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Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Xingming Hu Open the ORCID record for Xingming Hu [Opens in a new window]
Xingming Hu*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Nanjing University, Jiangsu, China
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Abstract

According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding.

Keywords

Knowledgeunderstandinggraspepistemic valuetestimony

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Type
Articles
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , May 2019 , pp. 291 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2018

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