures in cross-country analyses including most sovereign states and extending back to the 19th century. The result suggests the possibility of a ubiquitous ‘law’ of politics.

Keywords

demographypower concentrationcentralization

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , November 2018 , pp. 491 - 513
Copyright
© European Consortium for Political Research 2018 

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