This article explores the manner in which the Eurasian metallurgical tradition was transformed into an indigenous tradition on the Chinese Central Plains. It argues that the association of luminosity with the divine has a cognitive foundation, which accounts for the use translucent stones and shiny metals, including copper, bronze, silver, and gold as mediums for religious artifacts throughout the world. In China, this association was the primary impetus for the development of an indigenous metallurgy based on a piece-mold and coring technology. Although the technology ultimately concentrated on the production of ritual vessels, it was first developed at Yanshi Erlitou 偃師二里頭 for the production of clapper-bells (ling 鈴), which had similar round hollow bodies.

We further explore the history of clapper-bells, arguing that they were a development of a Central Plains tradition dating back to the Yangshao 仰韶 period (5000–3000 b.c.e.). We argue that their religious significance at Erlitou lay in the previously unheard sound produced when the two luminous substances, jade and bronze, struck against one another. Thus, religious interlocutors at Erlitou used them to contact the ancestral spirits. Later, in the Yinxu 殷墟 period of the Shang Dynasty (ca. 1300–1050 b.c.e.), bronze clapper-bells were worn by dogs buried in tombs. We propose that their role there was a development of the earlier one; that is, they were used to contact the occupant's ancestral spirits as he was guided by the dog in the underworld.

In recent years, a number of online outlets aligned with the right has emerged in Thai politics. Though it is often assumed that such actors are merely an extension of the Thai state propaganda apparatus, as the moniker “IO (short for Information Operation)” implies, closer inspection of their contents suggests a more complicated picture. Employing the morphological approach of ideological analysis, this article argues that the Thai Online Right articulates a decidedly conservative worldview, upholding a social order centred around the monarchy, and opposing particular instigators of change, similar to more traditional Thai conservatives. The concepts and ideas they deploy to bolster these core ideas, however, seem to emphasise more materialistic and personalised elements, as well as draw from more contemporaneous “Western” right-wing conspiracy theories, making their conservative expression a strange blend of the old and the new. The findings have implications to the study of conservatisms, both in the Thai context and comparatively.

Analysis of the oracular data newly discovered in the Shang era Huayuanzhuang site opens a fascinating window in the political and ritual activities of a prince previously unknown. He is identified as the prince Zai, the future king Zu Jia. These new data shed light of the pre-royal career of Zu Jia, and the nature and the mode of his relationship with the king Wu Ding, his father, and Lady Hao, his mother. This article also examines the difficult accession to royal power of Zu Jia in a context of political crisis. It studies and clarifies some of the steps leading to the selection of royal princes as heirs to royal power. Finally, this article examines the importance of the relationship between those princes and their mothers in the specific context of royal polygamy.

This article brings film/media theory into Southeast Asian research through a revisionist queer approach. It contains two goals: addressing some recent developments about queer imag(in)ing in Thai media whilst reappraising the fundamental question of spectatorship via screen theory. Taking into account the more general issue of media specificity and the particular textual device of identity/gender-switch in several recent Thai television serials, we propose the notion of wer viewership: a mode of viewing practice that features viewer-text interaction through the perceptual-cognitive processes, and is characterised by wer/excessive aesthetics, multiple meanings, and diverse pleasures. Resonant with camp reading, wer viewership underlines how the viewer actively makes sense of the ambiguities about gender, particularly those along the extra-/diegetic interface. We use Thai soap opera Shadow of Love to illuminate the wer/excessive aesthetics rendered through its identity/gender play bordering on the extra-/diegetic divide, and the enhanced pleasures and meanings thus available to its extradiegetic active viewers. We stress, though, the expanded queer imag(in)ing in Shadow is not of total free interpretation, but is animated in relation to both the evolving discourses about gender/sexuality in Thailand, and the popularising homoerotic Boys Love (BL) media across Asia in recent years.

We explored the nexus between the quality of human capital, productivity-enhancing factors, and the quality of institutions in nine Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries using canonical correlation and principal component analysis of country-level data for 2007–2017 from the World Bank, World Economic Forum, and Penn World Tables databases. We found that an unequal development of human capital in the ASEAN countries is clearly linked to their heterogeneous institutional conditions and that the quality of human capital drives technology absorption and innovation. The four transition economies in the region—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar—are facing particularly difficult challenges in developing institutional environments that stimulate human capital development to reach higher levels of knowledge intensity of their economies and achieve the resulting competitive advantages.

A review published in this journal claims that my first academic monograph, Uncertainty in the Empire of Routine: The Administrative Revolution of the Eighteenth-Century Qing State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2022), fails to meet “basic academic standards” (George Zhijian Qiao, “Was There an Administrative Revolution? Review Essay on Maura Dykstra, Uncertainty in the Empire of Routine: The Administrative Revolution of the Eighteenth-Century Qing State,” Journal of Chinese History (2023), doi:10.1017/jch.2023.19). The reviewer makes this remarkable claim not by demonstrating any egregious or particularly damning fault, but rather with an argument of preponderance, claiming that the book contains “hundreds of errors” (2). The review also contains several dubious and disturbing arguments about what constitutes good history. The flaws of those larger methodological and historiographical assertions are serious and compelling enough that they must be treated at length, separately. In this, my initial response to the review, I will constrain myself to rebutting the reviewer's false claims that the book is full of errors and that I have committed academic malfeasance.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) attracted more than passing interest in the pages of El Renacimiento in the Philippines and Bintang Hindia in the Dutch East Indies. Both publications featured pieces with editorializing tones that indulged in a significant degree of delight at the spectacle of Russian defeats and humiliations at the hands of the Japanese. This article engages in a close reading of this coverage to insert these instances of colonial schadenfreude into the broader trajectories of shaping communities of readers and nationalist awakenings in both colonies. Filipino nationalists in El Renacimiento dropped clear clues likening Russian aggression against Japan, an archipelagic Asian nation like the Philippines, to that which Filipinos experienced under the Americans, thus engaging in a symbolic displacement of that international event into their own historical present. Mocking Russians was part of a nationalist reading of the war that allowed for delight in the spectacle of White humiliation and the prospects of Japanese aid in anti-colonial struggle. The way the Russo-Japanese War was commented on by Bintang Hindia less than ten years before the ‘national awakening’ period was remarkably similar to the reporting in El Renacimiento. This isomorphism between two different historical contexts allows us to examine the role that mockery of Europeans played in forming a community of readers, nationalism, and the gradual undermining of the ideas of White supremacy on which colonialism was predicated.

Cai Yong 蔡邕 (132–192) was one of the most erudite scholars of the Eastern Han. A major project of his was the so-called “Stone Classics of the Xiping era” (Xiping Shijing 熹平石經) project first commissioned by Emperor Ling in 175 c.e., for which Cai Yong wrote the texts of the court-sanctioned Classics in his own calligraphy. For the text of one of these Classics, the Odes (Shi 詩), he is known to have used the so-called Lu 魯 version, which was the dominant interpretative line for the Odes classic in his time. However, the question of whether Cai Yong's literary writings also evince a preference for the Lu reading of the Odes has not yet received much scholarly consideration. In my study, the Qincao 琴操, a collection of anecdotes and song texts relating to pieces played to the accompaniment of the zither qin, a work that may also be assigned to Cai Yong but has also mostly been neglected so far, will be analyzed in relation to the Lu interpretive line, as will the “Qingyi fu” 青衣賦 (Rhapsody on a Grisette), one of Cai Yong's rhapsodies.

This article traces how the Yemeni-origin Sufi order of Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya and its ritual litany of al-Ḥaddād, with chants and prayers for the Prophet and his descendants especially from Hadramawt, became part of everyday Muslim devotional practices in Malabar through immigrant networks of Hadrami Sayyids. Competing, sometimes rivalling, and appropriating other Sufi religiosities, the Alawi order meaningfully involved within the theo-legal Sufi discourses that have been remoulding the Sufi cosmopolis in the Indian Ocean. By focusing on two notable early immigrant Sayyids in Malabar, this article argues that the successful placement of the ʿAlawī order within the Sufi cosmopolis and the permeation of the ritual was a complex socio-religious project that was brought forth by various aspects of the sacred genealogy, Alawi Sufi writings, Sufi activism, and the effective utilisation of Hadrami immigrant networks.

The incumbent-led subversion of democracy represents the most prevalent form of democratic backsliding in recent decades. A central puzzle in this mode of backsliding is why these incumbents enjoy popular support despite their actions against democracy. We address this puzzle using the case of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Although some Philippine analysts have speculated that his popularity was inflated due to social desirability bias (SDB) among survey respondents, there has been limited empirical examination. Our pre-registered list experiment surveys conducted in February/March 2021 detected SBD-induced overreporting at about 39 percentage points in face-to-face surveys and 28 percentage points in online surveys. We also found that the poor Mindanaoans, and those who believed their neighbors supported Duterte, were more likely to respond according to SDB. These possibly counter-intuitive results should be interpreted with caution because the survey was conducted during the height of the COVID-19 lockdown, and the findings cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the other period of his presidency. Nevertheless, this study suggests that preference falsification could be an alternative explanation for the puzzle of popular incumbents in democratic backsliding.

Theories about state-led Islamisation tend to attribute the phenomenon to domestic dynamics, such as political competition, institutional co-optation, and changing social norms. When exogenous factors are considered, they usually refer to imported ideologies. Moreover, Islamisation is often depicted as a firm rejection of the West. This article seeks to complicate those explanations. Using insights from the ontological security literature in International Relations, I argue that Malaysia's state-led Islamisation cannot be understood comprehensively without looking at macro-historical factors, particularly Malaysia's postcoloniality and its elites’ perception of the global order. Instead of being a manifestation of anti-West sentiments, I argue that the initial receptivity towards Islamisation by Malaysia's largely secular ethnonationalist elites constitutes a quest for recognition within an international order within which the Muslim identity is racialised and stigmatised. This is most obvious in Mahathir Mohamad's ideas on Islam, in that his calling for a developmentalist Islam has as its (imagined) respondent the stigmatising ‘West’. I argue that the forms of Islamisation undertaken during the Mahathir administration reflected this drive to catch up with the West while simultaneously securing recognition for Islam; and that such a leitmotif persisted even into the post-September 11, post-Barisan Nasional world.

Is political polarization in Indonesia here to stay? For years, scholarly consensus on partisanship in Indonesia viewed weak partisan identity, collusive party behavior, and the predominance of personality as features of a system that would prevent the emergence of deep polarization. In the wake of religious and ethnic mobilizations during three contentious elections, the question of whether polarization has come to Indonesia is increasingly salient. Where previous studies have focused on elite polarization, we focus on whether polarization has a mass base. Using an original, nationally representative survey of 1,520 Indonesian adults shortly before the 2019 election, we tested whether political preferences in Indonesia reflected any of four underlying sets of resentment—religious, anti-Chinese, anti-Java, or regional. We found links of varying strength between each of these resentments and political preferences. Analyzing the sources of resentments, we find evidence that different resentments may travel through different channels: religious resentment through organizational membership, anti-Chinese resentment through exposure to social media, regional resentment through awareness of regional resource disparities, and resentment of Java through having experienced the old politics of Java—Outer Islands conflict. These links between political affiliation and resentment suggest that polarization is here to stay, so long as politicians make use of real, underlying resentments.