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Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy and Logic
Logical Pluralism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 September 2025
Summary
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This view emerged in a dialectical context in which certain laws of logic were hotly debated by philosophers. For example, philosophers have spilled a great deal of ink over the logical principle of explosion ('from a contradiction, everything follows'). One side in the debate accepts this principle, the other side rejects it. It is exceedingly natural to assume that these rival points of view are incompatible, hence one side of the debate is correct while the other is incorrect. This is logical monism: the view that there is exactly one correct logic. Pluralists argue that the monistic assumption is subtly and surprisingly wrong. According to the pluralist, some logics that appear to be irreconcilable rivals are, in fact, both correct in their own ways. This Element will explain the debate over logical pluralism in an accessible manner.
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy and LogicOnline ISBN: 9781009189583Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 31 October 2025
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