Integrity is a shifty, furtive concept. Philosophers have had ahard time defining the idea because it raises a couple ofrecurrent perplexities. First, consider former Speaker JimWright's remark that "integrity is . . . the state or quality ofbeing complete, undivided, [and] unbroken," or the OxfordEnglish Dictionary connotation of an "unbroken state" of"material wholeness." The problem is that integrity, sounderstood, seems to leave no room for the possibility ofindividuals whose lives display any kind of self-critical revi-sion, changes in course, or discontinuities over historicaltime, or for those who compartmentalize, differentiate, andassume conflicting roles across social space; in other words,for all of us. We need, as Amelie Rorty has written ("Integ-rity: Political, not Psychological," in Alan Montefiore andDavid Vines, eds., Integrity in the Public and Private Domains,1999), a far better account as to how and where "integrationand integrity . . . coincide".