Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Further abbreviations
- Part A
- 1 Jurisprudence, globalisation and the discipline of law: a new general jurisprudence
- 2 Analytical jurisprudence in a global context
- 3 Mapping law: Families, civilisations, cultures and traditions
- 4 Constructing conceptions of law: Beyond Hart, Tamanaha and Llewellyn
- 5 Normative jurisprudence, utilitarianism, and theories of justice
- 6 Human rights as moral, political and legal rights
- 7 Meeting the challenges to human rights: Griffin, Tasioulas and Sen
- 8 Empirical dimensions of law and justice
- Part B
- 14 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Constructing conceptions of law: Beyond Hart, Tamanaha and Llewellyn
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Further abbreviations
- Part A
- 1 Jurisprudence, globalisation and the discipline of law: a new general jurisprudence
- 2 Analytical jurisprudence in a global context
- 3 Mapping law: Families, civilisations, cultures and traditions
- 4 Constructing conceptions of law: Beyond Hart, Tamanaha and Llewellyn
- 5 Normative jurisprudence, utilitarianism, and theories of justice
- 6 Human rights as moral, political and legal rights
- 7 Meeting the challenges to human rights: Griffin, Tasioulas and Sen
- 8 Empirical dimensions of law and justice
- Part B
- 14 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Tamanaha on Hart
The Concept of Law
Hart's The Concept of Law is the standard starting-point for considering conceptions of law. According to Tamanaha:
‘Hart's core analysis has survived relatively unscathed following forty years of critique. With the notable exception of Ronald Dworkin's engagement, much of the discussion today consists of refinements and modifications of Hart's theory, rather than outright repudiations.
Hart's project was to advance and defend a general descriptive theory of law. Hart employed methods of conceptual elucidation that were derived from Bentham and modern analytical philosophy. These methods are still widely, but not universally, accepted today and they form the basis for the approach adopted in this chapter. Although he used some of the tools of analytical philosophy developed in the heyday of J. L. Austin, I do not accept that it is merely ‘a semantic theory’ or an exercise in ‘linguistic analysis’. It both elucidates basic concepts and uses them to describe common features of the form and structure of all state legal systems. It is presented and has been largely interpreted as a general analytical theory of law – a set of answers to some basic puzzlements about the nature of law in general. It makes few claims for being useful in guiding detailed research or in assisting judges or lawyers in dealing with practical problems and it has not been used much for such purposes.
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- General JurisprudenceUnderstanding Law from a Global Perspective, pp. 88 - 121Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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