Model Describing the Effect of Employment of the United States Military in a Complex Emergency

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Abbreviations:
CE = complex emergency
IDP = internally displaced person
IGO = inter-governmental organization
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO = non-governmental organization
US = United States
USSR = Soviet Union

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Abstract

The end of the Cold War vastly altered the worldwide political landscape. With the loss of a main competitor, the United States (US) military has had to adapt its strategic, operational, and tactical doctrines to an ever-increasing variety of non-traditional missions, including humanitarian operations. Complex emergencies (CEs) are defined in this paper from a political and military perspective, various factors that contribute to their development are described, and issues resulting from the employment of US military forces are discussed. A model was developed to illustrate the course of a humanitarian emergency and the potential impact of a military response. The US intervention in Haiti, Northern Iraq, Kosovo, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda serve as examples.

A CE develops when there is civil conflict, loss of national governmental authority, a mass population movement, and massive economic failure, each leading to a general decline in food security. The military can alleviate a CE in four ways: (1) provide security for relief efforts; (2) enforce negotiated settlements; (3) provide security for non-combatants; and/or (4) employ logistical capabilities.

The model incorporates Norton and Miskel's taxonomy of identifying failing states and helps illustrate the factors that lead to a CE. The model can be used to determine if and when military intervention will have the greatest impact. The model demonstrates that early military intervention and mission assignment within the core competencies of the forces can reverse the course of a CE. Further study will be needed to verify the model.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War vastly altered the worldwide political landscape. With the loss of a main competitor, the United States (US) military has had to adapt to an ever-increasing variety of non-traditional missions, including humanitarian operations. In this paper, complex emergencies (CEs) are defined from the political and military perspective, various factors that contribute to their development are described, issues resulting from the employment of US military forces are discussed, and a model to illustrate the course of a complex emergency and the potential impact of a military response is proposed. United States interventions in Haiti (Operation Restore Democracy), Northern Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort), Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), Bosnia (Operation Deliberate Force), and Rwanda (Operation Support Hope) serve as examples.

Defining Humanitarian Emergencies

While political scientists dispute whether CEs are precursors to a failed state or define a failed state, there are common factors which are known to contribute to their development.[1,2] The loss of state authority is crucial to the development of a CE. According to Natsios, CEs have one or more of the following four characteristics: (1) civil conflict, which often is rooted in tra-

ditional, ethnic, tribal, or religious animosities; (2) loss of national governmental authority; (3) mass movements of populations either to avoid violence or to search for food; and/or (4) massive economic failure.[3] These factors lead to a general decline in food security. These characteristics were present, in varying degrees, in each of the previously mentioned operations.

A CE is very dynamic and any one of its contributing factors can shift the course of the emergency throughout its duration. In Haiti, following the coup in which democratically elected Jean-Bertand Aristide was overthrown, General Cedros completely controlled the military and no forces were capable of mounting military resistance, so there was little civil conflict. However, the mass exodus of Haitian refugees wanting to avoid brutal oppression is evidence that abject poverty and loss of a reliable food distribution system, which existed during Cedros's rule. In comparison, the famine that has gripped the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the last eight years has the potential to develop into a CE as it involves mass movements of populations, mostly towards China, massive economic decline, and food shortages.[4] At this time, however, there is no civil conflict, as the regime of Kim Jong-Il has maintained tight, national, military control over the population. If this were to change, the potential exists for the development of one of the greatest CEs of all time.

An examination of one contributing factor in isolation does not explain fully the effects of each on the course of a CE, as they all are linked inexorably and often are cumulative (Table 1). Each contributing factor will be discussed in the context of the previously cited examples in order to illustrate their relationships to one another.

I. Indicators of a failing state:
A. Living conditions of population
1. Poverty
2. Literacy
3. Morbidity and Mortality
B. Capacity of private sector economy to improve living conditions
1. Inflation rate
2. Emigration
3. Infrastructure
C. Capacity of the government to maintain or improve economic infrastructure
1. Ability of government to control borders
2. Maintain law and order
3. Willingness to act in response to situation
II. Factors which influence complex emergencies:
A. Civil conflict
B. Loss of national governmental authority
C. Mass movement of populations
D. Massive economic failure

Table 1—Indicators and factors associated with complex emergencies

Civil Conflict

Civil conflict is the nexus of many CEs, often resulting from religious and/or cultural differences. Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo serve as examples. Unlike conventional warfare, civil conflicts typically involve atrocities committed against the civilian population. In April 1994, the president of Rwanda attended peace talks held to stem the continuing bloodshed of civil war and was assassinated upon his return—an event that "triggered a crisis of a scale the world had rarely seen".[5] The civil unrest that followed resulted in one of the three known genocides of the 20th century, with one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus being massacred.[5]

Two million refugees fled Rwanda, and two million others were internally displaced.[6] This genocide was founded in tribal differences.

Victims of such atrocities often focus on revenge, and further escalate the violence.[3] This appetite for revenge makes a political settlement difficult. Victims often insist on a punitive component to any settlement. If this issue is not addressed, forces often are required under Chapter 7 of the United Nations (UN) Charter in order to enforce a peaceful settlement. Without this, the situation can degrade, resulting in a renewed crisis.

The Yugoslavian conflict, a conflict rooted in Muslim and anti-Muslim sentiment, greatly impacted the civilian population of the former Yugoslavia. In the early stages of the conflict, shelling killed 10,000 people and displaced 350,000. Later, an estimated 200,000 people were killed.[7]

These conflicts exemplify the vast impact large-scale killings and movement of citizens can have. A massive labor pool reduction, for example, can produce severe economic damage throughout a society. When labor pools are reduced, a state's ability to provide basic services falters, unemployment rises, and heads of households fail to provide for their families. Recruitment by local militias can reduce the workforce. Recruitment often plays to nationalistic, cultural, or religious sympathies at the heart of these conflicts. Recruits then will forsake their families to take up the "cause".[8]

Warring factions often lack adequate logistic capabilities, so they are forced to steal food from farmers. This type of "scorced earth" policy severely can damage local, agrarian-based economies in developing nations.

Loss of Viable Government

The end of the Cold War destabilized countries that comprised the former Soviet Union (USSR). Prior to the end of the Cold War, the USSR and the US supported many countries outside the USSR with economic and military aid. Upon the USSR's collapse, however, the Russian Federation neither had the motivation nor the resources to support these governments. Countries formally supported by the USSR often lacked the ability or desire to support themselves. Governments in these countries destabilized, and failed to provide basic services to their populations. In addition, conflicting factions forced many of these governments to direct resources intended for basic public services to maintaining civil order, as factions struggled to fill the power void left by the Russian Federation. This, in turn, further exacerbated the civil conflicts, particularly where there were movements to oust the current regime.

Prior to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, civil strife destroyed the country's entire agricultural system, including production, distribution, and major city markets. When the Ministry of Health's services were lost, for example, local herders could not get their herds certified as disease-free before taking them to market in Saudi Arabia. This forced them to sell at drastically lower prices in Yemen where the animals were quarantined for 60 days before being certified by the Yemeni Ministry of Health.

When Yugoslavia collapsed and the subsequent six republics formed, the fledgling governments could not agree on a constitution. This lack of agreement resulted in a government that was unable to provide basic services. The government failed to provide large cities with potable water or to protect water shipments delivered by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The scant resources that were available often were shunted to the military, leaving the civilian community without basic services. A UN peacekeeping mission could have kept the warring factions separate by enforcing a negotiated settlement (Chapter 6 mission) or having a settlement imposed upon them (Chapter 7 mission). Either mission, with the corresponding rules of engagement, would have allowed the NGOs and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) to provide services in a secure environment.

Massive Population Shifts

Population shifts by refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) are a hallmark of a developing CE. Many issues accompany these shifts. Public health concerns for the refugees and IDPs have a large impact on the population. The lack of a safe water supply and basic sanitation set the stage for the spread of diseases such as cholera and dysentery.

Populations will attempt to avoid the violence, which often results from ethnic, cultural, or religious conflicts. In Somalia, however, population shifts were not a major component of the emergency. Most people congregated in cities because that was where the food was located. In Rwanda, two million people were killed despite mass exodus of refugees hoping to avoid violence. Prior to Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, >100,000 people were displaced internally, mostly to avoid persecution and oppression by General Cedros and his military regime. This was followed by 60,000 refugees attempting to make the voyage to the US for political asylum in un-seaworthy vessels. The arrival of these weak and sick refugees, after being picked up by the US Coast Guard, had a staggering effect on the local health system in Florida.[9]

Economic Decline

The previously mentioned factors coalesce into massive economic decline. The economic implications are extremely complex and impact all aspects of the crisis. Civil strife and loss of infrastructure quickly can erode the country's economic viability.

Productivity, for example, declines when local militia recruitment or massive population shifts reduce the workforce. In addition, farming becomes impossible when civil war destroys arable land. This loss of productivity can exacerbate food shortages, which, in turn, increases civil strife and decreases government control, which then, increases population shifts. This course of events begins with chaos due to civil strife causing micro-economic collapse, often due to the loss of one's job or farmland. If this happens on a large enough scale, macro-economic collapse follows, due to the loss of middle class wealth. Massive unemployment and hyperinflation occurs, due, in particular, to the increase in the price of food. As the national economy collapses, there is a precipitous increase in the price of food, which then becomes a source of wealth and power, as was seen in Somalia.[10] Increasing hyperinflation devalues currency and the ability to pay workers a living wage decreases, worsening unemployment. This vicious cycle continues until the government or a negotiated settlement restores stability.

As the national economy collapses, a primitive black market economy often will develop. Following the collapse of the Somali government, for example, local warlords began to horde food and steal from the NGOs. "Food stocks become the bank accounts of merchants and warlords."[10] A very simplistic bartering system supplanted the collapsing economy as the traditional, currency-based banking system and economy collapsed. Food became the currency, with local power being determined by who possessed the most food.

Interestingly, interventions, such as sanctions, can precipitate or rapidly increase the pace of an economic collapse in an attempt to drive an illegitimate government from office. Often, the regime remains unaffected as it passes the consequences of the sanctions on to the citizens, who suffer food and water shortages and lose access to health care.

This worsens human conditions, escalates violence, and can hasten the development of a CE. In Haiti, for example, the US imposed economic sanctions in an attempt to restore democratically elected Jean-Bertand Aristide to power. Despite humanitarian aid being exempt from these sanctions, the economy collapsed, and hyperinflation, unemployment, violence, and the number of refugees attempting to flee the country increased.

As was mentioned previously, these factors should not be examined in isolation or linearly. As one factor increases, it can exacerbate one of the other factors and conditions worsen in a downward spiraling cycle. This may indicate that prevention or at least early intervention and stabilization of the situation is required to prevent a rapidly disintegrating situation.

Model

The model that follows should help illustrate the elements required for the development of a CE and may assist the decision-maker, whether an NGO representative or a military planner, in determining where along the continuum an intervention may have the greatest impact. It must be understood that geostrategic principles can have a large impact upon the development of the situation. If a government, such as the US, or an NGO, like the International Red Cross, cannot gain access to the area for political or security reasons, then determining when and where to have input is academic.

The location of an emergency and its geostrategic position will determine whether military forces will be deployed. This is illustrated by Operation Provide Comfort. The influx of Kurdish refugees into Turkey represented a political problem for the United States. In order to prevent destabilization of the Turkey-Iraq border, the US was forced to stem the flow of refugees into this already sensitive area. United States forces promoted the return of the Kurds to Northern Iraq and regional stability by providing basic services such as temporary housing, medical care, and food. Specific events call for the use of the military, as they can play important roles in humanitarian emergencies.

Description of the Model

The model expands on work initiated by Norton and Miskel for which they developed a taxonomy indicating failing or failed states.[11] This taxonomy can be used to examine three indicators of a nation's susceptibility to failure: (1) living conditions of the state's population; (2) capacity of the private sector economy to improve living conditions; and (3) capacity of the government to maintain or improve the economic infrastructure. Each of these three indicators is comprised of three components. *Living conditions* are assessed by: (1) poverty; (2) literacy; and (3) morbidity and mortality. *Private sector capacity* is determined by: (1) the inflation rate; (2) emigration; and (3) infrastructure. *Governmental capacity* is defined by: (1) the ability of the government to control its borders; (2) maintenance of law and order; and (3) its willingness to act in response to a situation (Table 1 and Figure 1).

Each of these indicators is assigned a color based on the current status of the country. Red represents a failing or failed state, yellow identifies a state that can go either way, while green shows no danger of failure.[12] The trend of each component also is considered. Improvements or indications of further decline are incorporated into the overall status. A color scheme can be devised once all of the indicators have been examined.

The vertical axis reflects the intensity of suffering that occurs over time. The situation worsens as the intensity of one or two of the above four factors increases. These factors often are self-perpetuating and require early intervention. Once a state has begun to fail, the factors that contribute to a CE will rise and the intensity of the suffering will increase. It is suggested by the model that intervention has the greatest impact before the state has failed.

The increase in the slope of the curve indicates an increase in the intensity of one or more factors, often driven by increased civil disorder. An upward-facing curve, which is leveling off, only represents a decrease in the rate of increase, and is not an indication of resolution. For example, this can be a result of militant groups achieving their objective, or could be due to refugees or IDPs reaching a refugee camp or safe haven. Health and food conditions rapidly decrease as this occurs, resulting in massive sickness and an increase in death rates (crude mortality rate).

The green area represents a marked increase in the factors responsible for the development of a CE. The red area indicates the area at which the suffering has been brought to the attention of the world community. There may have been some small-scale relief efforts by NGOs, but since they cannot solve the political problem, their efforts alone cannot resolve the crisis. At this time, the world media have become aware of the situation, which often leads to the mobilization of resources. The employment of US military forces occurs at this time only if there is a national security threat, or if it will further the US national security agenda.

The brown area indicates the arrival of forces and a concerted effort towards an integrated response, which includes unity of effort towards the resolution of the crisis. Cooperation among the military, NGOs, IGOs, host nation agencies, and other governmental agencies will determine how quickly the suffering will diminish. This is when the factors that contributed to the crisis must be resolved; otherwise, the suffering will continue.

The purple area indicates a return toward baseline due to stabilization of the situation as a result of increased security. This results in increased effectiveness of NGO efforts. At this time, military forces either are withdrawn or adopt a peacekeeping or peace enforcement role. The military only should serve as an instrument of power to enforce the political settlement. This is a crucial time, as the withdrawal of forces can lead to an increase in civil strife, resumption of economic shifts, and further loss of governmental control. It also represents the transition to NGO/IGO responsibility for providing humanitarian aid in cooperation with the host nation. The blue area represents the transition from the NGO/IGO to the host nation becoming responsible solely for providing the basic services and reversing the factors that led to the emergency. The situation should stabilize if the four factors that led to the CE, and their underlying causes, have been resolved either by a political settlement or an enforced agreement (Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3). Withdrawal of forces cannot occur until the root cause(s) of the crisis have been resolved. Operation Restore Hope demonstrates what happens when the underlying issues remain misunderstood and unresolved. Mechanisms must be in place to ensure that stability is maintained; otherwise, the situation will escalate again.

Role of the Military in Complex Emergencies

There are four core competencies of the US military in CEs: (1) providing security for relief efforts; (2) enforcing negotiated settlements; (3) providing security for noncombatants; and (4) employing logistical capabilities. Emergencies often occur in inhospitable regions and the military can deploy rapidly personnel and equipment in quantities no other organization can match. During Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, US forces were able to access the mountainous and hostile terrain rapidly where 500,000 Kurdish Iraqis were attempting to avoid conflict with the Iraqi Republican Guard. The NGOs cannot match the logistical reach that the US military possesses even though they may be able to access the remote areas (Figure 2).

Argument for Early Military Intervention

The model shows that the earlier hostilities cease, the faster social norms can be restored. The longer hostilities are pre-



Figure 1—Effects of the employment of the United States military on the course of a complex emergency (CE) (IGO = inter-governmental organization; NGO = non-governmental organization)



Figure 2—Operation Provide Comfort (IGO = inter-governmental organization; NGO = non-governmental organization; US = United States)

sent, especially if they are focused on one particular ethnic group, the greater the chance of retributive violence.

> The human appetite for revenge is insatiable—each atrocity, real or rumored, by one group is followed by other even more egregious, human rights abuses in retaliation for the original offense. The downward spiral accelerates, and the lives of the survivors are permanently scarred. The greater the scale and extent of atrocities which take place before the conflict ends, the more tenuous any political settlement will be.[3]

Early cessation of hostilities against non-combatants by the military must be the primary objective, as it not only stops the immediate crimes against humanity, but allows relief efforts by the NGOs to proceed. As the situation stabilizes, the full logistic and engineering capabilities of the military can be brought to bear upon the situation. Ensuring the rapid resumption of the criminal justice system is just one way of redressing the crimes against non-combatants. During United Nations Operations in Somalia-I in 1992, General Anthony Zinni, special envoy to Robert Oakley, the US Ambassador, quickly rebuilt a functioning police and judicial system to address the issue of crimes within Mogadishu. Former police officers and judges were able to return to work and provide legal services including legal representation and bail to their communities.

As was stated previously, civil violence can cause massive population shifts. Of the 36 CEs that occurred during the last 15 years, 85% involved civil strife, many of them

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

Figure 3—Operation Restore Hope (IGO = inter-governmental organization; NGO = non-governmental organization; UN = United Nations; US = United States)

resulting in a large number of refugees.[13] A major issue that must be addressed is public health in the development of refugee camps. These camps often are established in remote areas far from logistical infrastructure, and they often lack any type of sanitation or public health capacity. The plight of the Kurds in 1991, decimated by disease spread due to the lack of sanitary facilities, illustrates this point. In Rwanda, the camps presented two potential problems. First, the actual perpetrators of the genocide were able to blend in with the population and avoid prosecution for their crimes. Second, many of the refugees become so focused on retribution for crimes committed against them that the camps served as a "breeding ground for political extremism."[14] During the genocide in Rwanda, refugee camps were established in neighboring countries. Tensions with local residents arose once they realized that the refugees were getting better treatment than were the indigenous people.

> Such camps should be avoided if at all possible, and if they must be created, they should be designed for use over as short a time as is feasible. The principle must always be that people will return to their homes as soon as they can safely do so.[15]

If the military can be employed early in a conflict, these problems may be avoided. Large population movements can be avoided either by preventing civil strife altogether or by stopping it early. The cycle of civil strife, followed by the population shifts that lead to economic collapse can be broken by providing security to non-combatants.

One of the most difficult justifications for intervention by the military in CEs is the reluctance by national leaders to violate the sovereignty of a nation. It is much easier to justify this action when the media repeatedly display images of human suffering on the massive scale, as was seen in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The role of the military is not as clear in this particular aspect of CEs. The military can align its objectives with those of the international community to restore some level of functioning government and the basic services it provides, since these events do not occur in isolation. Military forces can enforce a negotiated peace settlement or a cease-fire agreement when civil strife is the cause of the loss of governmental control.

A long-term commitment is required to ensure stability. Once stability is achieved and the provision of services is restored, there must be a transition to a peacekeeping role, preferably by regional collective security agencies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the UN. This serves two advantages: (1) US troops can be returned to readiness to carry out their primary mission, the defense of the US; and (2) the potential negative political overtones of US involvement can be removed. Organizations with policies or viewpoints differing from those of the US may capitalize on US involvement. This may be in the form of political exploitation to further their agenda, or through direct conflict using asymmetric techniques such as terrorism. The earlier a humanitarian operation falls under the umbrella of collective security agreements, the quicker there will be a greater perception of legitimacy by the international community. Lastly, despite evidence to the contrary, there is the perception of a casualty-averse public, especially when it comes to non-traditional military missions. The sooner forces can be withdrawn, the less likely incidents that question US presence will occur.

Validation

A two-step validation process is needed. First, validation of the proposed model itself is needed to determine whether it is of value in studying and tracking CEs. Does the model accurately describe the course of a CE in a visually logical and simple manner? Can a government official, NGO

manager, or other planner utilize the model to monitor developing situations and accurately predict where resources may be needed for intervention? Can the model be used for teaching purposes, by providing a complete yet simple framework describing the interaction of a large number of factors? It seems likely that modifications will be needed as the validation process proceeds, and particular strengths and weakness are identified.

Second, once a refined model is validated, the impact of the military can be studied, such as examining the relative values of attempting to provide each of the four core competencies. Through either theoretical application (akin to "war games") or in tracking actual events, the model may be of value in studying the ability of a military force to address the four core competencies, and ultimately may allow military planners to determine just how much effect a military force can have on the course of a CE. Resources spent on one particular core competency may not be as effective as previously thought and, therefore, be reallocated. A new mission requirement also may be identified. In addition, the use of the model also may be helpful in mission analysis, a process military planners must perform prior to executing an operations plan. Finally, validation of the model may help convince skeptics within the military community that these core competencies are truly a necessary component of a military response and should be an integral part of the US military strategy.

Although finding CEs that have enough in common to allow for accurate comparisons may be difficult, data such as crude mortality rates, numbers of displaced persons and refugees, and numbers of refugee camps established during CEs appear to be readily available and reasonable measures of effectiveness so that a military response can be analyzed using the model. By holding as many factors as constant as possible (NGO/IGO response, host nation's capacity to provide relief, etc.), did military intervention impact the course of the CE and produce a quantifiable reduction in the chosen measures of effectiveness? If it is determined to have no impact, the model may offer insight as to why. If significant impact is identified, it then may be determined that a smaller number of forces can achieve the same result.

Although this paper has focused on the employment of US military forces, any force that possesses these core competencies is capable of performing the tasks. This may include the NATO or UN forces, or may be a yet to be considered role for the European Union's new Rapid Reaction Force. If employed early enough, with adequate forces and the rules of engagement to support their objectives, human suffering may be decreased.

Summary

The bipolarity of the world collapsed with the end of the Cold War. The US now is faced with being the sole superpower of the world, and often is viewed as the world's police force. Future instability around the world will increase as previously Soviet-supported nations descend into economic and political instability. Complex emergencies will be a direct result of this chaos. In an attempt to maintain order and stability in such regions, the US may be required to provide leadership, including military forces, in order to prevent further destabilization. This proposed model helps illustrate the chain of events that occur in the development and stabilization of a CE. Although limited in its role, the military with its core competencies, may impact the stabilization of such an incident, and the model will show where they can be most effective.

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Editorial Comments

Difficult Discussions: Military Intervention and United Nation Reform

The Theoretical Discussion entitled "Model Describing the Effect of Employment of the United States Military in a Complex Emergency" is welcome—not because of the model's accuracy, but for the author's recognition that the complexity and limitations of defining complex emergencies (CEs) are beyond the scope of this model and other models that have surfaced over the years. Unless, of course, your CE missions are chosen to compare and contrast, as was done to support this model. In its simplification, it does provide the reader with acknowledgement that students of CEs remain driven to provide order where there is none. The author does not acknowledge, until the last page, that he is including all military forces in this discussion, not just those of the United Sates (US). This is an opportunity lost, I believe, because the answers for military intervention will never fall to one country, or should it. The post-9/11 superpower status of the US is focused, not on the deprived and poverty stricken, but on asserting its

dominant role in international security by increasing attention to protracted crises and failed states considered bastions of terrorism. Hence, the sudden US interest in Sudan after many years of neglect. Nothing is said of Zimbabwe or northern Uganda where sociopathic despotism defines exactly the criteria that should lead to military intervention.

Political power translates into military power. Military intervention is always a political decision and what that translates into, on the ground, also is political. As such, it can be restrictive or overdone.[1] US military Task Force commanders uniformly report that there is a wide disconnection between what they are told to do and what they find they should be doing. Military humanitarian interventions, given their expertise and robust assets, have received a great deal of press lately. However, as Hansch testifies, during the highly visible airlift of food into Afghanistan in the winter of 2001–2002, the US military delivered only a tiny fraction of the amount of food that was being brought in through conventional operations by the World Food Program and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In fact, UN Agencies and NGOs have every bit and more capability to transport goods across countries and continents at a cheaper rate.[2]

The criteria referred to as core competencies of the US military: (1) providing security for relief efforts; (2) enforcing negotiated settlements; (3) providing security for noncombatants; and (4) employing logistical capabilities has not been realized to the fullest since the Kurdish emergency in Northern Iraq. At that time, all parties agreed that the military worked as an ally with the humanitarian organizations in the common purpose of security and humanitarian relief. In Somalia, the NGOs felt that the military made a positive difference, however, the military did not feel their mission was as successful as they had hoped, and began to find ways to increase both their sphere of influence and control, including getting into the aid business with community health and food programs.

The humanitarian community expects the military to provide protection, not humanitarian assistance. However, in situations in which the presence of humanitarian agencies is lacking or inadequate, or the security environment is prohibitive and preventing access, humanitarian assistance by armed forces is essential and obligated under international law to save lives and prevent "unacceptable human suffering".[3] Indeed, in Liberia, a mission not referred to in this published discussion, was very much unnoticed for the critical tipping point it illustrated. The 2003 war caused many deaths from violence, malnutrition, and a cholera epidemic. Many key NGOs, but not all, seeing that the contending factions in this war were holding hostage the entire population depriving it of food, health, and other necessities of life, were strongly critical of this international abandonment. They called for a military intervention by a multinational force. This action, both correct and successful, is considered one of the rare situations in which the humanitarian community can request armed intervention.

What has happened that we've strayed so far? We are competing, civilian versus military, and with each other, and avoiding or not noticing the obvious...when and why we must intervene in the sovereignty of a nation-state to protect the lives of its citizens? Is it that the former fight is nothing but avoidance so as not to address the uncomfortable realities of the latter? Politics, both here and there, is restrictive and unable to provide the protections MacMillan and other authors correctly claim are needed. If so, international intervention would have occurred in Zimbabwe long ago, and sociopathic despots like John Kony of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda would be long dead.

Yes, the opportunity lost here is that we should be openly talking and debating, not for more US military intervention, but UN intervention. The UN Charter, written in 1945, deals with cross-border wars. As a legal document, it totally fails to address internal conflicts and genocide. The UN reform currently being debated must rewrite the Charter to clearly address these current events. But, it also must implement UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 43 calling, once and for all, for a UN Standing Task Force with the capacity and will to deal appropriately with genocide and internal conflict. Without implementation, countries like the US will continue to triage where and when they will intervene, confusion will continue to reign, and populations and cultures, unnoticed, will be lost.

Several countries in 2000 recommended, as part of Charter revision and reform, a Collective Security Model that addresses circumstances in which the UN 'doctrine of non-interference' in a nation's internal affairs would be redefined in favor of international intervention.[4] These new 'criteria for involvement' would call for immediate intervention where large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, or where genocidal intent through deliberate nation action, nation neglect, or a nation's inability to prevent genocide would obligate intervention. Unless this type of reform is operationalized, and supported by the US, we will continue to rehash, debate, and publish these models and new ones. MacMillan should be applauded for launching this discussion. His legacy, however, will be for opening, once again, Pandora's Box.

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