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The Moral Force of Political Obligations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

George Klosko
George Klosko*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Abstract

Political obligations vary in force. Though we have strong obligations to obey certain laws, our obligations to obey others appear to be considerably weaker. Because the weakness of the obligations to obey certain laws has been employed as an argument against the existence of general prima facie political obligations, an adequate theory of political obligation must account for this. By employing the obligation to keep promises as a model, I sort out the factors that contribute to the force of prima facie political obligations. Their varying force can be explained according to a general theory of political obligation founded on the principle of fairness.

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American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 4 , December 1990 , pp. 1235 - 1250
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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