Hostname: page-component-54dcc4c588-r5qjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-12T07:52:43.312Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Vicarious Actions and Social Teleology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 April 2021

Philippe A. Lusson Open the ORCID record for Philippe A. Lusson [Opens in a new window]
Philippe A. Lusson*
Affiliation:
New York University in Paris, Paris, France
*
Email: pal305@nyu.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Actions receive teleological descriptions and reason explanations. In some circumstances, these descriptions and explanations might appeal not just to the agent’s own purposes and reasons, but also to the purposes and reasons of others in her social surroundings. Some actions have a social teleology. I illustrate this phenomenon and I propose a concept of vicarious action to account for it. An agent acts vicariously when she acts in response to the demand of another agent who knew that her demand was likely to succeed. I argue that vicariousness grounds the social teleology of the resulting actions.

Keywords

actionorderdemandcollective actionintention

Information

Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 51 , Issue 2 , February 2021 , pp. 108 - 122
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963. Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Austin, John L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Austin, John L. 1957. “A Plea for Excuses.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1): 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bratman, Michael E. 2009. “Shared Agency.” In Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, edited by Mantzavinos, Chris, 41–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burge, Tyler. 1979. “Individualism and the Mental.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Butterfill, Stephen A. 2016. “Joint Action: A Minimalist Approach.” In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind, edited by Kiverstein, Julian, 357–69. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jankovic, Marija, and Ludwig, Kirk, eds. 2017. The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kukla, Rebecca, and Lance, Mark. 2009. “Yo!” and “Lo!”: The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk. 2015. “Shared Agency in Modest Sociality.” Journal of Social Ontology 1: 7–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk. 2016. From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pacherie, Elisabeth. 2013. “Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.” Synthese 190 (10): 1817–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2017. “Entitlement to Reasons for Action.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Vol. 4, edited by Shoemaker, David, 76–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shapiro, Scott J. 2010. Legality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Velleman, J. David. 1997. “How to Share an Intention.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 29–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar