[1] Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard, “Six Party Talks Update: False Start or a Case for Optimism,” Conference on “The Changing Korean Peninsula and the Future of East Asia,” sponsored by the Brookings Institution and Joongang Ilbo, 1 December 2005.

[2] Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, “U.S.- Korean deal on arms leaves key points open,” New York Times, 20 September 2005.

[3] For relevant documents: Korea and World Affairs, vol. xxix, 3, Fall 2005, pp. 455-464

[4] North Korean Foreign Ministry Statement of 20 September, ibid., p. 458.

[5] “U.S., partners end N. Korea nuclear project,” Associated Press, 22 November 2005.

[6] Yoshida Yasuhiko, (head of public relations at IAEA, 1986-1989, subsequently professor at Osaka University of Economics and Law), “Keisuiro no tottoku wa Kin Nissei no ikun,” Shukan kinyobi, 30 September 2005, pp. 20-21.

[7] Kurt Achin, “Experts: North Korean reactor dreams more political than practical,” Voice of America, 6 January 2006.

[8] David Asher, head of the Bush administration's North Korean working group, quoted in Josh Meyer and Barbara Demick, “N Korea running counterfeit racket, says US,” Sydney Morning Herald, 14 December 2005.

[9] Guy Dinmore and Anna Fifield, “U.S. hardliners grab North Korean Policy reins,” The Financial Times, 20 December 2005.

[10] Both Pritchard (“Six-Party Talks Update,”) and Dinmore and Fifield mention Undersecretary for Arms Control Bob Joseph as the key person. Myer and Demick also note the role played by Treasury, with Daniel Glaser, deputy assistant Treasury secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, calling on North Korea “to cease its criminal financial activities.”

[11] “US accuses North Korea of $100 bill counterfeiting,” Washington Times, 12 October 2005.

[12] Meyer and Demick, cit.

[13] David L. Asher, “The North Korean criminal state, its ties to organized crime, and the possibility of WMD proliferation,” Policy Forum Online, No. 05-92A, Nautilus Institute, 15 November 2005.

[14] “US says N Korea ‘criminal regime’,” BBC News, 17 December 2005.

[15] UN General Assembly 10437, 16 December 2005 listed “torture, public executions, arbitrary detention, the lack of due process, extensive use of forced labour, high rates of infant malnutrition and restrictions on humanitarian organizations … severe restrictions on freedom of religion, assembly and on free movement within the country and abroad, as well as trafficking in women for sexual exploitation, forced marriage and forced abortions.”

[16] Even after years of intense effort, the US had not been able to persuade regional countries of its claims about a secret HEU program in North Korea. Like Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, it was crucial to the US case but similarly difficult to prove. North Korea, for its part, can only deny, but can never disprove. (Gavan McCormack, “The umbrella and the mushroom: realism and extremism on North Korea,” Japan Focus, No 373, 24 August 2005.)

[17] “Crafting intelligence: Iraq, North Korea, and the Road to War,” and “Did North Korea Cheat?” Japan Focus, No 229 No. 229 and 186respectively.

[18] Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw, “Upping the ante for Kim Jong Il,” US News and World Report, 21 July 2003.

[19] This not to downplay the likelihood of criminal intent, but to insist on the political context, hostile confrontation, that distinguishes any such North Korean action.