Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-hn9fh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-08-18T04:26:43.023Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND REASONING

Review products

Critical Note on Rationality through Reasoning, JohnBroome. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2014

Herlinde Pauer-Studer
Herlinde Pauer-Studer*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Austria
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This critical note concerns John Broome's book Rationality through Reasoning (2013). Broome claims that rationality amounts to satisfying rational requirements as opposed to responding correctly to reasons. My critique focuses on two issues. First, I try to show that Broome's account of rational requirements, in particular his answer to the so-called ‘symmetry-problem’, presupposes that responding correctly to reasons is part of rationality. Secondly, in discussing Broome's account of reasoning I criticize his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and, hence, no normative thoughts on behalf of the reasoner.

Information

Type
Critical Notice
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , November 2014 , pp. 513 - 528
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Boghossian, P. 2012. What is inference? Philosophical Studies. doi: 10.1007/s11098-012-9903-x.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 1999. Normative requirements. Ratio 12: 398–419. Reprinted in Normativity, ed. J. Dancy, 78–99. Blackwell, 2000.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2002. Practical reasoning. In Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, ed. Bermúdez, J. L. and Millar, A., 85–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2004. Reasons. In Reasons and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. Wallace, R. J., Smith, M., Scheffler, S. and Pettit, P., 28–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2007. Does rationality consist in responding correctly to reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4: 349–374.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2008. Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity. Ethics 119, 1: 96–108.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2009. The unity of reasoning? In Spheres of Reason, ed. Robertson, S., 62–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2012. Comments on Boghossian. Philosophical Studies. doi: 10.1007/s11098-012-9894-7.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2013. Rationality through Reasoning. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Gjelsvik, O. 2013. Understanding Enkratic reasoning. Organon F 20, 4: 464–483.Google Scholar
Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. The activity of reason. The Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 83, 2: 23–43. Reprinted in 2011, Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon, ed. R. J. Wallace, R. Kumar and S. Freeman, 3–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Raz, J. 1999. Explaining normativity: on rationality and the justification of reason. In Engaging Reason, 67–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schroeder, M. 2004. The scope of instrumental reason. Philosophical Perspectives 18, 1: 337–364.Google Scholar
Shah, N. 2003. How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review 112, 4: 447–482.Google Scholar
Shah, N. and Velleman, J. D.. 2005. Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review 114, 4: 497–534.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shpall, S. 2013. Wide and narrow scope. Philosophical Studies 163, 3: 717–736.Google Scholar
Velleman, J. D. 2000. The possibility of practical reason. In The Possibility of Practical Reason, 170–199. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Way, J. 2010. Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason. Philosophical Studies 147: 213–233. doi: 10.1007/s1 1098-008-9277–2.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2012. Comment on Paul Boghossian, ‘What is inference’. Philosophical Studies. doi: 10.1007/s11098-012-9892-9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar