Kant repeatedly describes the moral theory and practice of the Stoics as “sublime,” indeed as eliciting “the most sublime sentiments that have ever existed.” This is often understood as an expression of approval, since what is sublime is said to arouse our admiration. I argue, however, that the description is not a generic expression of approval, but a specific description of Stoic moral theories and their peculiar appeal. For however much we admire the thoughts and actions Kant calls “sublime,” our attraction to them is always accompanied with repulsion. To be sure, attraction and repulsion both belong to Kant’s representation of moral duty, which elevates us as it humiliates our self-conceit. Its very name he calls “sublime.” Yet in the end, moral goodness is not so much sublime as beautiful. In coming to appreciate this, we may deepen our appreciation of Kant’s interpretation of the Stoics, and his distance from them.