Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation

Artūrs Logins

doi:10.1017/9781009076012

Normative Reasons

Between Reasoning and Explanation

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Cited by 13
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This Book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.

Fassio, Davide 2024. Are Reasons Answers to Questions?. Philosophia, Vol. 52, Issue. 4, p. 985.

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Schultz, Conner 2024. The deliberative constraint on reasons. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 19, Issue. 7,

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Schmidt, Eva 2024. Comment on Logins – On the Connection between Normative Explanatory Reasons and Normative Reasoning Reasons. Philosophia, Vol. 52, Issue. 4, p. 1015.

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Logins, Artūrs 2024. Précis of Artūrs Logins Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation. Philosophia, Vol. 52, Issue. 4, p. 979.

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Finlay, Stephen 2024. Why Reasons Are Explanations. Philosophia, Vol. 52, Issue. 4, p. 1001.

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Logins, Artūrs 2024. Inquiry and reasons. Synthese, Vol. 204, Issue. 2,

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Hapla, Martin 2024. Projekt konsekvencializace a hodnotová východiska lidských práv. Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi, Vol. 32, Issue. 3,

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Zhi-Xuan, Tan Carroll, Micah Franklin, Matija and Ashton, Hal 2024. Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment. Philosophical Studies,

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Schleifer McCormick, Miriam 2024. Comments on Artūrs Logins, Normative Reasons: Between Reasons and Explanation. Philosophia, Vol. 52, Issue. 4, p. 995.

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Logins, Artūrs 2024. Replies to Fassio, Schleifer McCormick, Finlay, and Schmidt. Philosophia, Vol. 52, Issue. 4, p. 1025.

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Asarnow, Samuel 2025. Reasons Last.

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Bringas Colmenarejo, Alejandra State, Laura and Comandé, Giovanni 2025. How should an explanation be? A mapping of technical and legal desiderata of explanations for machine learning models. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, p. 1.

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Guilielmo, Benoit and Logins, Artūrs 2025. Suspension as a mood. Philosophical Psychology, p. 1.

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Artūrs Logins, Universität Zürich

Publisher:: Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:: July 2022
Print publication year:: 2022
Online ISBN:: 9781009076012
DOI:: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076012
Creative Commons:: This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/creativelicenses

Subjects:: Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
Series:: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

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Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Artūrs Logins develops and defends a new theory: the Erotetic view of reasons, according to which normative reasons are appropriate answers to normative why questions (Why should I do this?). This theory draws on evidence of how why-questions work in informal logic, language and philosophy of science. The resulting view is able to avoid the problems of previous accounts, while retaining all of their attractive features, and it also suggests exciting directions for future research. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

‘Arturs Logins has written an insightful and important book on what many believe to be the central normative notion. Because of his pluralist approach to reasons, he offers us an account that captures the desirable features of leading theories of reasons and explains why these leading theories shouldn't be seen as competitors. This book should have a tremendous influence on philosophical discussions of normativity and of reasons. I cannot recommend it highly enough.‘

Clayton Littlejohn - King's College, London

‘Arturs Logins not only gives one of the most lucid presentations of the ever growing field of reasons and normativity, but also provides a challenging new account, which will become the focus of many discussions to come. His book is a great achievement.'

Pascal Engel - EHESS, Paris

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Normative Reasons

Between Reasoning and Explanation

This Book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.

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Contents

Normative Reasons
pp i-i

Cambridge Studies in Philosophy - Series page
pp ii-ii

Normative Reasons - Title page
pp iii-iii

Copyright page
pp iv-iv

Dedication
pp v-vi

Contents
pp vii-viii

Preface
pp ix-x

Introduction
pp 1-8

Chapter 1 - Stage Setting
pp 9-37

Chapter 2 - The Reasoning View
pp 38-82

Chapter 3 - The Explanation View
pp 83-136

Chapter 4 - The Evidence View
pp 137-159

Chapter 5 - New Proposal
pp 160-191

Chapter 6 - An Application of the Erotetic View
pp 192-227

References
pp 228-237

Index
pp 238-242

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Normative Reasons

Between Reasoning and Explanation

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