The Movers and the Shirkers is a critique and extension of awell-cited and important research program: attempts tomeasure the degree to which legislators shirk, or advancetheir own policy goals at the expense of those held by theirconstituents. Such analyses (e.g., Joseph P. Kalt and MarkZupan, "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory ofPolitics," American Economic Review 74 [June 1984]: 279­300; John R. Lott, "Political Cheating," Public Choice 52[1987]: 169­86) typically assume a principal-agent relation-ship between constituents and elected representatives, andthey specify a regression analysis with roll-call behavior as aleft-hand side variable and various measures of constituencyinterests and legislator ideology as right-hand side variables.Previous work (John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon,"Ideology, Interest Groups, and Legislative Votes," AmericanJournal of Political Science 36 [August 1992]: 805­23) showsthat these analyses are bedeviled by measurement and esti-mation issues. Eric Uslaner highlights a more fundamentalflaw: By ignoring important and well-understood mechanismsthat tie legislators to their constituents, these analyses as-sume what should be tested.