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Impartiality and democracy: an objection to political exchange

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2022

Matthew T. Jeffers Open the ORCID record for Matthew T. Jeffers [Opens in a new window]
Matthew T. Jeffers*
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Email: jeffers.matt7@gmail.com
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Abstract

The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid equality concerns and inalienability concerns. I offer an alternative critique to formal mechanisms that encourage political exchange by drawing on the role that impartiality and impartial moral judgements play in democratic and electoral institutions.

Keywords

Democratic theorypolitical exchangevoting systemspublic choiceD63D70D72D82

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Article
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , March 2024 , pp. 166 - 189
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© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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