¹ Anon, “The US and South Korean Warmongers Should Prepare for Ultimate Destruction, “RodongSinmun, March 6, 2013; truncated to KCNA, “KCNA Commentary Warns U.S., S. Korean Warmongers Not to Wage War Drills Targeting DPRK's Headquarters and Social System,” March 7, 2013.

² Statement by a Spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry” Pyongyang Unattributed Korean Central Broadcasting Station, March 7, 2013; another text states that “The right to make a preemptive nuclear attack is no monopoly of the U.S. imperialists.” In KCNA, “U.S. Threat and Blackmail Can Never Work on DPRK: Rodong Sinmun,” March 7, 2013.

³ KCNA, “DPRK Has No Idea of Negotiating with U.S. Unless It Rolls back Its Hostile Policy towards It,” March 16, 2013.

⁴ T. Shanker, S.H. Choe, “U.S. Runs Practice Sortie In South Korea,” New York Times, March 29, 2013, p. 4.

⁵ W. Strobel, “U.S. B-2 Bombers Sent To Korea On Rare Mission: Diplomacy Not Destruction,” Reuters, March 29, 2013.

⁶ Reuters, “U.S. F-22 stealth jets join South Korea drills amid saber-rattling,” March 31, 2013.

⁷ Bill Gertz, ‘U.S. B-52 bombers simulated raids over North Korea during military exercises,’ Washington Times, March 19, 2013.

⁸ KCNA, “DPRK Will Show Its Will for Counteraction with Military Action: KPA Supreme Command,” March 26, 2013.

⁹ For an account of the August 1976 crisis in which such forces were mobilized in a nearwar, see P. Hayes, “Tactically Smart, Strategically Stupid: Simulated B52 Nuclear Bombings in Korea,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, March 20, 2013.

¹⁰ KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Convenes Operation Meeting, Finally Examines and Ratifies Plan for Firepower Strike,” March 29, 2013.

¹¹ H. Kahn, On Escalation, Metaphors and Scenarios, Praeger, 1965, p. 39.

¹² Sangwon Yoon, “U.S. Sees No N. Korea Military Movement as Kim Names Premier,” Bloomberg News, April 2, 2013 and Associated Press, “North Korea moves missile with ‘considerable range’ to east coast,” April 4, 2013.

¹³ KCNA, “Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee,” March 31, 2013.

¹⁴ Until recently, the US Navy routinely announced the location of US aircraft battle groups. These days, it's still easy to find them, for example, on the weekly Stratfor update.

¹⁵ KCNA, “DPRK to Adjust Uses of Existing Nuclear Facilities,” April 2, 2013.

¹⁶ KCNA, “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” April 1, 2013.

¹⁷ Roger Cavazos, “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 26, 2012.

¹⁸ See Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012

¹⁹ Kim Seyoon, Saeroni Shin, “Kospi drops most in 5 months, won falls on North Korea threats,” Bloomberg, 4 April 2013.

²⁰ Associated Press, “North Korea blocks South's access to Kaesong factory park, Workers not being allowed to cross border into shared industrial complex that was enemies’ only remaining bilateral initiative,” The Guardian, April 3, 2013.

²¹ Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korean defector in South crosses western sea border,” Yonhap, April 4, 2013.

²² See M. Halperin, “Promoting Security in Northeast Asia: A New Approach,” NASPNet Policy Forum, October 30, 2012.

²³ United Nations, “Establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,” Annex 1, Report of the Disarmament Commission, General Assembly, 54th session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), United Nations, New York, 1999, p. 7.

²⁴ Possibly involving states already allied with UNC under a new UNSC mandate. The 16 UNC member countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa (rejoined in 2010), Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. “The UNC continues to maintain a rear headquarters in Japan. Unique to that presence is a status of forces agreement that allows the UNC Commander to use seven UNC- flagged bases in Japan for the transit of UNC aircraft, vessels, equipment, and forces upon notification to the government of Japan. During 2010, four naval vessels and four aircraft called on ports in Japan under the auspices of the UNC. Almost 1,000 military personnel participated in these visits. The multi-national nature of the UNC rear headquarters is reflected in its leadership. Last year for the first time, a senior officer from Australia assumed command of the headquarters, while the deputy is an officer from Turkey.” In “Statement Of General Walter L. Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, United States-Republic Of Korea Combined Forces Command; And Commander, United States Forces Korea Before The Senate Armed Services Committee,” April 12, 2011.

²⁵ “Pivotal deterrence: This concept captures the possibility for nuclear weapons states to arbitrate between two adversarial states, and to deter them from attacking each other. This pivotal role does not imply impartiality, but it further complicates an already complex strategic situation and may supplant or be superimposed on old forms of strategic deterrence. Relevant contexts for the USA may be the Korean Peninsula, China-Japan relations, and Taiwan-China relations.” P. Hayes, R. Tanter, “Beyond the Nuclear Umbrella: Re-thinking the Theory and Practice of Nuclear Extended Deterrence in East Asia and the Pacific,” Pacific Focus, 26:1, April 2011, pp. 8-9. The concept was first explicated fully in Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003.

²⁶ United Nations, “Overwhelming majority of states in general assembly say “yes” to arms trade treaty,” United Nations, New York, 2 April 2013.