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The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

Jake Quilty-Dunn Open the ORCID record for Jake Quilty-Dunn [Opens in a new window] ,
Nicolas Porot  and
Eric Mandelbaum Open the ORCID record for Eric Mandelbaum [Opens in a new window]
Jake Quilty-Dunn
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA quiltydunn@gmail.com; sites.google.com/site/jakequiltydunn/
Nicolas Porot
Affiliation:
Africa Institute for Research in Economics and Social Sciences, Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Ben Guerir, Morocco nicolasporot@gmail.com; nicolasporot.com
Eric Mandelbaum
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Department of Psychology, The Graduate Center & Baruch College, CUNY, New York, NY, USA eric.mandelbaum@gmail.com; ericmandelbaum.com
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Abstract

The target article attempted to draw connections between broad swaths of evidence by noticing a common thread: Abstract, symbolic, compositional codes, that is, language-of-thoughts (LoTs). Commentators raised concerns about the evidence and offered fascinating extensions to areas we overlooked. Here we respond and highlight the many specific empirical questions to be answered in the next decade and beyond.

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Type
Authors' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e292
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

All authors contributed equally; authorship is in reverse alphabetical order.

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