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Aiming at the good

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Amir Saemi
Amir Saemi*
Affiliation:
School of Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Niavaran, P.O. Box 19395-5746, Tehran, Iran
*
*Email: saemi.amir@gmail.com
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Abstract

This paper shows how we can plausibly extend the guise of the good thesis in a way that avoids intellectualist challenge, allows animals to be included, and is consistent with the possibility of performing action under the cognition of their badness. The paper also presents some independent arguments for the plausibility of this interpretation of the thesis. To this aim, a teleological conception of practical attitudes as well as a cognitivist account of arational desires is offered.

Keywords

the guise of the gooddesireintentionpractical attitudesformal objectgoodcognitivismrepresentationfunctionteleological

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 197 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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