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The (Il)legitimacy of Constitutional Amendments in Africa and Democratic Backsliding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2024

Adem Kassie Abebe
Adem Kassie Abebe*
Affiliation:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, The Hague, Netherlands
*
Email: adem.abebe@gmail.com
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Abstract

In many African countries with hegemonic-party or de facto one-party systems, political leaders have historically exploited ostensibly proper constitutional amendments to undermine constitutionalism, a practice raising questions about the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of such amendments. This article argues that amendment legitimacy is contingent on achieving ‘broad consensus’, a concept endorsed by the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Traditional amendment procedures, such as supermajorities and referendums, while crucial, have proven to be imperfect proxies for ensuring such broad consensus. To more effectively safeguard the core constitutional rules of democratic governance, this article contends that political parties must be recognised as key sites of power division and checks and balances. Accordingly, constitutional amendment procedures should require some level of cross-party approval for key amendments, thus preventing individual political groups, regardless of their dominance, from unilaterally altering fundamental rules of the game. This approach would not only enhance the legitimacy of amendments but also serve as a safeguard against contemporary forms of democratic backsliding, where incumbents exploit formal processes to undermine democratic competition. While this process might make constitutional changes more difficult, it would apply only to a narrow set of fundamental aspects of constitutional democracy. Moreover, it does not necessarily conflict with popular self-governance (and its majoritarian expression), but instead calls for an inclusive re-imagining of majoritarianism.

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Asian Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 19 , Special Issue 3: Constitutional Legitimacy and Amendments , December 2024 , pp. 473 - 492
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the National University of Singapore

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Footnotes

*

Senior Advisor, Constitution-Building Processes and Democratization, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), The Hague, Netherlands; Extraordinary Lecturer, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, South Africa; Vice President, African Network of Constitutional Lawyers (ANCL).

References

1 UN Secretary General, ‘Guidance Note on United Nations Constitutional Assistance’ (originally released in 2009; updated in Sep 2020) <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SG%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Constitutional%20Assistance_2.pdf> accessed 21 Sept 2023.

2 This article does not seek to develop a methodology for assessing the legitimacy of constitutional amendments. Nor does it seek to provide detailed reasons why specific amendments have been considered illegitimate. Rather, it indicates the frequent reasons why the legitimacy of amendments has been contested in the African context, at the root of which is the perceived lack of ‘broad consensus’.

3 See Fombad, Charles Manga, ‘Some Perspectives on Durability and Change under Modern African Constitutions’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 382, 382CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 John Mukum Mbaku, ‘Threats to Democracy in Africa: The Rise of the Constitutional Coup’ (Brookings Institute, 30 Oct 2020) <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/> accessed 8 Feb 2024; Mbaku, John Mukum, ‘Constitutional Coups as a Threat to Democratic Governance in Africa’ (2018) 2 Cardozo International and Comparative Law Review 77Google Scholar.

5 Sethi, Amal, ‘Looking Beyond the Constituent Power Theory: The Theory of Equitable Elite Bargaining’ (2024) 13 Global Constitutionalism 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar, arguing that ‘a constitution is normatively legitimate if it is the product of an equitable bargain between elites from most major political groups in society at the moment of constitution-making’. See also Harel, Alon & Shinar, Adam, ‘Two Concepts of Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2023) 12 Global Constitutionalism 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar, in addition noting the importance of claims of legitimacy based on reason and justice.

6 See generally Albert, Richard, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (Oxford University Press 2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On Africa, see Jensen, Christian B, Kuenzi, Michelle & Mehanna, Jonathan-Georges, ‘Changing the Rules: Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa’ (2022) 57 African Spectrum 134Google Scholar; Fombad (n 3).

7 Jensen, Kuenzi & Mehanna (n 6); Fombad (n 3).

8 Landau, David, ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’ (2013) 47 UC Davis Law Review 189Google Scholar. In the African context, see Fombad (n 3).

9 Levinson, Daryl J & Pildes, Richard H, ‘Separation of Parties, Not Powers’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 2311Google Scholar.

10 Dixon, Rosalind & Landau, David, ‘Competitive Democracy and the Constitutional Minimum Core’, in Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z Huq (eds), Assessing Constitutional Performance (Cambridge University Press 2016)Google Scholar; Dixon, Rosalind & Landau, David, ‘Tiered Constitutional Design’ (2018) 86 George Washington Law Review 438Google Scholar; Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, ‘Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 606; David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, ‘Constraining Constitutional Change’ (2015) 50 Wake Forest Law Review 859; Landau, David & Dixon, Rosalind, ‘Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy’ (2020) 53 UC Davis Law Review 1313Google Scholar.

11 See Albert, Constitutional Amendments (n 6); Richard Albert, ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’ (2010) 42 Arizona State Law Journal 663, 707–711.

12 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds, University of California Press 1978).

13 Posner and Young speak of a ‘formalisation of politics’, see Posner, Daniel N & Young, Daniel J, ‘The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa’ (2007) 18 Journal of Democracy 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 ‘More than 90 Percent vote, paving the way for Congo president's third term’ (France 24, 27 Oct 2015) <https://www.france24.com/en/20151027-republic-congo-more-90-percent-approve-referendum-allowing-president-run-third-term> accessed 6 Feb 2024.

15 Adem Kassie Abebe, ‘The African Union's Hypocrisy Undermines Its Credibility’ (Foreign Policy, 27 Aug 2020) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/27/the-african-unions-hypocrisy-undermines-its-credibility/> accessed 21 Sep 2023.

16 ibid.

17 ‘Country Votes in Referendum on New Constitution’ (France24, 31 Oct 2010) <https://www.france24.com/en/20101031-niger-votes-referendum-new-consitution-africa> accessed 21 Sep 2023.

18 See Murray, Christina, ‘A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa's Final Constitution’ (2001) 23 University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 809Google Scholar.

19 See Oyaya, Charles O & Poku, Nana, The Making of the Constitution of Kenya: A Century of Struggle and the Future of Constitutionalism (Routledge 2020)Google Scholar.

20 See Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008.

21 On the different ways of establishing transitional governance structures, see Christine Bell & Robert A Forster, ‘Constituting Transitions: Predicting Unpredictability’, in Emmanuel HD de Groof & Micha Wiebusch (eds), International Law and Transitional Governance: Critical Perspectives (Routledge 2020).

22 See The Carter Center, ‘The Constitution-Making Process in Tunisia: Final Report’ (2014) <https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/democracy/tunisia-constitution-making-process.pdf> accessed 4 Feb 2024.

23 ‘Ugandan Leader Signs Bill Removing Presidential Age Limit’ (VOA News, 2 Jan 2018) <https://www.voanews.com/a/ugandan-leader-signs-bill-removing-presidential-age-limit/4188790.html> accessed 6 Feb 2024.

24 ’85 Percent of Ugandans Oppose Age Limit Amendment’ (Daily Monitor, 9 Dec 2017) <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/85-percent-ugandans-oppose-age-limit-amendment-1730066> accessed 21 Sep 2023.

25 Halima Athumani ‘Ugandan Opposition MPs Reject Payments as Bribes’ (VOA News, 25 Oct 2017) <https://www.voanews.com/a/ugandan-opposition-mps-reject-payments-bribes/4085811.html> accessed 8 Feb 2024.

26 See Commission Nationale de Réforme des Institutions, ‘Rapport de la Commission de Reforme des Institutions au President de la Republique du Senegal [Report of the Institutional Reform Commission to the President of the Republic of Senegal]’ (Dec 2023) <https://www.cnrisenegal.org/media/pdfs/1392807779.pdf> accessed 6 Feb 2024.

27 The Gambia Constitutional Review Commission Act, 2017.

28 Bonolo Ramadi Dinokopila, ‘Promised fulfilled? Botswana's first comprehensive constitutional review process gets underway’ (ConstitutionNet, 25 Feb 2022) <https://constitutionnet.org/news/promise-fulfilled-botswanas-first-comprehensive-constitutional-review-process-gets-underway> accessed 6 Feb 2024.

29 I thank Sumit Bisarya for this point.

30 See Lise Rakner, ‘Don't Touch My Constitution! Civil Society Resistance to Democratic Backsliding in Africa's Pluralist Regimes’ (2021) 12 Global Policy 95; ‘Mali: «Touche pas à ma Constitution» demande le retrait du projet de révision’ (Radio France Internationale, 26 Jun 2017) <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20170626-mali-touche-pas-constitution-demande-retrait-projet-revision> accessed 20 Aug 2024.

31 Sidi M Diawara, ‘Mali: Peace process, constitutional reform, and an uncertain political future’ (ConstitutionNet, 20 Jul 2017) <https://constitutionnet.org/news/mali-peace-process-constitutional-reform-and-uncertain-political-future> accessed 21 Sep 2023.

32 ibid.

33 See Adem Abebe, ‘The vulnerability of constitutional pacts: inclusive majoritarianism as protection against democratic backsliding’ in Adem Abebe et al (eds), ‘Annual Review of Constitution-Building 2019’ (International IDEA, 2020) <https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/annual-review-of-constitution-building-2019.pdf> accessed 21 Sep 2023.

34 ibid.

35 Stef Vandeginste, ‘Burundi's constitutional referendum: Consolidating the fait accompli in the run-up to the 2020 elections’ (ConstitutionNet, 23 Jan 2018) <https://constitutionnet.org/news/burundis-constitutional-referendum-consolidating-fait-accompli-run-2020-elections> accessed 21 Sep 2023.

36 Patrick Nduwimana, ‘Burundi's ruling party fails in first bid to change constitution’ (Reuters, 22 Mar 2014) <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-burundi-politics/burundis-ruling-party-fails-in-first-bid-to-change-constitution-idUKBREA2K1MO20140321/> accessed 6 Feb 2024.

37 Vandeginste (n 35).

38 Suteu, Silvia, Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2021)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Abebe, Adem Kassie, ‘Taming regressive constitutional amendments: The African Court as a Continental (super) Constitutional Court’ (2019) 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law 89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 Abebe, Adem Kassie, ‘The Substantive Validity of Constitutional Amendments in South Africa’ (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 656Google Scholar.

41 Gautam Bhatia, ‘The Kenyan Court of Appeal's BBI Judgment – I: On the Basic Structure’ (Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 23 Aug 2021) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2021/08/23/the-kenyan-court-of-appeals-bbi-judgment-i-on-the-basic-structure/> accessed 21 Sep 2023. See also Yaniv Roznai & Duncan M Okubasu, ‘Stability of Constitutional Structures and Identity Amidst Political Bipartisanship: Lessons from Kenya and Israel’ (26 Sep 2022), <<objidref>https://ssrn.com/abstract=4229657> accessed</objidref> 8 Feb 2024.

42 The Attorney General and 2 Others v David Ndii and 79 others, Supreme Court Petition No 12 of 2021 (consolidated with petitions 11 & 13 of 2021), 31 Mar 2022 <https://www.judiciary.go.ke/download/petition-no-12-of-2021-consolidated-with-petitions-11-13-of-2021-building-bridges-initiative-bbi-full-supreme-court-judgement/> accessed 6 February 2024.

43 ACDEG, ch 8, art 23. In the European context, the European Commission for Democracy through Law – commonly known as the Venice Commission – has emerged as a key actor in constitutional and institutional reform initiatives. Seeking the Commission's opinion on proposed constitutional and related reforms has increasingly become a standard expectation of various national and international actors. Failure to do so may lead them to view the processes as lacking legitimacy. Consequently, the Commission has effectively become an additional procedural layer in amendment processes.

44 ACDEG, art 23(5).

45 See Adem Kassie Abebe & Charles M Fombad, ‘The African Union and the Advancement of Democracy: The Problem of Unconstitutional Retention of Government Power’, in Charles M Fombad & Nico Steytler (eds), Democracy, Elections, and Constitutionalism in Africa (Oxford University Press 2021).

46 Nina Wilen & Paul D Williams, ‘The African Union and Coercive Diplomacy: The Case of Burundi’ (2018) 56 Journal of Modern African Studies 673.

47 Christopher R Mtikila and Others v Republic of Tanzania, Application Nos 009/2011 & 011/2011, Judgment of 14 Jun 2013 < http://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/Judgment%20Application%20009-011-2011%20Rev%20Christopher%20Mtikila%20v.%20Tanzania-1.pdf> accessed 3 Feb 2024.

48 Actions Pour la Protection des Droits de L'Homme (APDH) v The Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Application No 001/2014, Judgment of 18 Nov 2016 < http://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/JUDGMENT_APPLICATION%20001%202014%20_%20APDH%20V.%20THE%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20COTE%20DIVOIRE.pdf> accessed 3 Feb 2024.

49 XYZ v Republic of Benin, Application No 010/2020, Judgment of 27 Nov 2020, <https://africanlii.org/afu/judgment/african-court/2020/3> accessed 21 Sep 2023.

50 See generally Abebe, ‘Taming regressive constitutional amendments’ (n 39).

51 See The Honorable Attorney General v Reverend Christopher Mtikila, Civil Appeal No 45 of 2009, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 17 Jun 2010.

52 See, eg, Constitution of Nigeria 1999, art 6(6)(c), which expressly declares certain policy principles judicially unenforceable.

53 Kumm, Mattias, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 907, 907CrossRefGoogle Scholar, noting that ‘the legitimacy of international law is increasingly challenged in domestic settings in the name of democracy and constitutional self-government’.

54 Yaniv Roznai, ‘The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments’ (2013) 62 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 557, 557, noting that ‘constitutional law is still generally superior to international law’.

55 See Garlicki, Lech & Garlicka, Zofia A, ‘External Review of Constitutional Amendments? International Law as a Norm of Reference’ (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 343CrossRefGoogle Scholar, arguing that international (human rights) law can provide a basis for review of constitutional amendments. See also Dixon & Landau, ‘Transnational Constitutionalism’ (n 10), proposing the use of transnational constitutional norms (not international law per se) as a possible constraint on constitutional amendments.

56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 Jan 1980), art 27.

57 Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, art 328(7).

58 In Zimbabwe, for instance, constitutional amendments that empower the office of the president, rather than the president himself, such as those relating to the appointment of the highest judges, are not among the prohibited amendments; see David T Hofisi, ‘Clawing Back the Gains of Popular Participation – The First Amendment to the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)’ (ConstitutionNet, 26 Sep 2017) <http://constitutionnet.org/news/clawing-back-gains-popular-participation-first-amendment-constitution-zimbabwe-2013> accessed 3 Feb 2023.

59 This section does not theorise the legitimacy of constitutions or their amendments. Instead, it provides examples of African standards to help us understand the concept of illegitimacy of amendments.

60 Harel & Shinar (n 5). For a discussion of the potential sources of legitimacy of constitutions, see Richard H Fallon Jr, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1787.

61 Harel & Shinar (n 5).

62 For example, The Gambia in 2018, Botswana in 2021, and Mali in 2022.

63 On the interaction between elite pacts and popular participation, see Abrak Saati ‘Public Participation, Representative Elites and Technocrats in Constitution Making Processes: Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa and Kenya’, in Rosalind Dixson, Tom Ginsburg & Adem Kassie Abebe (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law in Africa (Edward Edgar Publishing 2022) 16.

64 See Richard B Bernstein & Kym S Rice, Are We to Be a Nation? The Making of the Constitution (Harvard University Press 1987). See also ‘Constitution of the United States – A History’ (National Archives, 7 Oct 2021) <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/more-perfect-union> accessed 22 Sep 2023.

65 See Hassan Ebrahim & Laurel E Miller, ‘Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South Africa: Constitution Making after Apartheid’, in Laurel E Miller (ed), Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making (United States Institute of Peace Press 2010) 117.

66 Judgment No DCC 06-074, Constitutional Court of Benin, 8 Jul 2006.

67 ibid.

68 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Guidance Note on United Nations Constitutional Assistance’ (Sep 2020) <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SG%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Constitutional%20Assistance_2.pdf> accessed 22 Sep 2023.

69 See African Union, ‘Peace and Security Council Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development’ (adopted Jul 2006) para 37(a) <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policy-framwowork-eng.pdf> accessed 27 Jan 2023.

70 ACDEG, art 10(2) (emphasis added).

71 Assembly of the African Union, ‘Decision on Streamlining of the African Union Summits and the Working Methods of the African Union’, Assembly/AU/Dec.597(XXVI) (adopted 31 Jan 2016) <https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/29514-assembly_au_dec_588_-_604_xxvi_e.pdf> accessed 27 Jan 2023.

72 Venice Commission, ‘Chile – Opinion on the Drafting and Adoption of a new Constitution’, CDL-AD(2022)004 (18 Mar 2022) paras 19, 23 <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2022)004-e> accessed 14 Aug 2024.

73 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights endorsed this view in XYZ v Republic of Benin, Application No 010/2020, Judgment of 27 Nov 2020 <https://web.archive.org/web/20221225015615/https://africanlii.org/sites/default/files/judgment/afu/african-court/2020-afchpr-3/010-2020_XYZ_v_Benin_Judgment.pdf> archived from the original 25 Dec 2022, accessed 14 Aug 2024.

74 See generally Albert, Constitutional Amendments (n 6). On Africa, see Jensen, Kuenzi & Mehanna (n 6); Fombad (n 3).

75 Supermajority rules ensure that ‘the incumbent government cannot in normal circumstances unilaterally approve amendments and usually has to negotiate with the opposition or other parties in order to make changes’, see Markus Böckenförde, ‘Constitutional amendment procedures’, International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 10 (2017) 6 <http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/constitutional-amendment-procedures-primer_0.pdf> accessed 22 Sep 2023.

76 Raymond Ku, ‘Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change’ (1995) 64 Fordham Law Review 535, 571.

77 Fombad (n 3), noting the ease with which post-independence African leaders subverted constitutionalism by regularly amending constitutions to suit their selfish political agendas.

78 Okoth Ogendo, ‘Constitutions without Constitutionalism: An African Political Paradox’, in Douglas Greenberg et al (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (Oxford University Press 1993).

79 Jensen, Kuenzi & Mehanna (n 6).

80 Duncan Okubasu, ‘Implications of Conflation of Normal and ‘Constitutional Politics’ on Constitutional Change in Africa’, in Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou (eds), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment (Bloomsbury Publishing 2017).

81 For example, on the partisanship of the 2017 Venezuelan Constituent Assembly, see Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, ‘The Venezuelan Political Crisis and the National Constituent Assembly’ (ConstitutionNet, 30 Aug 2017) <https://constitutionnet.org/news/venezuelan-political-crisis-and-national-constituent-assembly> accessed 22 Sep 2023.

82 Jensen, Kuenzi & Mehanna (n 6).

83 Ginsburg, Tom & Melton, James, ‘Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Culture and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 686CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

84 Levinson, Daryl J & Pildes, Richard H, ‘Separation of Parties, Not Powers’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 2311Google Scholar.

85 Sethi (n 5). See also Harel & Shinar (n 5), in addition noting the importance of claims of legitimacy based on reason and justice.

86 On unamendable provisions and the role of the judiciary, see generally Roznai, Yaniv, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (Oxford University Press 2019)Google Scholar.

87 Albert, ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’ (n 11) 667, noting that unamendable clauses are deeply troubling for democratic theory as they limit the ‘basic sovereign rights of popular choice and continuing self-definition’.

88 This criticism may particularly be pronounced in cases of constitutions that clearly lack sufficient democratic pedigree. For instance, in Myanmar, where the military holds 25% of parliamentary seats, the 75% approval requirement for constitutional amendments gives the military a veto over any reform. But the proposal in this article would empower political parties that compete and win seats in elections, not the military or similar actors. See Constitution of Myanmar 2008, arts 433–436 and 141(b).

89 See, eg, Wahman, Michael, ‘Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa’ (2017) 23 Party Politics 309CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jaimie Bleck & Nicolas van de Walle, ‘Change and Continuity in African Electoral Politics Since Multipartyism’ [2019] Oxford Research Encyclopedia: Politics 1.

90 Roznai & Okubasu (n 41).

91 W Elliot Bulmer, ‘Elite compacts and popular sovereignty: the constitutional referendum in comparative context’, in Adem Kassie Abebe et al, ‘Annual Review of Constitution-Building Processes: 2016’ (International IDEA 2017) 24 <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/annual-review-of-constitution-building-processes-2016.pdf> accessed 8 Feb 2024.

92 Constitution of Thailand, art 256(6).

93 On the dominance of Shinawatra, see Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee, ‘The Conundrum of a Dominant Party in Thailand’ (2018) 4 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 102.

94 On the ‘postpolitical’ constitutional tradition in Thailand, see Ginsburg, Tom, ‘Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand's Postpolitical Constitution’ (2008) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

95 Constitution of Jamaica, art 49(4)(a). I thank Elliot Bulmer for this example.

96 ibid art 35.

97 Elliot Bulmer, ‘Her Majesty's precarious opposition: ‘clean sweep’ elections and constitutional balance in Commonwealth Caribbean states’, in Adem Kassie Abebe et al, ‘Annual Review of Constitution-Building: 2018’ (International IDEA 2019) 48 <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/annual-review-of-constitution-building-2018.pdf> accessed 15 Aug 2024.

98 Constitution of Cyprus 1960, art 182(3).

99 ibid art 169.

100 ibid art 287.

101 ibid art 285.

102 Adem Kassie Abebe, ‘Constitutional referendums and consociational power sharing: strange bedfellows?’, in Adem Kassie Abebe et al, ‘Annual Review of Constitution-Building: 2018’ (International IDEA 2019) 8 <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/annual-review-of-constitution-building-2018.pdf> accessed 15 Aug 2024.

103 Constitution of Seychelles, arts 139–142, covering mandate, composition, and term of members of the Commission.

104 Constitution of Botswana, art 65A.

105 Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), ‘Mozambique: National Electoral Commission’ (Jun 2019) <https://web.archive.org/web/20221123132900/https://www.eisa.org/wep/moznec.htm> archived from the original 23 Sep 2022, accessed 15 Aug 2024.

106 Pierre Olivier Lobe, ‘Cote d'Ivoire's contested Electoral Commission and Ouattara's third term: A recipe for political crisis?’ (ConstitutionNet, 5 Nov 2019) <http://constitutionnet.org/news/cote-divoires-contested-electoral-commission-and-ouattaras-third-term-recipe-political-crisis> accessed 22 Sep 2023.

107 Constitution of Tunisia 2021, art 60.

108 Bulmer, ‘Her Majesty's Precarious Opposition’ (n 97).

109 Constitution of Jamaica, arts 98(1), 104(1), 111(3), 124(1) and (2), 129(1) and (2).

110 Constitution of Dominica 1978 (rev 2014), art 56(2).

111 Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, art 63(1).

112 See generally Bulmer, ‘Her Majesty's Precarious Opposition’ (n 97).

113 See Sumit Bisarya & Madeleine Rogers, ‘Designing Resistance: Democratic Institutions and the Threat of Backsliding’ (International IDEA 2023) 7 and 8 <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2023-10/designing-resistance-democratic-institutions-threat-of-backsliding.pdf> accessed 15 Aug 2024.

114 Arriola, Leonardo R, Rakner, Lise & van de Walle, Nicolas (eds), Democratic Backsliding in Africa? Autocratization, Resilience and Contention (Oxford University Press 2023)Google Scholar.

115 Afrobarometer Network, ‘Africans want more democracy, but their leaders still aren't listening’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No 85 (Jan 2023) <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/PP85-PAP20-Africans-want-more-democracy-but-leaders-arent-listening-Afrobarometer-Pan-Africa-Profile-17jan23.pdf> accessed 2 Feb 2024; Robert Mattes, ‘Democracy in Africa: Demand, supply, and the ‘dissatisfied democrat’’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No 54 (Feb 2019) <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r7_policypaperno54_africans_views_of_democracy1.pdf> accessed 15 Jan 2024.