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An A-theory without tense operators

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Meghan Sullivan
Meghan Sullivan*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA.
*
Email: sullivan.meghan@gmail.com
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Abstract

A-theorists think there is a fundamental difference between the present and other times. This concern shows up in what kinds of properties they take to be instantiated, what objects they think exist and how they formalize their views. Nearly every contemporary A-theorist assumes that her metaphysics requires a tense logic – a logic with operators like (‘it was the case that...’) and (‘it will be the case that...’). In this paper, I show that there is at least one viable A-theory that does not require a logic with tense operators. And I will argue that three common indispensability arguments for tense operators are unsound.

Keywords

A-theorypredicate modifierseternalismpermanentismtense logic

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 735 - 758
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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