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Actions and accidents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

David Horst
David Horst*
Affiliation:
Martin Buber Society of Fellows, Mandel School for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Room 321/322, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel
*
*Email: david.horst@mail.huji.ac.il
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Abstract

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential that it represents its effect.

Keywords

intentional actioncausal theory of actionreasons as causesDonald DavidsonG.E.M. Anscombe

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , June 2015 , pp. 300 - 325
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2015

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