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The Petitio: Aristotle's Five Ways

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

John Woods  and
Douglas Walton
John Woods
Affiliation:
University of Lethbridge
Douglas Walton
Affiliation:
University of Winnipeg
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Extract

If one looks to the current textbook lore for reliable taxonomic and analytical information about the petitio principii, one is met with conceptual disarray and much too much nonsense. The present writers have recently attempted to furnish the beginnings of a theoretical reconstruction of this fallacy which is at once faithful to its formidable complexity yet useful as guide for its detection and avoidance. The fact is that the petitio has had a lengthy and interesting history, and in this paper we shall want to explore certain features of its development, such as it may have been. The principal origins of the concept of circular argument are to be found in Aristotle. The Aristotelian doctrine recurs with variations in the sophismata literature of the middle ages and in logic texts and manuals right up to the present day.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 1982 , pp. 77 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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