In October 2021, under the pseudonym Bo Hmu Gyi, I wrote a short article for the ANU's New Mandala blog, examining some questionable casualty figures that had just been issued by the Kachin Independence Army. The publication by the shadow National Unity Government in September 2023 of some equally unlikely statistics prompted me to revisit that article and rehearse the same arguments to a new audience. In both cases, the watchword was caution.

Since the latest civil war in Myanmar began in 2021, elements of the opposition movement have been making increasingly bold claims about its battlefield successes and the problems facing the military regime. Some of these claims need to be treated very carefully.

There is no doubt that the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and its People's Defence Force (PDF), together with various other groups, have made considerable progress against the junta. Against the expectations of many observers, the armed resistance has become better organised, better trained and better equipped. It is now able to pose a real challenge to the junta's military forces (Tatmadaw) and police.

This has led to some remarkable claims. For example, in 2022 the NUG's acting president, Duwa Lashi La, announced that the regime had lost control of at least half the country. More recently, the NUG claimed (without presenting any evidence) that more than 15,000 military and police personnel had “defected” to the opposition side. This had reportedly undermined the morale of the security forces and left the junta gravely weakened.

Such claims have been welcomed by supporters of the opposition movement, who have predicted the imminent collapse of the military regime. Some claims have even been supported by professional observers. The Special Advisory Council on Myanmar, for example, stated last year that the opposition movement writ large, that is, including sympathetic ethnic armed organisations (EAO), now has the greatest claim to effective control of the country.