

international development projects. There is, likewise, a great difference between an ingrown nation and one with a proper concern for domestic tranquility and the general welfare. Furthermore, a case can be made for saying that a nation which tries too hard to re-make the world in its own image has more characteristics of being ingrown than outgoing. Rather than "committing suicide for the sake of domestic good to come," a nation which separates foreign policy from domestic questions as completely as Ramsey advocates runs the danger even more of committing suicide for the sake of an illusory "national security" to come.

Fourth, Ramsey implies that much of the condemnation of current U.S. foreign policy is merely a tactic used by those whose real purpose is to solve domestic problems and who have been frustrated in that purpose. Anyone who knows the extent and depth of the anti-war sentiment in our country, and the inclusion in the anti-war ranks of countless foreign policy experts, many of whom have been intimately involved with Vietnam, knows that the current condemnation of U.S. foreign policy is based on the merits of the case and does not stem initially from frustration over domestic reforms. Likewise, lamentation over domestic policies is based initially on the merits of that case. Ramsey imputes a cause and effect relationship which is not valid. It is true that each group of critics tends to support the other and receives additional impetus from the convincing case made by the other. But this phenomenon is more logically seen as adding to the evidence that domestic and foreign needs or crises can never be considered independently rather than as supporting Ramsey's "post hoc ergo propter hoc" argument. A conviction of the waste on the one hand and a knowledge of the need on the other hand binds the foreign and domestic critics together. There can be "vital interests" involved in either domestic or foreign policy, and in the present case it is the conviction on the part of growing numbers that we have few if any vital interests in Vietnam, which compounds both the tragedy and the frustration.

Fifth, toward the end of his article Ramsey offers another of his dualistic, either-or choices (a function of his two-kingdoms theology?) by trying to force a choice between "flexible response" (moral) and "massive retaliation" (immoral). This is a false dichotomy and is not really an issue. The fact is, as made evident in the Urban Coalition's "counter-budget" and by many expert witnesses before the two Armed Services Committees, that the military budget can be cut substantially without loss to a "flexible response" capability. Why do we need 15 carriers? Why do we need over 3000 bases abroad? Why do we need the B-1 bomber when existing B-52's can be modified at a fraction of the cost to do the job better? Why MIRV? Why A.B.M.? Why a "Pentagon propaganda machine"? Why billions in waste and cost overruns? Why an 8-1 ratio of support troops to combat troops? Why the projected geometric growth in nuclear warheads? We are already "protected by the most immoral weapons" so why do we need more?

The issue is really one of trimming excessive layers of

flexible response, which we will always be tempted to use if it is available in abundance, in order that we might be able, in Ramsey's words "to cure pollution, to aid our decaying cities, etc." These are basic social health issues which I consider rather more important than Ramsey's "etc." seem to indicate he does. I would be willing to see some cuts in the number of carriers, reduction of some under-utilized military manpower, and closer scrutiny of defense contracts in order to pursue some of the conditional values which are basic for domestic health, heretical and neo-isolationist as that might appear. And this transfer of emphasis and funds can be done, though it is not a foregone conclusion. Such a transfer requires political will. The chances that such a re-balancing will occur between two sets of interrelated conditional values will be improved when men of the stature and esteem of Paul Ramsey become as concerned with real mistakes as they are with "category mistakes."

Allan M. Parrent

Dept. of International Affairs,
National Council of Churches

"PHILOSOPHERS & PUBLIC POLICY"

Philippi, W. Va.

Dear Sir: Kudos to Bernard Murchland and his "Philosophers and Public Policy" (*worldview*, April, 1971). I think an additional perspective is needed, however. This perspective concerns the use of the word "philosophy." Lewis Feuer's pronouncement of the death of Philosophy implies a particular view of the nature and task of Philosophy. And fortunately or unfortunately, the problem of its own nature and task is an issue within the discipline itself. And it would appear that Coroner Feuer's assessment is of one view of the nature and task of Philosophy. Whether positivistic philosophy's "withdrawal" constitutes a demise is in itself debatable. Whether this is the pre-occupation of most undergraduate and graduate programs in Philosophy needs to be checked for reliability. But the point is, this is only one way to view the nature and task of Philosophy.

But why must we philosophers be forced into this dichotomy? C.D. Broad (fair company, indeed) has suggested a place for both critical and "speculative" philosophy. The term "speculative" may need some demythologization, but the point is well made. There is a role for both. And don't crowd the boys in Analytical Philosophy. Recoiling from the obfuscation of Hegelian-like philosophical architectonics, they made an important discovery—language, the basic building block of any human enterprise needing critical study. Some of their theories may be disputed, and some may feel they have "withdrawn," but in point of fact, they're engaged in a vitally important area. Must Philosophy then wait until this analytical groundwork is finished? I think not, for the

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relationship between critical and "speculative" philosophy is dynamic-reciprocal.

Here at our own small undergraduate program in philosophy [at Alderson-Broadus College], we proceed on the following view of its nature and task: Philosophy is the identification of, and analysis of assumptions—these assumptions may involve one's personal frame of reference, or the corporate frames of reference of significant human enterprises such as education, science, history, politics, religion, public policy. Analysis includes "honing logical tools," study of terms, the nature of meaning, etc. to be sure.

Murchland appears to be defending this kind of inclusiveness within the discipline of Philosophy. It is a needed and important perspective.

Dan R. Unger

of political processes and the conditions requisite for humane political life. They know no firm criteria in terms of which to guide or judge foreign policy. They have in large degree given up the Biblical assumptions about the nature and condition of man and the political wisdom of the historic church (including "just war" doctrine) in favor of the optimistic, individualist, rationalist (and therefore anti-political) stance of modern secular culture.

The churches failed to build on the foundations of Christian realism laid by Reinhold Niebuhr and a few of his successors in theological ethics. Can they now lead the nation in appropriating a deep and decisive lesson from the Vietnam experience, and begin to reconstruct an authentically Christian understanding of and ethic for politics?

Harry R. Davis

MORE ON "THE CHURCH AS ACCOMPLICE"

Beloit, Wis.

Dear Sir: Gordon Zahn's indictment of "the church as accomplice" to "atrocities and war crimes" in Vietnam (*worldview*, March, 1971) strikes me as both overstating and understating the case.

On the *overstating* side, for example, "war crime" is a legal concept (though a dubious one) on which the church should not rely too heavily, at least until legal processes have run their course. The Calley verdict indicates that Mr. Zahn exaggerates the deficiencies of military courts. It is surely not as obvious as Mr. Zahn assumes that "atrocities" have been a pervasive pattern on the American side in the war, consequent on official policy. He does not take account of the complexities of applying the principles of noncombatant immunity to the conditions of insurgent warfare. He would have done better to base his case on our mass bombing strategy rather than on My Lai.

More importantly, Mr. Zahn *understates* the issue by focusing narrowly on the treatment of noncombatants. If we are to indict the churches for failure to function as prophetic keeper of the nation's conscience in relation to Vietnam, must we not frame the question more broadly, and analyze more deeply? Ought not the churches have been asking themselves and the nation, both before and during the fact, whether the war itself is a necessary and justified one—applying to the case *all* the "just war" criteria? Instead the churches, like the rest of the nation, at first tacitly accepted the war, and more lately have tended to condemn it on confused and essentially emotional grounds.

In deeper historical and theological perspective, the churches were in no position to think and act adequately about Vietnam because they have no basic ethic for politics. They possess little realistic insight into the nature



in the magazines . . .

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that presumably distinguish intellectuals—are usually in short supply in government bureaucracies. Yet these are the very qualities that (presumably) enable intellectuals to acquire and use specialized data. Thus the old argument that only government initiates can devise foreign policy because only they have access to the data on which it must be based—that argument is progressively weakened as the number and sophistication of private sources increase and government information is made available by law to students of public affairs. Curiously, it is often populist critics who invoke the elitist idea that intellectuals should defer to more knowledgeable bureaucrats."

PAMPHILUS