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Courage, cowardice, and Maher’s misstep

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Brent G. Kyle
Brent G. Kyle*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, United States Air Force Academy, USAF Academy, CO, USA
*
E-mail: brent.kyle@usafa.edu, bgk5@cornell.edu
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Abstract

Could a Nazi soldier or terrorist be courageous? The Courage Problem asks us to answer this sort of question, and then to explain why people are reluctant to give this answer. The present paper sheds new light on the Courage Problem by examining a controversy sparked by Bill Maher, who claimed that the 9/11 terrorists’ acts were ‘not cowardly.’ It is shown that Maher’s controversy is fundamentally related to the Courage Problem. Then, a unified solution to both problems is provided. This solution entails that gutsy people who lack good ends are not courageous.

Keywords

Couragecowardicevirtuegoodnessmoral couragephysical courageconversational implicaturenegative strengtheninglitotes

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , 2017 , pp. 565 - 587
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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