Despite the growing interest in Chinese studies in this country, little, if any, attention has been paid to the study of Communist China’s view of international law. Some persons may feel that Communist China, as a Socialist country, cannot do other than to adhere to the Soviet concept of international law or that of Socialist countries in general. There may be some truth in this view, but it does not disclose the whole picture. Communist China does accept many principles of international law proclaimed or applied by the Soviet Union or by Soviet jurists, but in view of the growing differences of views between the two countries in handling many international problems and in conducting the international Communist movement, it is reasonable to infer that Communist China may have developed different views toward international law in some aspects. In this connection, it may be noted tha Wu Tê-feng, a prominent jurist in Communist China and President of the China Political Science and Law Association, not long ago severely criticized the Soviet concept of international law in a report delivered on October 8, 1964, to the general meeting of the Association.

For 167 years the shadow of the Logan Act has fallen upon those Americans who trespass on the Federal monopoly of international negotiations which it creates. In theory, up to three years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine await those Americans who, without authority, communicate with a foreign government intending either (a) to influence that government with respect to a controversy with the United States or (b) to defeat the measures of the United States. Though only one indictment and no trial have taken place under the Act, who can tell when a new Administration, thinner skinned or harder pressed than its predecessors, may in its irritation call into play this sleeping giant? Now, at a time when domestic opposition to certain aspects of our foreign policy has reached a pitch unknown for many years, it would be well to reflect upon this curious product of the confluence of criminal law and foreign relations law before we are in fact confronted by a test of its strength. All could be the losers from an unpremeditated encounter—the defendant by finding himself, perhaps to his very great surprise, the first person subjected to the Act’s severe criminal penalties, the Government by finding itself stripped of its long accustomed protection by a ruling that the statute as it now reads is unconstitutionally vague or restrictive of free speech. Despite its long desuetude as a criminal statute, the Act represents a principle which I cannot help but think is, at its core, a salutary one; that America in sensitive dealings with other governments “speaks with one voice.” It embodies the concept of bipartisanship, that quarrels about foreign relations are fought out domestically and not with the adversary. It deters sometimes very ill-advised attempts to take the conduct of foreign affairs into foolish and unauthorized hands. On the other hand, it cuts into freedoms which we regard as having the highest value, and many of the situations in which its use has been suggested clearly involve no danger that would justify such a restraint.

Modern science and technology have produced and will continue to produce new phenomena calling for new rules of law. Among these phenomena are the so-called “pirate” broadcasting stations, moored or installed outside territorial waters so as to escape the control of states. This new phenomenon has made its appearance in particular in Northwest Europe. It is natural, then, that states whose interests are actually or potentially adversely affected by such stations should contemplate what measures of protection are possible in fact and permissible in law.

The material for this section is compiled by Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State. Alfred P. Rubin, of the Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, and Bruno A. Ristau, of the Department of Justice, provide material originating in their respective Departments.

Wacker V. Bisson. 348 P. 2d 602.

U.S. Ct. App., 5thCir., June 23,1965.

The appellant, J. Samuel Wacker, awaiting extradition to Canada, brings this off-beat declaratory judgment action attacking the validity of an unappealable extradition order. Since Wacker is in custody, he might just as well have cast the action in the form of an application for habeas corpus. Wacker, however, has twice tried that approach without success. In the complaint and on appeal, the plaintiff advances on all fronts, attacking the constitutionality of numerous international treaties anil conventions, challenging the extradition statute (as written and as applied), and making other contentions based on all possible, and some impossible, reasons for the invalidity of the extradition. Wacker names as defendant the Consul General of Canada, the demanding state. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant. We reverse and remand, taking the view that the District Court has jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201 ff., to review collaterally the validity of the extradition proceeding.

Public Prosecutor V. Wang Min-tao and Sung Chen-wu.

District Court of Taipei, Nov. 8,1965. File No.: 54th Year, Shu—2107.

The defendants were Chinese nationals doing business in Seoul, Korea. On July 8, 1965, they led a number of Chinese nationals to the Chinese Embassy protesting the Embassy’s sale of some lands to Koreans. After having forcibly entered the Embassy, they led those Chinese in destroying the Embassy’s gate and furniture. They were arrested by Korean police and later handed over to Chinese authorities in Taiwan. They were prosecuted for interference with public functions and were sentenced to four and three years’ imprisonment, respectively, in accordance with Article 136 of the Chinese Criminal Code.

Italy-United States Air Transport Arbitration. Advisory Opinion of Tribunal

After a dispute had arisen between the United States and Italy as to the rights of American air lines to operate all-cargo services to Italy, the question was submitted to the arbitral tribunal: “Does the Air Transport Agreement between the United States and Italy of February 6, 1948, as amended, grant the right to a designated airline of either party to operate scheduled flights carrying cargo only?”