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Contingently existing propositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Nelson
Michael Nelson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, USA
*
*Email: michael.nelson@ucr.edu
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Abstract

I argue that propositions are contingent existents. Some propositions that in fact exist might not have existed and there might have been propositions that are distinct from every actually existing proposition. This is because some propositions are singular propositions, which are propositions containing ordinary objects as constituents, and so are ontologically dependent on the existence of those objects; had those objects not existed, then the singular propositions would not have existed. I provide both a philosophical and technical understanding of the contingent status of propositions.

Keywords

singular propositionsnecessitycontingencyexistence

Information

Type
Modal Metaphysics
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 776 - 803
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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