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When Do States Follow the Laws of War?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2007

JAMES D. MORROW
JAMES D. MORROW
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Abstract

The laws of war seek to regulate conduct during wartime. The record of compliance with these treaties is mixed. I explain compliance as the result of publicly accepted and so legally binding agreements that create incentives for the parties to enforce those agreements through reciprocity. Ratification by a democracy is a signal that it intends to abide by the treaty standard; those that ratify are more likely to comply. Ratification does not effect the behavior of nondemocracies, however. Ratification of the relevant treaty by both warring parties strengthens reciprocity. There is a hierarchy of average compliance across issues which matches the scope for violations by individuals on each issue, with greater scope for such violations corresponding to lower levels of compliance.

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ARTICLES
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American Political Science Review , Volume 101 , Issue 3 , August 2007 , pp. 559 - 572
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© 2007 by the American Political Science Association

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