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Expressivism, meaning, and all that

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sebastian Köhler
Sebastian Köhler*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Law, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Frankfurt, Germany
*
E-mail: s.koehler@fs.de
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Abstract

It has recently been suggested that meta-normative expressivism is best seen as a meta-semantic, rather than a semantic view. One strong motivation for this is that expressivism becomes, thereby, compatible with truth-conditional semantics. While this approach is promising, however, many of its details are still unexplored. One issue that still needs to be explored in particular, is what accounts of propositional contents are open to meta-semantic expressivists. This paper makes progress on this issue by developing an expressivist-friendly deflationary account of such contents.

Keywords

Expressivismdeflationismpropositionsmeta-semanticsmeta-ethics

Information

Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 3-4: Special issue: Representation and Evaluation , 2018 , pp. 337 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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