Provisions in consumer contracts that deprive consumers of recourse in the event of a product failure effectively cancel the insurance that the law would otherwise provide to consumers who are injured by sellers of consumer products. This redistributes wealth from the poorest consumers to richer consumers because richer consumers can afford to self-insure against the risk of product failure whereas poorer consumers cannot. It follows that consumer sovereigntist arguments that consumer indifference to consumer-unfriendly contract terms suggests that consumers prefer the lower prices that come with such terms are misleading here. The interests of rich and poor consumers diverge with respect to these contract terms and the fact that rich consumers may carry the day in the market does not imply the consumers as a group prefer these terms. Accordingly, the European approach to consumer law, which treats democratically elected governments regulating consumer contract terms as a more authentic reflection of popular will than the purchase decisions of consumers in markets, may be more appropriate when it comes to the regulation of consumer contracts.