Consider a well-shuffled deck of cards of n different types where each type occurs m times. In a complete feedback game, a player is asked to guess the top card from the deck. After each guess, the top card is revealed to the player and is removed from the deck. The total number of correct guesses in a complete feedback game has attracted significant interest in the past few decades. Under different regimes of m, n, the expected number of correct guesses, under the greedy (optimal) strategy, has been obtained by various authors, while there are not many results available about the fluctuations. In this paper we establish a central limit theorem with Berry–Esseen bounds when m is fixed and n is large. Our results extend to the case of decks where different types may have different multiplicity, under suitable assumptions.

The rich-get-richer rule reinforces actions that have been frequently chosen in the past. What happens to the evolution of individuals’ inclinations to choose an action when agents interact? Interaction tends to homogenize, while each individual dynamics tends to reinforce its own position. Interacting stochastic systems of reinforced processes have recently been considered in many papers, in which the asymptotic behavior is proven to exhibit almost sure synchronization. In this paper we consider models where, even if interaction among agents is present, absence of synchronization may happen because of the choice of an individual nonlinear reinforcement. We show how these systems can naturally be considered as models for coordination games or technological or opinion dynamics.

For the gambler’s ruin problem with two players starting with the same amount of money, we show the playing time is stochastically maximized when the games are fair.

In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain two-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is attained by hitting times at two separate boundaries, then such boundaries also trigger a Nash equilibrium in the game of singular control. Moreover, a differential link between the players' value functions holds across the two games.

We consider the Bernoulli bandit problem where one of the arms has win probability α and the others β, with the identity of the α arm specified by initial probabilities. With u = max(α, β), v = min(α, β), call an arm with win probability u a good arm. Whereas it is known that the strategy of always playing the arm with the largest probability of being a good arm maximizes the expected number of wins in the first n games for all n, we conjecture that it also stochastically maximizes the number of wins. That is, we conjecture that this strategy maximizes the probability of at least k wins in the first n games for all k, n. The conjecture is proven when k = 1, and k = n, and when there are only two arms and k = n - 1.

In this paper we study limit theorems for the Feller game which is constructed from one-dimensional simple symmetric random walks, and corresponds to the St. Petersburg game. Motivated by a generalization of the St. Petersburg game which was investigated by Gut (2010), we generalize the Feller game by introducing the parameter α. We investigate limit distributions of the generalized Feller game corresponding to the results of Gut. Firstly, we give the weak law of large numbers for α=1. Moreover, for 0<α≤1, we have convergence in distribution to a stable law with index α. Finally, some limit theorems for a polynomial size and a geometric size deviation are given.

We consider two players, starting with m and n units, respectively. In each round, the winner is decided with probability proportional to each player's fortune, and the opponent loses one unit. We prove an explicit formula for the probability p(m, n) that the first player wins. When m ~ Nx 0, n ~ Ny 0, we prove the fluid limit as N → ∞. When x 0 = y 0, z → p(N, N + z√N) converges to the standard normal cumulative distribution function and the difference in fortunes scales diffusively. The exact limit of the time of ruin τN is established as (T - τN ) ~ N -β W 1/β, β = ¼, T = x 0 + y 0. Modulo a constant, W ~ χ2 1(z 0 2 / T 2).

We study zero-sum optimal stopping games (Dynkin games) between two players who disagree about the underlying model. In a Markovian setting, a verification result is established showing that if a pair of functions can be found that satisfies some natural conditions then a Nash equilibrium of stopping times is obtained, with the given functions as the corresponding value functions. In general, however, there is no uniqueness of Nash equilibria, and different equilibria give rise to different value functions. As an example, we provide a thorough study of the game version of the American call option under heterogeneous beliefs. Finally, we also study equilibria in randomized stopping times.

This paper is devoted to the study of two-person zero-sum games for continuous-time jump Markov processes with a discounted payoff criterion. The state and action spaces are all Polish spaces, the transition rates are allowed to be unbounded, and the payoff rates may have neither upper nor lower bounds. We give conditions on the game's primitive data under which the existence of a solution to the Shapley equation is ensured. Then, from the Shapley equation, we obtain the existence of the value of the game and of a pair of optimal stationary strategies using the extended infinitesimal operator associated with the transition function of a possibly nonhomogeneous continuous-time jump Markov process. We also provide a recursive way of computing (or at least approximating) the value of the game. Moreover, we present a ‘martingale characterization’ of a pair of optimal stationary strategies. Finally, we apply our results to a controlled birth and death system and a Schlögl first model, and then we use controlled Potlach processes to illustrate our conditions.

We consider explicit formulae for equilibrium prices in a continuous-time vertical contracting model. A manufacturer sells goods to a retailer, and the objective of both parties is to maximize expected profits. Demand is an Itô-Lévy process, and to increase realism, information is delayed. We provide complete existence and uniqueness proofs for a series of special cases, including geometric Brownian motion and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, both with time-variable coefficients. Moreover, explicit solution formulae are given, so these results are operational. An interesting finding is that information that is more precise may be a considerable disadvantage for the retailer.