This letter investigates the electoral effects of symbolic class signalling through ‘cultural consumption’ in contemporary politics. We explore how politicians referring to an activity related to class-specific ‘cultural consumption’ – drinking beer in a pub or listening to classical music with a glass of wine – appeals to voters. We argue that symbolic class signalling has gained in importance due to the political realignment along the cultural dimension, and we expect radical right parties to benefit most from it. Our conjoint survey experiment with 1,550 respondents in Switzerland in January/February 2023 confirms our expectation. While many voters are biased against politicians claiming to enjoy classical music and wine, politicians drinking beer in a pub appeal particularly to radical right working-class voters without tertiary education. These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of symbolic politics and class identity in times of political transformation.

The existing literature shows that frequent elections depress electoral participation and contribute to the global decline in voter turnout. However, the causal mechanisms remain unclear. This paper investigates the sources of voter fatigue and hypothesizes that frequent elections make electoral abstention more acceptable to citizens. It tests the main hypothesis via an original pre-registered survey experiment fielded in five countries with a total sample size of 12,221 respondents. The results provide pioneering evidence on the psychological effects of election frequency. They confirm that high election frequency increases the social acceptability of electoral abstention and that this effect is proportional to the number of past elections. It can be equally observed among all major social groups, including politically engaged citizens and those who believe that voting is a civic duty. These findings hold major implications for our understanding of voter turnout and democratic institutional engineering.

Members of the ethnic majority tend to view immigrants and ethnic minorities as less willing to contribute to the collective. Why is this the case? I argue that in Europe, ethnic attributes signal citizens’ socioeconomic resources, cultural values, and norm compliance and that these factors, rather than ethnic identities per se, explain why citizens are expected (not) to contribute. Through a novel conjoint experimental design in Denmark that manipulated respondents’ access to information about these different mechanisms, the argument finds support. First, in information-sparse environments, ethnic majority members expect that minority members contribute substantially less to the provision of public goods than majority members. Second, this ethnic bias is reduced by each of the three mechanisms and explained away once information on all three is available. This demonstrates that negative expectations toward minorities operate through multiple, complementary channels and that stereotype-countering information can reduce the majority-minority expectation gap.

The extent to which the public takes an interest in politics has long been argued to be foundational to democracy, but the want of appropriate data has prevented cross-national and longitudinal analysis. This letter takes advantage of recent advances in latent-variable modelling of aggregate survey responses and a comprehensive collection of survey data to generate dynamic comparative estimates of macrointerest, that is, aggregate political interest, for over a hundred countries over the past four decades. These macrointerest scores are validated with other aggregate measures of political interest and of other types of political engagement. A cross-national and longitudinal analysis of macrointerest in advanced democracies reveals that along with election campaigns and inclusive institutions, it is good economic conditions, not bad times, that spur publics to greater interest in politics.

In an era of intergenerational inequality and political polarization, what might make older voters support greater government spending on the young? Building on literature concerning family-centric political preferences, we theorize that older voters support pro-youth policies and vote for pro-youth parties when they perceive younger relatives to be struggling financially due to emotional bonds and shared risks. Using a large, original survey of British adults, we find that negative evaluations of the financial wellbeing of one’s younger relatives – which are linked to their objective economic assets – are associated with support and prioritization of state investment in education, childcare and housing. They are also associated with opposition to the incumbent Conservatives, in a relationship mediated by assessments that this party represents young people badly. The implications are important for understanding how emotional connections, more than self-interest, sensitize voters to family-wide economic hardship and help produce ‘family-centric’ economic voting.

How, can the negative effects of partisan polarization on democratic attitudes be mitigated? Can polarized individuals be persuaded to choose democracy over party, that is, support a candidate from an opposing party who upholds democratic norms when their co-partisan candidate fails to do so? We tested the effect of an online civic education intervention conducted on over 41,000 individuals in thirty-three countries that was designed to promote the choice of ‘democracy’ by emphasizing the benefits of democratic versus autocratic regimes. The results are striking: exposure to civic education messages significantly dampens the negative effect of partisan polarization on anti-democratic co-partisan candidate choice. Civic education also has a small positive effect on polarization itself, with further exploration showing that this is the result of increased evaluations of parties that uphold democratic norms and practices, resulting in greater differences between democratic and anti-democratic parties.

This study investigates the effects of media exposure on gender gaps in political participation in post-war Liberia. Five weeks prior to the 2011 general election, women eligible voters in randomly selected villages were provided radio sets and organized to listen to and discuss a series of elections-related programmes from a ’trusted’ United Nations radio in group settings. Results show the programme had positive effects on measures of women’s political participation, but not on men’s political behaviours, suggesting potential narrowing of gender gaps. Results also show the programme improved the quality of women’s political engagement in a way that reflected their own preferences and voting autonomy. Mediation analysis suggests that programme effects likely occurred through enhanced women’s political knowledge and efficacy and by harnessing coordination and mobilization potential of pre-existing civil society groups of a political character.

We investigate how sexism and harassment affect political candidates’ preferences for political positions by deploying a conjoint experiment among political candidates in the 2021 Danish local elections. We find that, compared to men candidates, women candidates experience far more sexism and harassment, and assess their risk of victimization as being far higher. Correspondingly, the conjoint experiment reveals that women candidates state stronger preferences for equal working environments in politics than men, while holding similar preferences for formal working conditions like political positions, remuneration, and workload. Substantively, women’s willingness to lower their remuneration and increase their workload to avoid sexism in politics is more than double the size of men’s willingness. Our approach provides us with highly accurate descriptions of candidates’ preferences for political jobs, which are often assumed rather than measured directly. This lets us quantify the magnitude of an important working condition in politics with significant repercussions for women.

Existing research argues that malapportionment primarily favours rural areas, resulting in conservative biases of electoral systems. In this paper, we provide a new perspective on the study of apportionment processes by identifying the institutional design under which malapportionment may favour other regions. Because of the geographical sorting of non-citizen residents, we argue that regions with high shares of non-citizen residents benefit from population-based apportionment, whereas the spatial sorting of non-citizens does not affect malapportionment in the case of citizen-based apportionment. Empirically, we use sub-national data from ten advanced democracies to forward evidence that differences in apportionment mechanisms and district-level shares of non-citizen residents systematically influence malapportionment. Our findings suggest that the impact of malapportionment on political representation and public policies may be more heterogeneous than previously thought.

Why do some areas experience lower voter turnout even under compulsory voting systems? This paper examines the impact of migration turnover – encompassing both in- and out-migration – on voter turnout across communities. While past research has focused on migrant/non-migrant differences or in-/out-migration separately, we propose that both migratory movements tend to decrease political participation due to increased transaction and social costs. Using surveys and a new panel dataset combining census and voting records from over 5,000 Brazilian municipalities, we identify a robust negative association between local migratory turnover and voter turnout. This relationship holds across various time frames, levels of aggregation, analytical approaches, and variable definitions. Individual-level data analyses further corroborate these results. Additional tests suggest social costs constitute a key mechanism deterring turnout. These findings highlight the need to consider the broader consequences of population mobility for democratic processes and representation, particularly in areas experiencing higher levels of turnover.

The description of the long-run historical development of parliamentarism has presented an empirical and methodological challenge because it is only loosely related to constitutional writings. This article offers a solution. Using a wide variety of historiography, I collect data on government terminations in eleven West European states from the establishment of national parliaments until today. To describe the evolution of parliamentarism, I apply a Bayesian learning model that estimates institutional development as the change in current expectations about interactions grounded in past experience. The result is the first long-run continuous description of parliamentarism at the country level, which suggests that parliamentarism in many cases was established later than hitherto believed. In general, it is an institution of the Postwar period. The finding that unelected heads of state in several countries influenced government terminations well into the twentieth century also has implications for ideas about democratization.

How does a politician’s gender shape citizen responses to performance in office? Much of the existing literature suggests that voters hold higher expectations of women politicians and are more likely to punish them for malfeasance. An alternative perspective suggests that voters view men politicians as more agentic and are, therefore, more responsive to their performance, whether good or bad. Using an online survey experiment in Argentina, we randomly assign respondents to information that the distribution of a government food programme in a hypothetical city is biased or unbiased, and we also randomly assign the gender of the mayor. We find that respondents are more responsive to performance information – both positive and negative – about men mayors. We find little evidence that respondents hold different expectations of malfeasance by men versus women politicians. These results contribute to our understanding of how citizens process performance information in a context with few women politicians.

Why do Islamists regularly win elections in the Middle East? Why, for instance, did Ennahda perform well in every election in Tunisia’s democratic era (2011–2021)? I argue that regular interactions in mosques allow Islamists to build deeper ties and greater trust with their supporters than secular parties can. Post-election, this trust also allows Islamists to better sell their performance and justify their compromises, contributing to re-election as well. I test this infrastructure advantage in Tunisia in two ways. First, an original survey shows that mosque attendance strongly correlates with voting for Ennahda in the 2019 elections and that this correlation is driven by greater trust in Ennahda. Second, a dataset of Tunisia’s 6,000 mosques shows that sub-nationally, mosque density strongly correlated with Islamist vote share in the 2011, 2014, and 2019 elections. Overall, these results help us understand the continued victories of Islamist political parties even in contexts of poor performance.

It is often argued that when legislators have personal vote-seeking incentives, parties are less unified because legislators need to build bonds of accountability with their voters. I argue that these effects depend on a legislator’s ability to cultivate a personal vote. When parties control access to the ballot and the resources candidates need to cultivate personal votes, they can condition a legislator’s access to these resources on loyalty to the party’s agenda. I test this theory by conducting a difference-in-differences analysis that leverages the staggered implementation of the 2014 Mexican Electoral Reform. This reform introduced the possibility of consecutive reelection for state legislators, increasing their incentives to cultivate personal votes. I study unity in position-taking and voting behaviour of Mexican state legislators from 2012 to 2018. To analyze position-taking, I apply correspondence analysis to a new dataset of over half a million legislative speeches in twenty states. To study voting, I analyze over 14,500 roll-call votes in fourteen states during the same period. Results show that reelection incentives increased intra-party unity, which has broad implications for countries introducing electoral reforms aiming to personalize politics.

What factors contribute to closing the turnout gender gap after female enfranchisement? In the wake of franchise expansion, we test whether being a poll officer—and hence being exposed to election management—boosted the politicisation and mobilisation of women. In the context of the Spanish Second Republic (1931–1939), we exploit a lottery that assigned recently enfranchised women to be poll officers in the first election women were allowed to vote (1933). We use an original individual-level panel database and show that women randomly selected as polling officers were as likely to participate in subsequent elections than men, while the gender turnout gap persisted among the rest. Further analyses suggest that being poll officers made women more receptive to political organisations mobilisation strategies, and their presence had positive externalities by encouraging other women to participate. Our findings highlight the potential benefits of exposure to election engineering among groups previously excluded or less engaged with democracy.

In many authoritarian regimes, multiparty elections are held in which the opposition can potentially defeat the incumbent. How do ordinary citizens perceive the integrity of elections in such regime environments? We argue that government supporters adopt the incumbent’s narrative to consider elections fair and legitimate. By contrast, opposition supporters regard elections in such systems as biased and not meaningful. We provide evidence from large cross-country public opinion data and the unexpected 2018 Turkish snap election announcement to examine long- and short-term patterns of perceived electoral integrity. We find that the partisan gap in perceived electoral integrity is more substantial under electoral authoritarianism than under democratic rule. The partisan gap grows in autocratizing political systems, and these perceptions are mostly stable in the short term, even at times of radically increased salience of electoral competition. Our study yields implications for the dynamics between elites and citizens in autocracies in which elections remain a critical source of regime legitimacy.

How does rising access to the Internet shape elections in low-income democracies? In a controversial, overturned election in Malawi, I show how online exposure can reduce incumbency advantages and improve election administration. Leveraging geocoded polling station returns and the expansion of 3G coverage in a difference-in-differences setting, I show that ruling party vote share and election irregularities decline in areas newly exposed to the Internet. This is robust to a series of specifications, including matching on pre-treatment characteristics and adjusting for polling station complexity. To examine mechanisms, I turn to interviews and focus group discussions with voters, party figures and election officials. These reveal that opposition groups used social media to campaign and organise, online platforms expanded the reach of civic education efforts, and election staff used WhatsApp to coordinate on polling day. The paper contributes to the literature on information technology, party strategy, and election administration in low-income settings.

Why do citizens fail to punish political candidates who violate democratic standards at the ballot box? Building on recent debates about heterogeneous democratic attitudes among citizens, we probe how divergent understandings of democracy shape citizens’ ability to recognize democratic transgressions as such and, in turn, affect vote choice. We leverage a novel approach to estimate the behavioural consequences of such individual-level understandings of democracy via a candidate choice conjoint experiment in Poland, a democracy where elections remained competitive despite an extended episode of backsliding. Consistent with our argument, we find that respondents who adhere less strongly to liberal democratic norms tolerate democratic violations more readily. Conversely, voters with a stronger liberal understanding of democracy are more likely to punish non-liberal candidates, including co-partisan ones. Our study identifies political culture, particularly the lack of attitudinal consolidation around liberal democracy, as a missing variable in explaining continued voter support for authoritarian-leaning leaders.

One of the most important global political developments is the current wave of autocratization. Most research identifies this as an executive-led process, while others highlight the role opposition actors play in resisting it. We combine this work into a common framework asking, how (anti-)democratic are party systems? Party-system literature emphasises and measures policy differences, while we conceptualise party systems’ democratic positions highlighting to what extent divergent regime preferences are prevalent across parties. To estimate this dimension, we introduce the Party-System Democracy Index (PSDI), capable of tracking regime preferences across party systems from 1970 to 2019 across 178 countries and 3,151 country-years. We implement well-established content, convergent, and construct validity tests to confirm the PSDI’s reliability. Finally, we also show that the PSDI is an important predictor for regime changes in either direction and that changes in the PSDI can signal a looming regime change. This work provides a new framework for studying regime changes and contributes to the renewal of the party-systems literature.

Public sector worker absence has been cited as a reason for the poor performance of public services. This paper argues that the differential attention politicians pay to public services over their tenure cycle can explain levels of absenteeism. Using the case of teachers in India, teachers and politicians are embedded in a dynamic principal-agent relationship that allows for absenteeism when electoral incentives are not salient and results in increased accountability when they are. I constructed a panel of all schools across India between 2006 and 2018, employed an event study design, and found that teacher absenteeism decreases the year before an election and is higher the year after an election. I found inconsistent effects in the private sector, lending support for a channel of political control in the public sector. Political interference has an effect on bureaucratic performance, and relationships between public sector workers and politicians can ameliorate absenteeism.