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Emotionally guiding our actions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mary Carman
Mary Carman*
Affiliation:
Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
*
E-mail: marycarman@gmail.com
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Abstract

If emotions have a rational role in action, then one challenge for accounting for how we can act rationally when acting emotionally is to show how we can guide our actions by our emotional considerations, seen as reasons. In this paper, I put forward a novel proposal for how this can be so. Drawing on the interconnection between emotions, cares and caring, I argue that, as the emotional agent is a caring agent, she can be aware of the emotional consideration as a pro tanto reason favouring an action choice and, even, as the reason for which she should act.

Keywords

Emotionsemotional actionsrational actionguidancecaring

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , 2018 , pp. 43 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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