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Status Quo Basing and the Logic of Value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Frederic Schick
Frederic Schick
Affiliation:
Rutgers University
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Extract

Some writers have noted that valuation is often focused on foreseen changes. They say that we often don't value situations in terms of what we would have in them only but also in terms of the gains or losses that they offer us — that we then focus on departures from our status quo. They argue that such thinking conflicts with basic economic analysis, and also that it violates logic: they say that it is irrational. I agree that it seems to be common. But is such a way of setting one's values a challenge to economics? And does it conflict with being rational?

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Type
Essays
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , April 1999 , pp. 23 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999

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