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PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2016

Alan Millar
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Abstract

Should a philosophical account of perceptual knowledge accord a justificatory role to sensory experiences? This discussion raises problems for an affirmative answer and sets out an alternative account on which justified belief is conceived as well-founded belief and well-foundedness is taken to depend on knowledge. A key part of the discussion draws on a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities to account for how perception gives rise both to perceptual knowledge and to well-founded belief.

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Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 1: The Epistemology of Perception , March 2016 , pp. 43 - 59
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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